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ABSTRACT
CONFRONTING OUR ENLIGHTENMENT APPREHENSIONS:
MORALLY INFORMED ACTION AND
OUR CAPACITY FOR PROGRESS IN AMERICA
February 2003
STEPHEN TERHUNE SMITH, B.A., BOSTON UNIVERSITY
L.L.B., BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey Leigh Sedgwick
For over three hundred years, we have increasingly been acculturated to the mod-
est moral expectations of our dominant public philosophy, liberal republicanism, and its
more affectionate subordinate, communitarianism. Neither captures the full reach of our
individual, social and political nature, although the designs based on the ontological as-
sumptions of each model, and the actors who support them, have grown to powerfully
constrain - and enervate - our social and political life. We are much more capable of
deeply understanding and broadly caring about life, and of acting on the strength of both,
than either account provides.
The above assertions are supported by historical and contemporary evidence of a
dynamic that has been at work in America since before the Founding. It begins with
morally informed core actors, nonconformists who are among the first to initiate major
social and political changes which ultimately become part of our institutional landscape.
Acting in venues of all sizes and locales, they demonstrate that significant, profound
change is possible. The form and qualities of their actions — reflecting a nature that is
vii
more robust in its capacity to know, to care, and to act that our public philosophies pro-
vide - ultimately convince many of us to support their reforms. Their demonstrative
persuasive successes on issues including abolition, civil rights, women’s emancipation,
worker protection, and much more suggest that their nature is not exceptional, and, ac-
cordingly, that it is time expand our prevailing accounts of who we are.
After first presenting an overview of the origins and development of liberal repub-
licanism and communitarianism in America, the nature of selected morally informed core
actors is derived from accounts of their background, context, and activism. These narra-
tives are presented in a conceptual framework of action, caring, and knowledge that is
that is informed by the actors’ demonstrated capacities. Two pairs of historical core ac-
tors - Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frederick Douglass from the pre-Civil War era, and
Jane Addams, and Eugene V. Debs from the Progressive era - are used to accomplish this
ultimately persuasive task, along with thirteen contemporary social and political activists
connected with the Pioneer Valley and Berkshires of Western Massachusetts.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
[I]t would seem that we have nowadays broken the natural link between
... acts and
beliefs; that harmony which has been observed throughout history between the feelings
and ideas of men seems to have been destroyed, and one might suppose that all laws of
moral analogy had been abolished.”
- Alexis de Tocqueville
1
common view of the world, based on values and conceptions, constitutes the essen-
tial unity between men who must necessarily see the world through different eyes.”
- Wilson Carey McWilliams 2
“Groups are formed for a great variety of reasons, but one of the chief reasons is
to advocate or act out ... a new conception of the highest good, a conception at
which the state does not aim, and perhaps cannot.”
— Michael Walzer
2
There has been a strong moral dynamic at work in the development of America.
To the extent that we have entered this century as a more equal, just, inclusive, and ar-
guably less hostile society than at our political beginnings, such uneven, contingent
progress has been constructed by and at the insistence of a form of human agency that is
rarely acknowledged and too rarely understood. At the very beginning and remaining at
the center of the process that drives virtually all profound changes in our social and po-
litical arrangements - those that require for their impetus something more than the
informing of prudent self-interest or the support of traditional community - is the mor-
ally aware core actor.
Conceiving and acting alone and in small groups, in venues of all sizes that are
often first opened by their acts, they place themselves in conventionally foolish, at times
risk-laden, public postures of nonconformity with existing practices. 4 These dominant
customs are ramparts defended by other concrete actors, powerfully wrapped in cloaks
1
of prevailing philosophical wisdom, practical morality, and traditional faith. Ultimately,
although perhaps only after several generations of connected effort, our social and po-
litical practices, corresponding wisdom and prevalent beliefs have changed at least
somewhat in conformity with the core moral actors’ views. Such results suggest that a
sufficient portion of us have been persuaded in some manner by the words and deeds of
eccentrics no longer with us, even as we isolate, attack, or ignore those now in our
midst.
Locating Common Ground
Our failure to acknowledge or even recognize the dynamic set in motion by core
moral actors is the product, in significant part, of two related, fundamental misappre-
hensions. First, we lack a sufficient common understanding of how morality - social,
political, and individual — is most strongly, fundamentally conceived and grounded
within us as individuals. Two frequently offered short answers to this “how” are the
“that depends” of relativism and the private truths of subjectivism. Such responses, par-
ticularly when considered alongside the largely enervated rhetoric of contemporary
American moral discourse, seem quite plausible. At the very least, they furnish sooth-
ingly logical, apparently pragmatic retreats from our contemporary inability to broadly
identify and publicly build upon common ground.
Among other variables in our moral formation, there is, to be sure, a wide range
of social and inner human variety in cognition, experience, and mental reflection, much
of it driven by modem complexity. However, while our undeniable individuality may
approach the logic of infinity in the post-modem gossamer worlds of subjectivity and
abstract or aesthetic possibility, the record of our demonstrated collective accomplish-
2
merits at the insistence of morally informed actors, in the American experience at least,
suggests that differences of fundamental substance are few and manageable.
Yet, our variety should be acknowledged to the extent that it reflects an authen-
tic disclosure of self. As such, it constitutes a necessary part of the moral dynamic - the
above-noted ability of these actors, acting in imperfect concert, to draw enough of us in
their direction to have a chance at practical social or political success. It takes a range
of voices to reach and enlist a critical mass within the broad audience that is America.
Each voice, whatever its accent, requires for its moral vitality - its inner-
grounding as well as its social and political energy - some elemental, affirming connec-
tion, awareness, or reflective understanding from repeated encounter or unmediated
relationship with life itself. To act persuasively against the comfort of conformity and
the pressures of convention requires no less. These recurring glimpses at fundamental
truth inform, inspire, orient, and drive core actors across the broad spectrum of human
achievement that is broadly seen as uplifting, enhancing, constituting the fundamental
meaning of life. By their reactions to events and interactions with others in each genera-
tion, they furnish us with the fundamental parameters of justice and expanding content
of the good as part of the inclusive, life-reverent world-view that they demonstrate and
inspire .
5
The combination of vital personality, and the passionate, active, demonstrative
quality of their knowledge of the just, the unjust, and the good, stimulates in these core
actors a pheromone-like attraction that draws at least a few of us into close, caring,
common goal-seeking relationships with them. Others, due to the constraints of space,
time, and human capacity, must be content with more imaginative, but still warm rela-
3
tionships of inspiration, common goals, and mutual support. As McWilliams somewhat
suggests, these products of life awareness and encounter constitute the organic heart and
mind bonds of fraternal and sororal association that sustain virtually all moral endeav-
ors .
6
The inevitable variety in expressions of insight and awareness from these indi-
viduals mandates our return to the matter of surface confusion due to human diversity.
Some core actors openly discuss their moral grounding, or at least the feelings and en-
ergy stimulated by their encounters with life. They do so, however, in ways that suggest
a number of broad avenues, each leading to a common central locale. In their typically
occasional roles as moral philosophers, the outline of these avenues is suggested. Han-
nah Arendt, for example, describes the key insight of existentialism: our inability to
know Being, except in the course of a life engaged with the world and with others.
Even then, “[It] can be experienced only as something ‘all-encompassing ’.”7 According
to Jerome Kohn, Arendt described her reactions to such experiences as
“‘philosophic shock’ - the sheer wonder at existence, which is to be sharply distin-
guished from mere curiosity .” 8 For theoretical physicist, Stephen Hawking, it is an
accrued sense of underlying order, acquired by reflection on all manner of observations
of the cosmos, which led him to posit a unified theory of the universe. He explains his
openly acknowledged, non-instrumental quest as part of a common profound curiosity:
“[E]ver since the beginning of history, people have not been content to see events as un-
connected and inexplicable. They have craved an understanding of the underlying order
in the world.”
9
Jewish theologian and philosopher Martin Buber described brief, unme-
diated encounters with others and with the natural world that each offer a fleeting,
4
encompassing awareness of a fundamental relationship between the observer and the
observed
.
10
Finally, on the evening before his assassination, Martin Luther King, Jr.
eloquently summarized his innumerable encounters with life as part of his spiritual jour-
ney “to the mountain[top]. And I’ve looked over. And I’ve seen the promised land.” As
King made clear, however, this land was located in the concrete world of America, the
place where he then stood and acted on the strength of a life-informed moral vision. “I
may not get there with you,” he continued, “[b]ut I want you to know tonight that we, as
a people will get to the promised land .” 11
The most common form of profound life-awareness and resulting vitality ap-
pears to come quietly, imperceptibly, cognitively, in the framework of ordinary life.
The ‘bush’, we have long known, bursts forth into flame only for some. For the rest of
us, it briefly flickers or glows, often in one’s own back yard. Such awareness stems
from the early, gradual, daily routine encounters with familiar others in authentic, caring
relationships with oneself, as well as in observed like relationships among others and
with life more broadly. Thus nurtured, one is equipped to act and to react, to the extent
of one’s other competencies, for justice and against injustice, even to stand at times
alone, armed only with a renewable supply of vital insight and strength . 12
The above expressions of fundamental insight suggest an understanding - some
elemental knowledge which informs a basic orientation to life - that is powerfully dis-
tinct from one that is informed by individual self-awareness leading to a life premised
on mortal insecurity or fear or to one that is premised upon fundamental social depend-
ence. Yet, it is these latter perspectives which are said to substantially inform the moral
conceptions and the individual and social nature of the enlightenment actor from his
5
discovery on English soil to his fullest fruition in America. Neither of our prevailing
public philosophies - liberal republicanism and communitarianism - nor their support-
ing religious traditions, afford any significant historical weight to the to the core moral
actors described thus far. It is as though they either do not exist, or are so exceptional
that they do not much matter.
Partial Enlightenment
The second, related misapprehension is suggested by the very attraction that core
moral activists can sometimes stimulate in us: that we fail in all but extraordinary times
to detect the potential reach of our own moral capacity, to see its full contours dis-
played, our most profound aspirations expressed in our typically private resonance with
the words and behaviors of these exemplars. Informed by what so pervasively sur-
rounds and enfeebles us, they appear as exceptional in their freedom - so wanton in
their apparent detachment from mortal anxiety that they stimulate in us both admiration
and resentment.
This is not at all surprising. For over three hundred years we have become in-
creasingly attuned to the modest moral expectations of both liberal republicanism and
communitarianism. Moreover, we have become so in a society whose laws, ethics, in-
stitutions, and major operating systems are so thoroughly constructed upon the former
paradigm and its dispassionate methodology, enlightenment rationalism, that they
stimulate in many a mythic nostalgia for traditional versions of the latter. In the process,
we have increasingly lost sight of our ability to discover, develop, and affirm our richer
potential moral selves, and, as one consequence, of our intrinsic connection to each
other and to the world.
6
It is exactly as though we have escaped the grasp of pre-modem social, political
and economic obligations dictated by arbitrary force, tradition, and otherworldly doc-
trines of faith, only to step into a world where rational design, professional expertise,
and rational management — each lightly tethered by like-derived moral principles of tol-
eration and obligation - are the highest capacities we can bring to bear on the otherwise
pluralistic excesses of our enlightenment freedom
.
14
Occasionally, we sense that our
twin philosophies - our secular faiths as practiced in daily life - have failed to capture
the essence and dynamic potential of who the core moral actor demonstrates we, at least
potentially, are.
The consequences of this lack of robust self-understanding are mounting. As
Michael Oakeshott trenchantly observed, “...what we ought to do is unavoidably con-
nected with what in fact we are; and what we are is (in this connection) what we believe
ourselves to be .”
14 We need to redetermine “what we are” so that we can reformulate
our obligations and arm them with the motive strength that emanates from belief in a
self that is more than economically stalwart and more than instrumentally connected to
the world and to those with whom we are not intimately attached within it. We need to
move ourselves beyond the sterile soil of informed self-interest, prudence, and rational
necessity that support modem liberal republicanism, and the comfortable conformity
and shallow-rooted affection that constitute contemporary communitarianism. Properly
understood, core moral actors demonstrate that such movement is possible.
To the extent that the morally informed core actor is not captured by either of
our public philosophies, and must now work increasingly undetected in the stultifying
outwash of our corporatized, systematized, behavioral republic, we lose precious oppor-
7
tunites to identify them as both ordinary and extraordinary exemplars in our midst. As
with each preceding generation, we need to identify and acquaint ourselves with these
people in order to discover or, more hopefully, confirm our private intimations of the
above-sketched powerful, shareable moral grounding that stimulates and awakens ca-
pacities that we each possess. From their words and deeds - their expressed and
demonstrated world-views and self-understandings - we are able to learn why and how
they variously trouble our consciences, even as they educate, inspire, and draw us in
their direction. They inform us that the key lesson of modernity - that we are agents,
co-creators in unavoidable evolution - need not be seen or accepted as a process without
an assigned moral content, or as one that is controlled by others or by no one at all . 15
Core Moral Actors; A Further Introduction
When seen through the combined insight of history and our own life-informed
imaginations, a small number of actors emerge as the initiators and sustainers - as the
critical agents of morally driven change. They are the first to publicly label some prac-
tice immoral or unjust, or to otherwise call for fundamental change, whether by written
and oral rhetoric or by more demonstrative acts of protest, alternative possibility, and
direct challenge. Acting alone and in small fraternal and sororal groups, in venues that
now range from local to global, their actions and interactions also serve more simply as
evidence of an actual alternative, of a better way to live. In doing so they offer us an
enhanced, more comprehensive definition of our personal selves, of ourselves in relation
to each other and to life itself.
Abolition, expanded citizenship, civil, and workplace rights for African Ameri-
cans, women, children and others are a few of the more noteworthy products of their
8
myriad initiatives where some plateau of accomplishment can be discerned in our law
and culture. Other projects that target broader, more persistent forms of injustice
- pov-
erty, war, and other forms of powerfully endorsed, socially supported violence directed
at people, other life, or the planet - continue as endeavors, the life work of at least a few
in each generation.
Taken together and over time, the above efforts suggest the presence of five
moral perspectives - beliefs shared by core moral actors that stand at variance not only
with the conventional vantage points of their respective eras, but also with others acting
under claims of injustice and moral reform. The first is a world-view of greater inclu-
sion and expanded democratic participation, each informed by a primary perspective of
common humanity. The second is a reverence or respect for life that is most notably in-
herent in the self-assumed risks of public, nonviolent non-conformity. Often, it extends
to virtually all life forms, connecting human life with nature and the cosmos, but not at
all in ways that deny the inevitable, powerful role of human agency in either realm. The
third is a palpable, seemingly reflexive sense of offense, hurt, even anger or outrage,
when confronted with injustice - some painful incongruity between the humanly
achievable and the actual. Characteristically, these passions are directed more at the
offense, or at the institutions and systems that reinforce and legitimate the wrong, rather
than at the offenders.
16
The fourth is a persistent, durable optimism, reflected in part by
an informed predisposition to friendship and other forms of caring relationship that in-
clude and extend far beyond the local warmth of fraternity, sorority, community, and the
particularity of loved ones and kin.
9
As will be demonstrated, this hopefulness does not indicate a naivete when it
comes to a practical assessment of our ability to take part in or condone massive injus-
tice; rather, it reveals a frank personal and social appraisal of our universal capacity for
good and evil, coupled with a strong belief that most of us share an inherent preference
for the former, and have the ability to discern the difference.
Finally, there is a sense of obligation, of duty to act that extends beyond any co-
herent definition of self-interest, attachment to community, or rationally grounded
volition. Its motive force is the profound valuing of life as encountered, imagined, and
reflected upon by the self.
A common set of perspectives, to the extent that they inform action of the type
suggested above, is evidence of a powerful combination of extant human capacity, in-
formed by elemental knowledge, facilitated by nurture, experience, and education, and
expanded by imagination and reflection. As suggested, it is the core actors’ varied, re-
callable, and recurring detection of some profound truth about life - which is accepted
as such - that informs them. They have each discovered something that we have been
encouraged to avoid looking for or taught not to recognize as substance: a morally in-
forming awareness - some profound glimpse at or encounter with what is and what is
therefore congruent and possible. As a result, they have exercised and reinforced by re-
peated action, a capacity for morally-informed action that both liberal republicanism and
communitarianism, in all of their mainstream permutations, have either failed to detect
or seriously entertain.
At this point, a brief introduction to a few of the contemporary core actors relied
upon in this project is in order. Jean Grossholtz, a gifted academic and one of those in-
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terviewed for this project, has acquired her insights in wide reach of experiences over a
lifetime of extensive, often civilly disobedient peace and social justice activism that has
its informative origins in her hardscrabble childhood during the Great Depression.
As a young child growing up in a large rural family, she was tutored and other-
wise equipped to see the common humanity of other, even poorer families driving and
walking through town “with their full possessions “on their back[s].” Her father would
often bring them home for a meal or a short stay. There was one family she vividly re-
called: I remember my father saying, ‘you have to give these kids your socks’ ... and
we didn t have any socks either. I mean, our socks had holes in them, but we gave them
just the same.”
Jean also has a broader sense of life congruence that it is perhaps most deeply
derived from her habitual, daily encounters with nature:
“[I] walk in the woods every day with my dog. And I see. . .the way nature is,
you know? I see foxes out there, these beautiful foxes, and they live there in
some kind of respectful way with nature. They put up with us coming into their
space, and it just seems to me that it’s natural for people to live in harmony.”
For some core actors, part of their awareness of profound truth is negative.
Another of the interviewees, Ira H., attributes much of the motive-strength for his exten-
sive anti-war, anti-nuclear, pro-disarmament activism, to his coming of age in America
in the 1950s and 1960s as the son of a holocaust survivor. His father imparted to him
“...a tremendous sense, not just of the barbarism of the Nazis, but of the [complicity of]
good Germans.” His activism, which started when he was a freshman at Harvard during
the Vietnam War,
“...was not [motivated by] a fear of the draft .... [I]t was a fear of being a good
German. What was happening in Vietnam was palpably wrong. My government
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was doing it, and if I did not do everything I possibly could to stop this evil, I
was no better than the Germans who allowed the Nazis to carry out the final so-
lution.”
As he reflected back on his twenty-two years of extensive nuclear disarmament
work with Physicians for Social Responsibility, a group he helped re-vitalize in 1978
together with noted activist Dr. Helen Caldicott and a few others, he identifies the sim-
ple belief that further informs his above fear. “[F]or me the notion that human life is
good is a core value. It is the core value . That’ s what this is all about.” 17
Core actors come in a typical cross-section of American variety. There is, for
example, Lucille, a frail white Grandmother from Arkansas, interviewed by political
psychologist Kristen Renwick Monroe around 1990. 18 Monroe recounts that “[t]he idea
of defending others, fighting against injustice, taking personal responsibility for others,
and loving all humanity ran like leitmotifs throughout Lucille’s narrative.”
Beginning with the story of her most recent, heroic intervention, the physical
rescue of a neighborhood, African American, teenage girl she only barely knew from a
vicious male rapist, Monroe describes Lucille’s history of civil rights activism dating
from her Arkansas childhood. She credits her world-view largely to her Grandmother,
herself a life-long, somewhat well known suffrage and temperance activist. “[She] al-
ways told us that we were not allowed to destroy anything in nature unless it was
harming something else .... Grandmother taught me that everything is dependent on
everything else...”
19
One of Lucille’s earliest memories of direct action occurred as a child in the late
1930s or early 1940s, while travelling on a streetcar in the city of Little Rock with her
Grandmother. On that occasion, she intervened on behalf of a younger black child who
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was being harassed by the white conductor. During the 1950s, when Little Rock was
the locus of some of the most nationally visible resistance to integration, Lucille
marched and protested for civil rights for black Americans while running a repertory
theater with an integrated cast.20 In doing so, she ignored warnings from Governor Fau-
bus, the Ku Klux Klan, and the local White Citizen s Council, as well as episodes of
violence and numerous threats. The theater was closed only after she was ousted as di-
rector by the non-profit's board of directors who had also been subjected to warnings
and threats. 21
Lucille’s most recent act of individual heroism is easy to relate to and admire.
David and Goliath tales readily inspire us under conditions where we need not confront
the possibility of some Goliath within us, or the humiliation of standing by while he ei-
ther prevails or is exposed by someone like Lucille as a coward. Space and time serve a
similar function, allowing the majority of us, for example, to dismiss any obvious per-
sonal connection to the racial cowardice and bigotry that characterized the South - and
the North - during the era of Rosa Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. - and Lucille.
Contemporary core moral actors do not afford us that luxury.
Given the nature of her work, it is unlikely, yet entirely possible, that the name
and story of Kathy Kelly, another of the persons interviewed for this project, will one
day join Lucille and Lucille’s better known counterparts in the American civil rights
movement as moral icons and sources of broad or local inspiration. Few would argue
that she is a core moral activist. To those familiar with the life of Dorothy Day and the
Catholic Worker Movement, it is apparent that Kelly has been strongly influenced by
both.
22 She acknowledges having been inspired and mentored by many from within that
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lineage, including her former husband and ongoing colleague. He, in turn, was a pro-
tege of Day and A. J. Muste, one of the elder statesmen of American peace, labor and
social justice activism in the twentieth century.23
Consistent with her education as a teacher and lay theologian, Kelly describes
her vocation since 1978, using Day’s words, as an effort to “create a world wherein it is
easier to be good.”24 Her methods, which she describes in Gandhi’s words as “the fur-
ther invention of nonviolence,” have been anything but conventional, passive, or
popular. ~ In addition to her work with the poor in Chicago, in the early and mid 1990s
she took part in several “peace teams” - groups of nonviolent protestors - who placed
themselves in open encampments, between opposing forces, both at the outset of the
Persian Gulf Conflict and also during the siege of ethnic violence in Sarajevo, in the
former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Since 1996, Kathy has made several trips to Iraq with members of her aptly
named group, Voices in the Wilderness. The trips, which openly challenged official
U.S. policy of broad economic sanctions, including basic food and medicine, were un-
dertaken for two purposes: first, to gather public health and other data on food scarcity
and living conditions; second, to distribute donated medical supplies and other life ne-
cessities to Iraqi citizens who have suffered and died under the combined effects of
American-led Western and Iraqi official intransigence. Between visits, she and her col-
leagues travel in this country, speaking to small groups and larger audiences wherever
possible. They do so in order to raise funds, broaden awareness, and build support for a
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change in what is increasingly seen as a morally bankrupt American policy."
14
In common with almost all of the historical and contemporary actors researched
or interviewed for this undertaking, Kathy Kelly conveys a profound optimism in her
assessment of human nature. She views humankind - locally and broadly - with
warmth and a predisposition to friendship. In fact, it is this world-view - a composite
product of cognition based on life encounter, formal knowledge, reflection, and fellow
feeling - which appears to inform and sustain her seemingly quixotic quest for justice.
Each of us, she believes, possesses the capacity for good and evil, with an inherent pref-
erence for the former. Like Ira H. and Jean Grossholtz, however, she readily recognizes
the relative purity of evil in major actors like Sadam Hussein, although she and they are
concerned with our tendency to personify evil in others and thereby avoid implicating
ourselves. Finally, it is Kathy’s encompassing, integrative world-view and her affec-
tionate, interconnected assessment of humankind within it, that each help to explain
why she still sees the possibility of moral political change through human agency, some
twenty-two years after her conversion into activism.
It is certainly possible to quarrel on a number of levels with the moral under-
standing, goals, and strategies of contemporary activists like Kathy Kelly. The last of
these certainly locates her at the outermost periphery of the culturally and politically ac-
ceptable in our society. She and her colleagues have initiated, for our generation, moral
claims in ways which are radical and discomfiting to many, if not most of us, yet they
are not at all unlike those asserted by Lucille and her activist cohort in the American
South years earlier. They bear an even stronger resemblance to those pursued by aboli-
tionist and women’s rights advocates such as Frederick Douglass and Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, two of the historical core actors who will be discussed herein at some length,
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and by others during the antebellum era of slavery and chattel womanhood. With the
persuasive means available in their generation, each has strived to accomplish the most
difficult moral task: to call to our attention some profound wrong in our midst, a wrong
in which we are at least thereafter implicated if we do nothing to end it.
Moral Achievement in the American Setting
Many, perhaps most, of the specific projects - individual and small group “ven-
tures into the public realm — that are begun by the core actors in our midst are failures
from the vantage points of empirical verifiability or of unrealistic expectations
.
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Yet it
is their undertakings and the achievements that sometimes follow which ultimately con-
stitute the most profoundly unifying sense of moral direction or coherence in our
history. This record of accomplishment affords the only external evidence of our ulti-
mately congruent reactions to their efforts. They should be seen, in effect, as having
continued to build upon the enhanced, broadened, often unforeseen possibilities for in-
dividual and small group moral challenges to the social, economic, and political status
quo that the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and our Founding each partially repre-
sented in their respective times and settings . 29
Confluence leading to change on the scale suggested, and one’s place in its out-
ward rippling wave of initiation and reaction are contingent events. At the outer edges
of morally driven change, America is adequately supplied with tolerators, soft sympa-
thizers, and with those who are inclined to acquiesce in a wide array of outcomes.
Private philanthropic supporters - political, social, and economic, elite and non-elite -
can also usually be found. Core actors and those prepared to actively, publicly support
their work at its earliest stages are, however, in chronic short supply.
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Our public philosophies are not full-bodied actors to be held solely responsible
for our current, morally enervated social and political state. To the extent, however, that
ideas serve as interpreters of experience and are accepted as received wisdom, they are
historically potent. As suggested, there are ample reasons to be grateful to both tradi-
tions for the platform and framework that their adherents have each helped construct
and support by the somewhat oppositional tension of their debate. Surely, republican
logic and structure have enhanced our supply of liberal tolerance. Likewise, republican
virtue, as understood, practiced, and transmitted by both traditional and newer social
and political elites, has been instrumental in forming our various responses to external
threats and internal crises by broadening self-interest and by softening its harsh impacts
with philanthropy .
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Moreover, locally democratic communities and religious institu-
tions have furnished significant support for core moral activism - as well as fierce
opposition. The fact remains, however, that their largely shared fundamental misunder-
standing of who we are can no longer be ignored.
The practical problem with both philosophies is the justification that they afford
to those in each generation who are powerfully, actively opposed to morally driven
change. Liberal republicanism has shielded the pursuit of private interest and substan-
tially preserved its fruit by equating both with immutable human nature and,
consequently, as a moral necessities. It has further afforded shelter to the increasing
number who regard unlimited private gain as a high order good. Progress beyond de
jure political equality and our limited instantiation of democratic process have been sub-
ordinated to the unequal distribution of power that is the predictable progeny of its
flawed ontological beliefs.
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Communitarianism has more subtly legitimized the same outcome in our society
by adopting a substantially similar view of human nature and interposing social rather
than political institutions or law as the supreme creator, preserver, and inculcator of mo-
rality. Neither has been grounded deeply or broadly enough to support the promise once
offered within their respective, largely complementary edifices of civil society and the
state.
Rationalism and Moral Capacity
If we are to enjoy a politics that supports our engagement in the quintessential^
human, interdependent process of self and world discovery, we must not only rebuild
the ontological foundation of our complementary public philosophies, we also must ex-
pand our selection of epistemological tools rather than accept the limits of those now
employed. Both liberal republicanism and communitarianism have relied from the out-
set on rational methodologies to determine who we are and what we are capable of
achieving individually, socially, and politically. Like-derived understandings of our so-
cial and political structures, and their more recent transmogrification into systems, have
contributed to their over-reification as prime determinants of both the content of moral-
ity and the possibility of morally-motivated change. This agency stultifying
,
meta-
structural backdrop is unfortunately well illustrated by contemporary moral critics and
prophets - academics, policy experts, and other influential members of our two philoso-
phical camps. Over the past decade and more, they have focused the debate on the
relative importance of civic versus political and local versus national institutions to re-
store the moral health of America . 31 Individual, social, and political moral decline.
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anomie, and angst are variously depicted as the product of anemic, overweening, cor-
rupt, or disappearing institutions, public and private.
The cures consist largely of policy formulas, with the enfeebled heart of the de-
bate focused on public versus private implementation. Some call for the restoration of
local institutional wetlands where civic trust and good citizenship can grow. Others
seek the reinvigoration or moral order via new prohibitions and enhanced penalties - or
tax incentives. Robert D. Putnam offers something of a liberal-communitarian synthesis
of these approaches in a recent book expansion of his “Bowling Alone” thesis:
[S]ocial capitalists need to avoid false debates. One such debate is ‘top-down
versus bottom-up.' The roles of national and local institutions need to be com-
plementary
. . . Another false debate is whether government is the problem or the
solution
... [I]t can be both . 32
Although he urges upon us the necessity of human agency, the call comes with implic-
itly modest expectations, at the very end:
“The final false debate to be avoided is whether what is needed to restore
trust and community bonds in America is individual change or institu-
tional change. Again the honest answer is ‘Both.’ America’s major civic
institutions, both public and private, are somewhat antiquated ...and they
need to be reformed in ways that invite more active participation.... In
the end . . . institutional reform will not work - indeed, it will not happen
- unless you and I, along with our fellow citizens, resolve to become re-
connected with our friends and neighbors. Henry Ward Beecher’s advice a cen-
tury ago ... to ‘multiply picnics’ is not entirely ridiculous today.”33
The effective reforming power of individual and small group human moral
agency is seen, from our enlightenment-derived, social science-informed perspective, as
limited to those with high intellectual rational capacity, who hold to key positions in ex-
isting institutions or have access to those that do. To these requisites some would add,
with implicitly modest expectations, character or virtue grounded by either high-secular
institutional imparted learning, or traditional religious belief .
34
The rest of America is
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left in the bovine pasture of pluralistic passivity - dependent on associational empow-
erment and mass market information, targeted and counted in one or more sub-groups of
an otherwise atomistic herd. Thanks, however, to ample material and other sensory
satisfactions that constitute our up to deathbed pursuit, we are now less subject to
manipulation by those who lack modest enlightenment virtue and seek to stir radical
emotive fevers. This group image, this national portrait, is emblematic of our impover-
ished self and world understanding.
The foregoing is only suggestive — the tip of our contemporary iceberg - of our
dilemma of rational over-reliance. America’s political development - if it is to be un-
derstood within a shared profoundly moral perspective - must include significantly
more than structures, forces, mass movements, conventional elite leadership, and other
exclusively rationally-conceived notions of change. We are not able, by empirical ob-
servation, behavioral experiment, life-detached theory, or other exclusively rational-
intellectual means, to understand our actual and potential selves, let alone affirmatively,
boldly order our life together. It is this impossibility which lies at the center of our twin
philosophical dilemma.
Our rational faculty constitutes only a portion of our extant and developable ca-
pacity to discern the shape, order, content, and potential meaning - the moral content -
of the world around us and ourselves within it. Reason and its product, intellectual
knowledge, require the essential complement of demonstrated belief, itself the product
of cognitive, intuitive, and rational awareness, reflection, imagination, and insight that
lead to moral knowledge. The ultimate source of moral knowledge is direct, relational
experience or encounter with actual others, with other life, and with the physical world.
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From the wellspnng of such knowledge, there arises the motive force of deep and broad
caring, a state of mind and heart that stirs us to act on what we have come to know with
certainty about life.
Such knowledge, by virtue of its simple yet profound content, ubiquitous source
material, and varied means of acquisition, is widely obtainable, and shareable with oth-
ers by means of demonstration and persuasion. In the context of social and political
action, the certainty of fundamental knowing and the strength afforded by profound car-
ing, can subdue - even transform - the fear, unbounded self-serving, delusion, and
avoidance that mortal self-awareness so often provokes, into a vital, life-affirming sense
of justice or morality, and the motive energy to plan and to act in concert with those
who see the world in a similar light.
Moral Progress; Revitalizing an American Nostrum
To further frame this project, it is important to offer at the outset a reconceived
version of a formerly widely accepted idea - progress. After its introduction in the
nineteenth century as a powerful new idea linked to scientific development and human
evolution, it quickly came to signify boundless material prosperity and American na-
tional destiny. In the turbulent, disillusioned aftermath of World War I, progress began
to lose its intellectual and spiritual luster to the extent that it also suggested the possibil-
ity of individual moral growth leading to the betterment of either society or
government . 35
Notwithstanding its past false promises and its mendacious appropriations, the
idea of progress as the product of morally informed purposive, sustained individual and
group social and political action, must be reintroduced in America if morality is to be
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powerfully integrated in our political and social lives. Thus conceived, progress serves
not only as a reminder of the essential role of human agency in the initiation of change,
but also as a framework for undisguised moral debate and public action . 36 Most impor-
tant, the idea of progress reinforces a view of a human nature that is capable of personal,
social, and political growth beyond the limits suggested by reason attached to self-
service or existing community, or the behavioral parameters of enhanced rational de-
sign.
The fact that the twentieth century has powerfully reminded us that events and
outcomes are neither fully predictable nor certain, or that the consequences of collective
human action undertaken under any ideological banner can be horrific, does not obviate
the necessity for concerted, morally informed human agency to move us in the direction
of a worthy goal.
“Progress” as intended herein is always a contingent outcome, a product of our
varied, yet common individual potential to comprehend simple, profound truths about
life, to care deeply about what we learn, and to act congruently to implement justice and
other social and political goods on the strength of both. The realization that morally in-
formed agency is actual and powerful, and that by its means major uplifting, life-
enhancing change has occurred in our social and political landscape, is to reclaim the
full reach of human nature and its potential to learn and to grow.
As a practical concept, the idea of progress must apply broadly, deeply and per-
sonally - to our society, its politics, and to ourselves. To accomplish this, we must
come to appreciate and value the role of core moral actors in our past and in our midst.
We must learn from them how we are variously able to drink from the same informing.
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inspiring well, and act with them to enhance our lives together, sustained in part by the
future promise of what we can become aware of, know, and act upon in the present.
Making the Case
The primary goal thus far has been to provoke interest, to stimulate a conversa-
tion, and thereby encourage the reader to keep on reading. In legal parlance, this
particular effort is analogous to making an opening to a jury in a difficult, uphill case.
To have a chance at success, the jurors — who are free in this instance to simply close
the cover and move on - must be convinced they should not only continue, but also ac-
tively engage the evidence with an open mind. The last task is especially difficult.
Each of us across the American socio-political spectrum has been raised and tutored to
some extent at least in the popular enlightenment tradition. Moreover, although many
of us dispute key aspects of its twin public philosophies, we have likely employed simi-
lar rational methodologies to arrive at our conclusions. Finally, there is the apparently
considerable evidential weight of over two hundred years of relatively stable liberal re-
publican governance, as well as local communitarian experience within the former’s
tolerant framework.
Accordingly, the selection of an impartial jury is impossible. However, this is
always the case, unless one equates ignorance or disinterest with the absence of poten-
tial bias. An open mind is not an empty one, but one that is willing - motivated to
entertain new evidence and unconventional methods that may lead to an alternate ar-
rangement and interpretation of existing facts. Ideally, this willingness is the product, at
a minimum, of unease or dissatisfaction with the current state of our society and its poli-
tics, and our roles within them. The perfect juror for this imperfect text already has a
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sense that something is wrong, and that satisfactory explanations and remedies have not
been forthcoming.
Finally, this endeavor, if it is to be at all successful, should not be accepted as
yet another attempt to deconstruct the Enlightenment project or diminish its achieve-
ments. Rather, it is an effort to expand our existing, enlightenment-dominated
understanding of why and how profound, morally informed change has occurred in
America and to suggest why further such change has become so difficult in our era.
The next two chapters consist of selected expert testimony, primarily from
scholars of both the Liberal Republican and Communitarian schools. Many are parti-
sans, both secular and religious, and some are not. Cross-examination will be by
analysis, comparison, and critique, pitting alleged hostile witnesses against each other to
test not only the validity of their views, but also the actual depth of their claimed an-
tagonisms. The primary focus throughout is on human moral nature - its content and
grounding. This necesssitates some further consideration of what each philosophy ex-
plains - and fails to explain - about our personal, social, and national development.
Enlightenment rationalism is the focus of further attention in each chapter. This
special attention is, as already suggested, important. Rationalism or one sort or another
has been assigned an almost exclusive role by adherents of both philosophies in the ‘dis-
covery’ of all shareable knowledge accepted as truth, or as a valid hypothesis. Thus,
rationalism is the perceived means of discovery of enlightenment and enlightenment-
derived theories of our moral nature and, based on these suppositions, the method by
which both the structure and most of the content of our social, environmental, eco-
nomic, and political relationships are created and understood. Hopefully, the effort will
24
be enough to at least convince the reader of the inadequacy of rationalism when em-
ployed in intentional isolation from our other, extant capacities for moral
comprehension.
Chapters 4 through 6 involve testimony of a different sort. Two tasks are at-
tempted in this part. The first is to restore the role of agency or intentional action to its
rightful place in our understanding of how fundamental, morally grounded change has
occurred in America. All of the major changes that we have undergone as a society and
a polity have had a concrete, particular beginning. In the midst of mass society and
modem complexity, too many of us have forgotten that actors constitute systems, struc-
tures, and events, not the reverse. Apart from natural calamity, change on any scale has
its origins in action by one or a few, which stands in marked contrast with existing
norms and practices. Private inner thoughts have led to intimate and local conversations,
to public action and reaction, and to some durable alteration in the social and political
fabric of America. The first task, then, is to understand the dynamic of morally informed
action in America, in contrast to our Enlightenment-derived rational explanations of so-
cial and political development.
The second assignment is to attempt understand the nature and capacity of those
who initiate and sustain such action. Given the argued critical importance of their ac-
tion, it is important to begin that process by introducing actual core actors and becoming
familiar with several of them.
Two groups are utilized for this task. The first consists of four historical activ-
ists: Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815-1897), Frederick Douglass (c. 18 17-1895), Jane
Addams (1860-1935), and Eugene V. Debs (1855-1926). They were chosen principally
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because of their well-known, early and protracted association with notably unpopular
causes. At least in part through their efforts, many of the specific reforms sought by
them were achieved, in their lifetimes, while other items on their broad agendas have
been achieved since their deaths.
As is evident, they are chronologically paired in distinct, semi-contiguous eras.
Stanton and Douglass were most prominent in the antebellum period, although they both
wrote, worked, and spoke out on their respective primary concerns for women’s and Af-
rican American equality until their deaths at the end of the nineteenth century. Addams,
a broad social reformer and peace activist, and Debs, a labor organizer, socialist politi-
cal leader, and anti-war activist, began their careers early in the Progressive Era as the
first pair s life work was ending. While the Addams and Debs were undoubtedly aware
of the others’ accomplishments, no claim of direct tutelage or other concrete inter-
generational linkage can be directly sustained. Each should be accepted, however, as
constitutive of their era, which, in itself, is a form of mentorship for those who follow.
There are other criteria which warrant the selection of these actors. Their back-
grounds vary by race, gender, region, and, somewhat, by class and circumstance.
Although such a small sample is hardly representative, they are offered as emblematic
of the many equally prominent, less known, and unknown core moral actors of their re-
spective times. Further, their racial and gender diversity is particularly important, where
one of principal problems of the enlightenment view of human nature is the extremely
narrow make-up of the original empirical sample, a problem which persists. Women
and blacks were totally excluded, along with the overwhelming majority of politically
inchoate white males; in fact, it is likely entirely accurate to assume that our dominant
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social and political ontological assumptions were gleaned only from a small cadre of
progressive aristocrats and other white males with middle and upper class standing or
aspirations. For reasons that will be addressed, these omissions are quite significant
.
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In addition, all four wrote extensively, and all but Debs wrote at length about
themselves, thus offering us some direct insight into their self and world understanding.
Further, each has been written about from a reasonably wide range of perspectives. Fi-
nally, each of them corresponded extensively with intimates and others connected to
their activist work. Accordingly, although the witnesses themselves are dead, it should
be possible within the limits of interpretation over time and setting, to detect and com-
pare the following: their formative development; the origins, nature, purpose, extent,
and methodology of their activism; their understanding of themselves as individuals, in
relation to others, and in relation to the world.
The second group consists of twenty-six social and political activists who live or
work in the four counties that comprise Western Massachusetts. This region - particu-
larly the portion lying along the Connecticut River, north of the Holyoke-Springfield
metropolitan area, commonly referred to as the Pioneer Valley - has a justly deserved
reputation as something of a “hotbed” of peace and social justice activism, dating from
well prior to the Vietnam era. No doubt, this is attributable, in some part, to the conflu-
ence of the so-called Five Colleges - Mount Holyoke, Amherst, Hampshire, and Smith -
plus the much larger, more diverse University of Massachusetts in Amherst.
Less well known, but also important, is the presence of an active Society of
Friends Meeting in Leverett, and three nearby peace centers - one of which is loosely
connected to the Friends or Quakers. The other two are operated by a Buddhist order
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that is dedicated to world peace. The Quakers, in particular, have a long and unique in-
volvement with peace and social justice activism in America.38 This is evident in the
education training, connections of several of those interviewed, as well as with three of
the four historical actors studied. Finally, there are two Unitarian churches and one or
two other protestant-denominational churches that have long been associated with simi-
lar activism in the Pioneer Valley. 39
With one exception, each of this latter group was informally 'deposed' — encour-
aged to talk about themselves and their activism in a semi-structured conversational
format - by one or more individual, in-depth interviews conducted between July, 1999
and February, 2000. The unusual history of the Pioneer Valley area initially seemed to
be a burden as well as a blessing in the selection of interview participants. Much of the
activism in this sub-region is loosely inter-connected. People who are involved in un-
conventional forms of social and political activism know or know of each other across a
broad range of issues and one helpful activist can readily identify and locate many oth-
ers with whom he or she has worked. However, the construction of a reasonably
diverse, representative sample is not reliably constructed by such means. It was consid-
ered important from the outset to strive to achieve at least as much issue, organizational,
demographic, and geographic variety, in a functionally analogous sense, as is repre-
sented in the smaller historical group. If the case for our richer moral capacity is to be
vigorously tested, it is important to include as many potential variables as possible, par-
ticularly where small numbers of participants are relied upon, as in this project.
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Variety was sought by three principal means. First, news accounts from four
newspapers in the region were used, as well as alternative publications, for initial selec-
tions in the four issue areas that were ultimately included 41 The areas are as follows:
1
.
peace and social justice concerns relating to American foreign, military,
nuclear, global trade, and environmental policy;
2. economic, racial, ethnic, gender, and other justice issues directly affect-
ing the two largest and most diverse cities in the region, Springfield and
Holyoke;
3. concerns over claims of corruption and related reform needs in American
politics at the state and national levels;
4. issues involving the morality of abortion.
In addition, a consistent effort was made to obtain at least two independent refer-
rals for each interviewee. A list of names gathered from the above publications was
used as a starting point. To this initial roster, a more extensive, somewhat overlapping
set was compiled from conversations with three veteran area reporters and non-activist
faculty at the University of Massachusetts. Suggestions and referrals were also sought
from and volunteered by practically all participants. Names obtained from media and
other non-activist sources, when matched with a participant’s suggestions, were consid-
ered independent or reasonably non-biased. Finally, when the above method did not
yield enough potential participants who would constitute a sufficiently diverse sample,
interviewees were asked either to furnish or to verify names of activists who they knew
of but had not worked with personally.
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It is interesting to note that only one of those contacted refused to participate,
and, technically, he did not so much refuse as avoid. Ultimately, the number of inter-
viewees directly used and quoted at length herein has been narrowed to thirteen. The
decision to do so was difficult but inevitable, given the overriding importance of pre-
senting each actor to the reader in enough detail so that their moral formation could be
developed and compared, their actions adequately depicted alongside their words, and
their expressed and inferred understanding of themselves in relationship to others and
the world presented as fully as possible. Hopefully the reader will agree that the requi-
site diversity has been retained and that the selections were not made to conceal, but to
more adequately reveal the strength and depth of their moral natures, and ours.
In the last two chapters, an effort is made to assemble from the historical and
contemporary ensemble a coherent image of the content of their moral capacity - apart
from their demonstrated capacity to act in the manner that they evidence. Chapter 7 ex-
plores the motive strength - the state of mind - that propels these actors to initiate and
sustain their nonconforming action. The final chapter is an attempt to discern the
sources and methodologies of moral learning that these actors appear to share and which
inform their state of mind or will to act. Finally, it offers a brief look at the content of
the knowledge that informs them, simple yet certain truths that they demonstrate, which
are thereby and otherwise available to us all.
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This is precisely what Herbert Croly attempted at the beginning of the last
century in The Promise of American Life
, (1909; New York: Capricorn Books, 1964).
He offered to America what he saw as its original national promise - democracy, some-
thing he saw “as a process and [moral] ideal.” 7.
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conceived and transmitted, has seriously narrowed our understanding of the content and
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CHAPTER 2
OUR ENLIGHTENMENT
MISAPPREHENSIONS
Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism at first only dams the spring of
public virtues, but in the long run it attacks and destroys all the others too and finally merges into
egoism.” - Alexis de Tocqueville
1
“No doubt the view that there exist objective moral or social values, eternal and universal
. . . accessible to the mind of any rational man if he chooses to direct his gaze on them, is open to
every sort of question. Yet the possibility of understanding men in one’s own or any other time,
indeed of communication between human beings, depends of the existence of some common val-
ues, and not on a common ‘factual’ world alone.” - Isaiah Berlin
2
“One of the most persistent trends in modern philosophy since Descartes ... has been an
exclusive concern with the self, as distinguished from the soul or person or man in general The
greatness of Max Weber s discovery about the origins of capitalism lay precisely in demonstration
that an enormous, strictly mundane activity is possible without any care for or enjoyment of the
world whatever, an activity whose deepest motivation ... is worry and care about the self.”
- Hannah Arendt
5
“Whenever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country ema-
nates from its class interests and its feelings of class superiority.... Another grand determining
principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, ...enforced by law or opinion, has
been the servility of mankind toward the supposed preferences of their temporal masters or of their
gods.”
- John Stuart Mill
4
Introduction
We have each been “inescapably molded by a distinctive political culture that
emerged out of the great historical watershed of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
called ‘The Enlightenment’.” 5 Its concepts and underlying beliefs - the public philosophy
of liberal republicanism - are nowhere more dominant than in America. Accordingly, it
is not at all surprising that the evidence of its essential foundational flaw - its partial, iso-
lated portrayal of human nature and of the limited moral capacity of actual and potential
political actors - should be most prominent here as well.
Our republic has been largely premised from its founding on the liberal republican
self-understanding, social perspective, and world-view. Taken together, they furnish a
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group portrait of a dramatically new model of elite actor - Enlightenment Man . 6 Al-
though his construction herein is abstract, he is offered not only as the embodiment of
liberal republican philosophy, but also as the representative political face of actual actors,
both powerful and ordinary, in our past and present. As suggested above, he was first
presented as the product of revolutionary philosophical thought, discovered and since re-
affirmed by empirical observation, theoretical construction, history as structural
development, and behavioral research.
Enlightenment Man’s origins, however, are best understood as concrete and par-
ticular. As Thomas Pangle notes with respect to the contribution of English political
philosophers to his initial discovery, “We must also try to see how their mighty, and often
competing, intellectual beams were refracted and disbursed through the medium of the
statesmen - the men of action and practical wisdom .”7 Significantly, Pangle does not
mention other initial refractors. This hint, together with modest knowledge of the history
of the era, suggests something of great importance to the rest of us: that the builders of
the original model and their backers, the philosopher and the political patron, were related
not only by race and gender, but also by class-expanding commercial economic interests -
in at least one instance by joint venture. Accordingly, one can surmise that Enlighten-
ment Man was conceived from the corresponding world-views and self-understandings of
a narrow class of actors known to the philosopher, likely starting with observation of his
close associates and his own self-reflection . 9
Since Enlightenment Man’s early arrival in colonial America, he has acquired the
broad support of those who see him as a moral, political, and social ideal - the best that
man can make of himself — and those who assert from the conventional strength of realist
38
insight and theological legitimacy that he is flawed, but factual and immutable
.
10
From
his narrow but powerfully sponsored intellectual beginnings, stripped of his religious and
ideological veneers, he has become the cultural exemplar of our dominant public philoso-
phy. Today he lives among us, often within us, in apparently large numbers, flexing his
increasingly pervasive, organized and systematized, economic and political strength as
never before. It is therefore surprising to learn how insecure, how needy, how profoundly
frightened and alone he has believed himself to be from the moment of his first published
discoveries to date.
A Somewhat Competing Model
In actuality there are two Americanized models which correspond with our pre-
vailing public philosophies. Enlightenment Man, the dominant ideal, originated in Eng-
land as modem capitalism was emerging and was constructed early on by John Locke and
others. The second. Communitarian Man, is a more diffuse conception. Shaped some-
what by the Scottish branch of enlightenment thought, it is also influenced by selective
nostalgia for, and arguments grounded in the continuing necessity of the ideas, practices,
and continuity of traditional society, including classical republicanism and Puritanism . 12
The contemporary model, however, is most indebted to a more modem, sociological
understanding of society and of human nature within it. Democratic theorists have
attempted to shape both models, often seeking to reconcile them, but with notably less
success. In part, this is because they so often ground their calls for enhanced democ-
ratic practices in views of human nature and moral capacity that mirror those whose
models they seek to reform.
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Although the communitarian model will be discussed in some detail in the next
chapter, a bnef account of his relationship with his Lockean rival is important for our un-
derstanding of both. As suggested in Chapter 1, Communitarian Man’s presence was at
first localized in America, as elsewhere, by the physical realities of place and the logic of
separate traditions. He has since been subjected to the instrumental processes unleashed
by the projects of his rationally self-enlightened competitor, namely, to the burgeoning of
economic organization, specialization, commodification, and mandated human mobility.
This subservience to economic “necessity,” greatly aided by the individual allure of lib-
eral ideals, has led to the amorphous softening and outright dissipation of traditional
social institutions, leaving us free only to choose among the limited instrumental and pri-
vate goods offered within the climate-controlled envelope of mass society. Reduced to
the production and distribution of their own alternative magazines, catalogues, and semi-
nars, one wonders if proponents of the contemporary communitarian model fully sense
the irony of their “Catch-22” dilemma.
Perhaps the foregoing explains the quiet, reasoned tone of the communitarian cri-
tique and the puzzling lack of fervor, as well as action, behind its proponents’ calls for
economic and political institutional reforms that would promote a national community
capable of identifying and pursuing common goods. 14 Trapped by their rationally-
grounded belief in our fundamental reliance on a society that is now seen as overwhelm-
ingly individualistic in its values and unpredictably complex in its structural interactions,
communitarians appear to have concluded that reform, triggered like all purposive change
by individual and small group agency - even that of a social scientific elite - is not at all
likely.
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This notable lack of communitarian passion is also attributable to the basic com-
patibility between the pluralistic, multicultural variety of America that is valued by
mainstream communitarians and our liberal republican political framework. Community
as like kind, locale, or other association of belief and practice has, after all, been part of
our liberal, federal, pluralist scheme from the beginning. All that has been consistently
insisted upon by those at the helm of liberal republican governance is that community
practices not pose a threat to overarching liberal republican social, political, and eco-
nomic order. Polygamy, syndicalism, industrial unionism, and other potentially
contagious radical social and political grassroots projects are good examples of the limits
imposed on community - often by other communities - within our liberal republican
state. Lifestyle enclaves and other zones of status, personal moral preference, comfort
and nurture can be maintained and replicated, depending on one’s ability to pay and one’s
willingness to accept the above over-riding constraints.
Under this subordinate relationship, the fact that Communitarian Man's propo-
nents see us as the product of social formation only completes our political enervation.
We do not exist as humans, even in theory, apart from society - understood in its current
pluralistic form as a “community of communities.” 15 Our moral content and our capacity
as moral actors are each critically dependent on the vitality of families, communities, and
the other institutions that comprise society. If society is disintegrating or changing too
rapidly, if communities are disappearing, we become anomic, anemic, underdeveloped,
dangerously radical, or otherwise dysfunctional. Lacking the virtues that can change so-
ciety, qualities that society itself must impart, we will continue to produce, consume, and
remain quiescent within the liberal republican framework, likely past the point where it
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has ceased to be either liberal or even virtually republican. Communitarian Man is no
threat to Enlightenment Man, who, in his realist variant, at least understands the reality of
human agency.
Gender and Other Omissions
Upon closer examination in the next chapter, we should not be surprised to see ac-
tual others, and at least something of ourselves, in the communitarian model as in the
Enlightenment individual construct. Further, as suggested above, we should acknowl-
edge the possibility that both models are not only compatible, but have been potentially
so from the moment of their original conceptions of who we are, how we are formed, and
what we are capable of both socially and politically. Finally, most critically, we need to
ask ourselves how completely these models, considered either separately or together, de-
scribe either ourselves or others whom we believe we know well. This is especially
important for those groups - women, African Americans, and others - who were ex-
cluded from the initial formation of the enlightenment model, or who were assigned
separate, subordinate functional roles in the American communitarian scheme that have
lingered to the present.
The omission of women from our public philosophical self-understanding, at least
until recently, has been unique in its moral consequences. It has been accompanied by the
gendered segregation and subordinate ranking of virtues, such as compassion, coopera-
tion, affection, non-violence, nurture, and self-sacrifice, all of which women are said to
possess either uniquely or in greater quantity and non-instrumental purity than men .
16
The location of such behaviors, actively discouraged in men, in the safe, non-political
42
comfort of women’s hands and domains, has left the larger playing fields of society,
economy and state largely cleared and organized for enlightened, pragmatic pursuits.
To the extent that the above values have persisted, notwithstanding the limited so-
cial and political weight of women and those men able to withstand or recover from
conventional moral nurture, we must further question the universal human ontological
claims that are made by the proponents of each philosophical model. It is not enough to
simply acknowledge the gradual admission of women within each paradigm and to
thereby assume that their presence has thereby altered the models, inoculating them with
gender neutrality . 17 The foundations, the “who we are” claims of both, must be re-
examined. The point is not to state a case for either a sex- or gender-specific human na-
ture, but rather to support a claim that human virtue - our personal moral capacity in
action - is much broader, more routinely other-regarding, and more powerful than either
liberal republicanism or communitarianism provides. Accordingly, both public philoso-
phical models are described herein in masculine terms, both to reflect their origins and to
remind us that much of their current content retains a distinctly masculine, as well as ra-
cial, ethnic, historical, and cultural bias. This reminder further helps to explain the
contrast of the enlightenment and communitarian models with core moral actors intro-
duced in the first chapter and the moral dynamic they represent. The ultimate collective
strength of the moral actor depends on the shared, yet varied, capacities of women and
men of all hues, ethnicities, cultures, and circumstances.
Enlightenment Man at Conception
The writings of John Locke afford a good place to study Enlightenment Man's
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gestation and birth where, as Thomas Pangle argues, he offers “the most completely
worked out presentation of that current in political philosophy which exerted the strongest
pull on the Framers as they struggled to formulate an adequate understanding of them-
selves and their ultimate goals .” 18
Locke presents man as a unique product of his tense, dynamic relation with the
state of nature. Lockean scholars Thomas Pangle and Leo Strauss are in agreement that
the state of nature that Locke describes “is not so much an historical condition that men
dwelt in at some time in the past as it is a “mixed mode” — a reality inferred from the
natural bent of the passions.’ As such, it not only existed at some point in our prehis-
tory, but can develop at any time, in any number of locations, “wherever there are any
number of Men, however associated, that have no ...decisive power to appeal to ....”20 In
sum, the state of nature is both the physical world of nature and the nature of unenlight-
ened humans within it.
Prior to discussing the passions Locke is referring to, it is important to note his
view that man differs in three remarkable capacities from those who are otherwise his
brethren in the animal kingdom:
First
,
he is self-conscious, aware of his own existence, and able to identify his
needs and drives, his underlying fears and longings, the sole possessor among creatures of
a true “Self;”
21
Second
,
he is capable of this task by virtue of his ability to reason, which not only
enables him to understand himself, but also to study others, to comprehend the rest of the
world around him, and devise sound strategies to deal with at least some of his existential
dilemma;
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Third, he is strongly motivated by his fears, needs, and drives and therefore pos-
sesses the necessary will to act in his rationally informed self-interest.
Locke begins the construction of Enlightenment Man, then, from the premise of
an inherently, unalterably isolated inner self, a personal identity that once discovered cre-
ates a fundamentally unbridgeable temporal divide between himself and everyone,
everything else. He shares with animals and other humans a strong, primal instinct for
survival, together with other needs and drives that he seeks to satisfy in a natural world of
scarcity. His most “unremitting and powerful uneasiness is the fear of death and of the
physical suffering that attends or intimates death. This fear is not to be confused with
animal instinct alone. It is much more powerful than primal instinct, informed as it is by
rational self- and world-understanding. It is this fear, greater than any other, and the cor-
responding strength of the passion it triggers, which grounds - and limits - his moral
nature.
In an associated manner, Enlightenment Man, until death forces its final, inevita-
ble awareness upon him, is engaged in an unceasing quest to satisfy his bodily needs and
drives and thereby obtain pleasure, or even more important, minimize or avoid pain. The
conditions necessary to satisfy his fear and need driven nature - life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness - are his fundamental, natural or divine rights, inferred from the logic of
his nature. Property, the possession of which affords most storable, lasting, effective
means of producing pleasure or reducing pain, is what most comforts him. It is the
source of his greatest joy, a “...delight of the Mind [which comes] from the consideration
of the present or assured approaching possession of a Good [and the knowledge] that we
can use it when we please .”23 According to Pangle’s analysis of Locke, “this shows us
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why the practically limitless drive for power, hence property, but also dominion, prestige
and triumph is so natural to man .”24
Individual efforts to allay mortal fear and satisfy needs in the social and physical
environment stimulate competition and a taxing awareness of constant potential danger.
Being rational, Enlightenment Man is instrumentally social - others are necessary for
one’s own survival, comfort, and prosperity. He is also drawn into social relationships by
unpredictable, disorderly, “impulsive passions of tenderness and lust, envy and triumph,
fear and dominion .”^5 Clearly, Locke does not trust unmediated affection of any sort to
form a durable social adhesive. It seems that Enlightenment Man is able to remove him-
self from the constant potential anarchy of life in nature “only with the power of the
passionate fear it induces, and by the human capacity to reason .”26
His social and political morality is grounded in inherent isolation, mortal fear, and
other drives or passions - and in his belief that others are similarly informed. Its precepts
are derived by the instrumental use of reason, the same tool by which he has made his on-
tological discoveries. Only reason is available to tame passion, subdue nature, and
construct a stable order. It is Enlightenment Man’s only implement to aid him in the
search for modest, unromantic, social, political and economic truths. Given the premise
of his inner nature, his reason also has the unfortunate consequence of objectifying the
world and everyone else within it .
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Enlightenment Man is also instrumentally political and educable, at least to the
extent of common sense, in the acquisition of knowledge and its connections to self-
interest. Accordingly, he is willing to consent to a regime which affords him the follow-
ing:
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1 . a liberal personal sphere of property and other secured negative rights that
safeguard his personhood and his ability to participate in the other two
spheres;
2. a voluntary sphere or civil society of social, economic, and political associa-
tion;
3. a carefully crafted republican governmental sphere to act as a neutral referee -
or as an arena for constrained conflict - on behalf of an aggregate sovereign of
nominal, juridical, or theoretical equals;28
4. the right of revolt if the contract is materially breached by the state or others
in civil society.
These are Enlightenment Man’s political conceptual gifts to himself and, by recip-
rocal obligation, to like-minded others. Each feature empirically reflects and is instru-
mental to his nature - to his separate self, his chronic, primary mortal anxiety and his
need to assuage it, as well as to satisfy his less complex needs, drives, tastes, goals and
other pursuits that constitute his unique composite of happiness. 29
The American Model
Whether roaming the corridors of our increasingly private social, political, and
economic institutions, or receiving a membership renewal notice at home, Enlightenment
Man - the current public version of the above original model of the rational self-seeker,
the possessive pursuer of interest - increasingly reigns.
30 As a result, the search for, and
the instantiation of, common good in America - some deeply unifying sense of a living,
vital, shared purpose and common enterprise that extends beyond aggregated projects of
self-preservation and material enhancement - has been increasingly foreclosed. With En-
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Enlightenment Man at the helm of governance, the twin screws of utilitarian aggregation
and the selective absolutism of autonomous rights, each forged by a politics of economi-
cally biased, structurally and organizationally enhanced plurahsm, have moved us in this
direction
.
31
It is the second prop which makes our plurahsm liberal and tucks in the
sheets around such strange bedmates as socially conservative libertarians, amoral priva-
teers such as Larry Flynt, and the Kantian purists of the A.C.L.U
.
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Our constitutional framework has operated as the device into which the openings
for these screws were installed at the outset. As Pangle and others have detailed, the
Founders were well, although indirectly, imbued with the enlightenment model of human
nature. ' They accepted the view of political actors as described at their abstract concep-
tion: individuals - men - who were unreliably social, virtuous or altruistic outside of their
respective private circles of family and intimate friends.
Experience on the challenging yet fertile, abundant soil of America modified the
implicitly elite model only slightly at first, primarily by rewarding the long-standing con-
stant of hard work with the early elimination of frequent scarcity and the provision of
somewhat broader rough economic parity . 34 These conditions, however, contributed to
the imbuing of Enlightenment Man with a passion for liberty as autonomy. Nature, as
Masachusetts Bay Colony Governor Winthrop discovered, could not be relied upon to
“...compel men into the political community, they must be induced to enter it .35 They
also helped to equip him with a broadened sense of non-aristocratic elite equality, and an
enthusiasm for economic self-fulfillment, which in an existing, growing commercial soci-
ety, was potentially boundless in its scope.
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Property only gained in importance in our dominant Protestant culture. It contin-
ued to serve as the guarantor of security for the fundamentally needful, isolated self, even
as its unequal acquisition increasingly offered tangible evidence of enlightenment-
influenced religious virtue and possible salvation
.
36
Later, as access to heaven became
more democratized and less real to the most rationally enlightened, property still fur-
nished the purchase price of philanthropic immortality. As always, property remained
instrumental to power, but only to the extent that it could be pursued, enlarged, and pro-
tected in the realm of private freedom. If Enlightenment Man was optimistic concerning
his own future, his mood was at least somewhat grounded in his assessment of the ra-
tional commonsense potential of others, informed by practical wisdom and other modest
virtues, such as tolerance and civic obligation.
At the Founding
Early evolutionary and other emerging technical and scientific rationalism was
seen by Enlightenment Man at the Founding to have confirmed his Lockean nature in a
process that, in turn, was seen as reflecting the prevailing component of human moral ca-
pacity - reason itself.' It is this faculty, Locke had already informed us, which enables
us to act with volition, and which constitutes our freedom . 38 It also provided the means
to design a system of limited governance and laws which are congruent with his nature.
. . . . .
in
Reason, then, is Enlightenment Man’s “...infallible guide to political activity.”
Rationality, in all its permutations, remained Enlightenment Man’s sole resource
for detecting his moral nature, while instrumental rationality enabled him to construct
moral principles, ethical rules and laws to govern his public (social, economic, and politi-
cal) interactions. By this means, he comes to acquire Locke’s understanding of himself,
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and of the importance of prudent, practical virtue. He is able to be fair, even modestly
generous, in his dealings, because reputation is useful and because reciprocity is antici-
pated. He is also able to be ruthless and deceitful when forced to contend with the
unenlightened. He does, however, tolerate some degree of difference in religion or else-
where in private life, because a stable order is, above all, rationally preferable. He is
frugal, hard working, and modest in displays of wealth for similar reasons of enlightened
self-interest
.
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Finally, he is willing to voluntarily consent to a system of limited republi-
can government and positive law, where his capacity for rational calculus leads him to
conclude that his fears will be maximally reduced and wants optimally secured. His con-
sent, however, is conditioned upon his personal inclusion in the actual embrace of its
guarantees of political equality, maximum liberty, and above all, secure property. More-
over, with the assist of new enlightenment political expertise, he is able to improve upon
the Lockean political design.
Montesquieu, the only social and political theorist of the Enlightenment referred
to by name at the Philadelphia Convention, was a prime architect for our unique version
of the political structure of Enlightenment Man . 41 He expressed even greater confidence
than Locke over the contribution to political stability of the new, more modest and egali-
tarian, self-indulgent forms of virtue, above-described.
4
^ He saw the grounding for this
virtue in shallower, narrower waters, however, identifying only the “spirit of commerce”
as the animating force of what he saw as a new, expanding political elite. He did not ap-
pear to agree with Locke that Enlightenment Man reflected our universal human nature;
however, he concluded that the commercial elites that were either unconsciously or sur-
reptitiously employed by Locke in his model were the best hope for a stable republican
50
order. His institutional design was intended to harness this new vitality, and to rein-
force it by “favorable laws” so that it would replace the older forms of civic and patriotic
virtue, excepting only the lighter armor of fame and honor, and make either monarchy or
an aristocratic republic unnecessary
.
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To accomplish this novel task, Montesquieu sought to institutionalize and privi-
lege the spirit of commercial self-interest as the engine of regime stability. This special
preference, he hoped would constrain the rationally unenlightened in both the lower and
upper social strata from pursuing any exclusive, fanatical, divisive claims or obligations
of a higher moral nature in the political realm. In other words, man would relinquish any
hope that he might have of seizing control of government either to instantiate ‘pure’ mo-
rality, or to engage in unbounded sensual or material pursuit .45 Enlightened actors, men
of modest virtue, and a republican governmental design of divided power, as well as
checks and balances, would secure society from either democratic or aristocratic excess.
Those who were powerfully motivated by a Machiavellian passion for fame would still be
drawn to the flame of political leadership, but in a “form of government” that would con-
strain their ambition, while giving them “...a share in its honors and distinctions .”46
Classical republican virtue, although evident among many of America’s founding politi-
cal leaders, was seen by Montesquieu and the Founders alike as occasional, prone to
fanaticism, and therefore unreliable; self-interest and ego rewards, within rational con-
straints, were more dependable constants .
47
In sum, our constitutional design was masterful, brilliantly conceived, and based
on a human model that was informed by a still narrow sample: a slowly diversifying, vir-
tually all male, white, commercially savvy economic elite. How much the Founders felt
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that they, individually, had in common with the model is hard to assess; however, the his-
torical record during the period leading up to the Founding, including the Philadelphia
Convention, suggests that they were much more complexly driven - often less self-
interested, more fraternal, and less determined by mortal fear or bodily needs than the
group model assumed. What is clear, however, was their general distrust of virtuous or
fraternal men to reliably combine over time and distance in order to trump the organized
self-interest of either a democratic majority or an elite faction. According to Diggins, the
classical notion of politics as a regenerative activity was overwhelmingly rejected by the
Founders in favor of a design that assumed man's fallen nature and their enlightened ra-
tional capacity to create an architecture for politics that could withstand both mobs and
factions.
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By the end of the Founding era, our non-elite understanding of human moral na-
ture and moral capacity was presumably also under the increasing influence of
Enlightenment Man. The idea of a liberal republican state run by a propertied elite at the
national level, for example, was already evident at the state and local level. Yet there was
evidence of internal dissension in the conflicts over democratic issues of sovereignty, par-
ticipation, and representative accountability apparent not only during the ratification
debates, but at least as early as the Andros controversy in Boston between 1689 and 1691.
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Such episodes are early evidence of belief in an individual and social human na-
ture that was more vigorous, broadly distributed, other-regarding, and capable of
democratic self-governance than Locke, Montesquieu, or the vast majority of the Foun-
ders were willing to accept.
50 As social historian Gary B. Nash, Howard Zinn, and a few
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others have noted, part of the reason for their reluctance was the still common tendency,
in reporting or analyzing our history or current events, to ignore, over-aggregate, or mis-
characterize the nature, behavior, motivation, and capacity of non-elite actors. 51 Another
reason has been and remains a marked reluctance by those who hold or value elite status
in our culture to share or entrust substantial power to those who are unwilling to incur the
risks and costs - including moral compromise - of its pursuit, its use, or its mainte-
nance.
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Dominance without Universality
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Enlightenment Man has greatly
strengthened his upper hand in American politics and society. On the surface, he seems
to have overcome his fearful preoccupation with death. This was not due any new
transcendental discovery, although for the vast majority of us who still consider religion
“somewhat important, important, or very important,” the possibility of an easily accessi-
ble divine hereafter still dampens mortal fear and assuages guilt in present.53 In the
1830s, Tocqueville linked the future of democratic self-government to the strength of in-
dividual afterlife-focused religion in an America that he saw as populated by enlightened
men. Such a faith served to satisfy our “longing for immortality, equally tormenting
every heart,” without unduly burdening the liberal republican state with either religious
zealotry or church supported moral activism.
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Even the enlightened non-believer, “still
considers it [religion] useful ... He understands [its] power to lead men to live in peace
and gently to prepare them for death.”55
Thanks to scientific advance, death in America, although still greatly affected by
race and class, has increased its average distance from birth. While most of us are still
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aware that, in the words of an anonymous Maine gravedigger, the base line rate remains
at “about one per person,” it is an event that has receded from the forefront of conscious-
ness. There are subtle signs, however, that mortal anxiety still has the power to drive self-
interest. Our apparently soft support for universal health care, for example, reveals the
fears of some of those fortunate to have private coverage that universality may impair the
quality they now receive and their future ability to stave off the inevitable. As the “Harry
and Louise” campaign by the health insurance lobby in 1994 demonstrated, our fears are
not hard to provoke. 56 Once aroused, they seem to easily overcome our residual belief in
rough equality, much as Tocqueville had predicted. 57 What remains difficult to detect, in
the absence of true democratic opportunities to inform, discuss, persuade, and decide, is
the social prevalence and individual motive weight of such fears. Enlightenment Man’s
progeny may not be as numerous as they often seem when such issues are identified and
framed in the overwhelmingly privatized, corporatized, commercial venues that pass as
our public discourse.
As for supposed ubiquity and primacy of Enlightenment Man's acquisitive, entre-
preneurial nature, McCloskey and Zaller offer some evidence that, for some of us, other
concerns may matter more. In their study of opinion surveys conducted in the late
1950s and the late 1970s, they detected a curious elite-mass disparity in the data. In a
1958 survey, for example, seventy percent of a large national sample from the general
public (distinguished in the survey data from political influentials) thought that personal
economic security for them was more important than advancement. For influentials, how-
ever, the figures were the mirror reverse. Further, only forty-two percent of the general
public and fifty percent of political influentials, separately tallied in a 1978-1979 survey,
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thought that everyone would profit in the long run “...if businesses were allowed to make
as much money as they [could].”59 Finally, there was a significantly negative correlation
found by McCloskey and Zaller between the strength of one’s commitment to democratic,
as compared to capitalist values, with members of the general public and opinion leaders
included, to some extent, located at each priority
.
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While the range of debate among
both groups was — and continues — to be constrained by a weak, wary acceptance of capi-
talism by strong democracy advocates and equivalent ambivalence toward political
democracy by the most enthusiastic supporters of capitalism, the differences were too
wide to support the notion of general American conformity to the Lockean model of hu-
man nature and political structure.
The above findings, although somewhat aged, and certainly subject to shift over
time, suggests that significant numbers of the American polity implicitly understand
themselves and see others quite differently than the liberal republican account provides.
McCloskey and Zaller, drawing upon a much wider range of social and political opinion
data than indicated above, concluded:
“People who are convinced of the need for social change, who are strongly moti-
vated to alleviate distress [in others], and who take an optimistic view of human
nature, tend to be enthusiastic about democracy and wary of capitalism. In con-
trast, people who value order and stability, who are tough-minded about the
prospects for alleviating social distress, and who take an essentially pessimistic
view of human nature tend to be strongly pro-capitalist and cautiously democ-
ratic.”
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Tocqueville’s Insights
At the time of his travels in America, it was apparent to Tocqueville that the indi-
vidual pursuit of material comfort beyond necessity had become an increasingly popular
mortal distraction, facilitated by natural resource abundance. Apart from the modest re-
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straint prompted by the doctrines of our institutional individual faiths, it was our republi-
can “mores” - his term for the modest social and political virtues of Enlightenment Man
- that supported the promise of stable democratic governance into the future, more so
than our laws and republican framework.6" Our sense of yeoman equality, our acceptance
of majority rule, our belief in popular sovereignty - these “moral and intellectual disposi-
tions” owed most of their observed strength to our practical experience with self-
government, reinforced by public education that emphasized “the history of his country
and the main features of its Constitution. However, he also detected a general “rest-
lessness amid prosperity
,
evident in the perpetual movement and commercial zeal of the
population. He saw both as a reflection of Enlightenment Man’s “perhaps most natural”
drive for physical comfort, and as a potential threat to instrumental virtue .64
While Tocqueville admired the concept of “self-interest, rightly understood,” he
acknowledged the limits of its use in defining common goods and detected its centrifugal
effects already at work. “One must expect that private interest will more than ever be-
come the chief if not the only driving force behind all behavior, [b]ut we have yet to see
how each man will interpret his private interest.”65 Even with the rational and religious
constraints, along with the sense of rough democratic equality that Tocqueville detected,
he concluded that even the kind of “decent materialism” that Enlightenment Man first
offered in America would “soften and imperceptibly loosen the springs of [collective]
action .”
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He also commented on the evidence of indecent materialism he detected among
America’s small manufacturing elite. He thought this new “aristocracy” to be “one of the
hardest that have appeared on earth [but] at the same time one of the most restrained and
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least dangerous .”67 Although he was prescient in many areas of American life, his gift
did not enable him to discern the organizational and technological dynamic then gathering
momentum. That energy, along with straightforward corruption that he also failed to de-
tect, would soon combine to sweep away the external restraints he had noted .68
Fostering Certain Establishments
By the end of the nineteenth century, institutional religious faith, operating as
Tocqueville had observed from its comfortable restricted sphere, was seen by some to
have failed miserably in reigning in Enlightenment Man’s then obvious excesses. In the
space of only several decades, rough equality had given way to rampant inequality, liberty
had become economic license for a few, and republican government had failed to main-
tain even a semblance of pluralistic balance. Moreover, new variants of enlightenment
rationalism - scientific, social scientific, and philosophical - justified the inevitability and
the overall desirability of the results. Tacitly acknowledging what many had known all
along - namely, that Enlightenment Man was a model for dominant elite behavior in a
new era - his most avid proponents offered Social Darwinism to explain the inevitable
costs of progress to an audience that largely benefited from the changed economic land-
69
scape.
At the same time, historically underrated changes in the organization and compre-
hension of economic pluralism were also underway. Enlightenment Man’s admirers in
our legislatures and courts, and professional supporters in the law and academia, devel-
oped, improved upon, and legitimated organizational and conceptual innovations that
greatly strengthened the broad social, economic, and political reach of those whom the
model best describes. Perhaps the most remarkable among many examples was the devel-
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opment of the modem business corporation. It entered the nineteenth century as a limited
duration, licensed legal fiction, created to rationalize and facilitate the production, accu-
mulation and protection of capital for the benefit of private investors and the congruent
public development needs of the liberal republican state. Public goods, in other words,
were created by the harnessing of the tidal power of private accumulative desire in a
“win-win” scenario that was rife with temptation.70
By the end of the century, the prime investors in corporate business and financial
entities had secured a divorce for their entities from public service, having already ob-
tained an unconscionable property settlement of public land and natural wealth in the
process. They had also acquired for their soulless fictions legal personhood and immor-
tality, constitutionally-secured political liberties and civil rights, and the beginnings of
virtual personality as well as faceless agency71 They further gained unprecedented wealth
at greatly reduced individual risk, as well as astonishing political power for their insider
owners. All that was left in order to fully consolidate these organizational and political
accomplishments, to complete the disguise of the individual and joint ventured nature of
interlocking corporate accomplishment, was to anoint them with new concepts of histori-
cal, developmental inevitability. Scholars from our newly secularized academia,
equipped with an enlightenment view of individual moral nature and armed with new
forms of positivist rational expertise, were up to the task. No where was this more evi-
dent than in the field of economics.
The small “manufacturing aristocracy which we have seen rising before our eyes,”
Tocqueville wrote around 1836, was discovered in retrospect to have been evidence of
the emergence of a powerful new historical force.
73 New technologies of mass produc-
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tion and transportation, innovative organizational methods to finance and direct their en-
ergy, the connection of these components, together with labor and other commodities in
vast, interconnected market networks of supply and demand - all this was now compre-
hended as vast new system. What had begun as concrete projects of individual and joint-
ventured business endeavor was now conceived as having necessitated a new level of
economic abstraction, an understanding of something distinct from the sum of its entre-
preneurial parts. Its actions could only be explained, interpreted by experts as
interactions and signals, expansions and contractions, patterns and dislocations.
From the perspective of Enlightenment Man’s exemplars, the elevation of the
economy to a complex, interactive, systemic realm was a delightful artifice or, more accu-
rately, a series of them. Conceived of as a domain whose size and mobile dynamics are
detectable only via quantities and formulae, it is seen today by admirer and foe alike as a
barrier to democratic governance. As political theorist John Dryzek observes, the dictates
of “free trade, market liberal ideology, economic rationalism, and aggressive individual-
ism” have combined “to obstruct any deeper democratization and to erode existing
democratic achievements .”74
Accepted as something greater - more powerful, yet more delicate - that any one
of its complexly interdependent institutions and sub-systems, the economic system has
moved beyond direct safe or intelligent control by one of its larger subsystems, the na-
tion-state. Its essential energy and fragile balance wheel are the key components of our
professed common nature: rational self-interest expressed in markets for production and
consumption of all manner of invention and enterprise; increasingly abstract, diluted, re-
mote, and contingent forms of ownership as our new security; mortal anxiety expressed as
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a level of confidence upon which the whole system is said to depend; and the critical de-
pendence of the whole enterprise upon constant bottom line growth.
This reification of what had been - and still is - created or initiated by individual
and small group invention, replication, and refinement, including propagation of the no-
tion of inevitable progress by its critical means, has further dampened our sense of
democratic equality, of sovereign citizen power, of human moral agency itself. The
Amencan model that Tocqueville described, a nation of small citizen freeholders able to
variously pursue individual security, was retained as a growing popular myth, while ser-
vile wage labor and social, communal uprooting has emerged on an increasing scale as
mass reality. As Isaiah Berlin noted:
“To try to frighten human beings by suggesting to them that they are in the grip of
impersonal forces over which they have little or no control is to breed myths.... It
is to invent entities, to propagate faith in unalterable patterns of events . . . which
by relieving individuals of the burden of personal responsibility, breeds irrational
passivity in some, and no less irrational fanatical activity in others ...”75
Countervailing Views
As the twentieth century arrived, Enlightenment Man’s alienation from nature,
from any sense of unified being, was approaching completion in practice, although not in
his professions of faith .
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Walter Rauchenbusch, a leading theologian of the Social Gos-
pel Movement, derided Christian churches in America for their continuing focus on
individual afterlife and for their silence on action against growing social and economic
injustice in the present. Using Old Testament prophets as his model, he chided the moral-
ity of individual Christian piety, noting that the lack of immortal self-assurance in
Judiasm, combined with a belief in divine justice, had once lent religious sanction to the
nn
demand for social and economic justice in the world. He saw that the “virility and hu-
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maneness of the prophets and that capacity for growth which stir our enthusiasm were
largely due to the breadth and inclusiveness of their religious sympathy and faith .”78
There were many others in academia and elsewhere who were not enamored with
the excesses and social consequences of the new rational economy. Muckraker journal-
ists - Ida Tarbell, Upton Sinclair and many others - investigated corporate abuse, peered
through organizational obfuscation, and named names. Setting the tone for the century,
however, much of the political reform debate was internecine, an argument among pro-
ponents of liberal republicanism over how to best accommodate what they saw as the
constant nature and undeniable economic benefits of the enhanced enlightenment model.
Accordingly, much of the Progressive debate, while often critical of the primarily
commercial republic conceived by the Founders, was a largely rational discussion of
experts concerning the best means to reduce or offset harmful, socially destabilizing
consequences of capitalism — while allowing large scale self-interested pursuit to further
organize, systematize, and flourish. Virtually all of them realized, with Woodrow Wil-
son, that they were “in the presence of a new organization of society .... life has broken
away from the past .”79
Those who had benefited most from the faux laissez-faire frontier period of
American development were seen as immoderate, greedy, but undeniably successful and
ultimately philanthropic. In fact, those that had amassed great fortunes were and remain
largely understood as having played a critical role in the development of a powerful new
nation. At issue was the restoration of rational moderation, of self-interest rightly under-
stood. Both the democratic and republican factions of the Progressive Movement called
for the strengthening of government to regulate the new forms of highly organized self-
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interest, as well as to soften of some of ‘its’ harsh human consequences. While they
quarreled over the best means to control trust monopolies, both saw the necessity of a
stronger, less corrupt, more competent republican government - one that emulated the
efficiency of business structure and management, but which restored some mix of direct
democratic and republican accountability. The call was for new public rational designs,
institutions and technical expertise that would offset the power of the private sector with
the countervailing power of government.
Capable governance, understood as a separate system able to counteract or regu-
late the excesses of private power, would restore the public’ s secular faith in American
ideals. Enlightened men could and did agree to progressive taxation and redistribution,
as well as sound administration to regulate and ameliorate the new corporate-structured,
mass production, mass consumption national order. Capitalism, seen by most elites as a
legitimate reflection of human nature and the engine of material progress was to be left in
private hands, watched and regulated insofar as individual excess could still be detected
and restrained without risking the whole enterprise . 81
The fact that the new economic order had left labor without Lockean autonomy
was acknowledged by many mainstream reformers; however, the inevitability of progress
seemed to mandate that labor co-operate in the new order and look to the state to insure
health and safety in the workplace. When Progressivism’s early principal spokesman,
Herbert Croly, subsequently departed from mainstream reform orthodoxy with a call for
workplace democracy that suggested at least a partial rejection of the American enlight-
enment model, he was largely ignored. “ Croly’ s realization that genuine political liberty
could only be secured by eliminating the private governance inherent in a corporatized
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private economy and pluralistic framework was drowned out by the arguments of others,
such as Fredenck Winslow Taylor, calling for the “enforced cooperation” of manufactur-
ing workers mandated by the dictates of rational management
.
83 As the Progressives still
saw it, the contents of our social and political morality were still deduced from a moral
nature that remained mortally insecure and acquisitive. In the heady, opportunistic envi-
ronment spawned by a huge, powerful industrial republic, rational self-moderation
required greater reinforcement than at the Founding. New institutions and policies
grafted on to the existing regime, each enhanced by new scientific knowledge and techni-
cal expertise, were essential for America to collectively manage its way into the future.
In the analysis of new experts, the direction of that future would thereafter be understood
as the product of organized and aggregated self-interests, mass-assessed individual needs
and preferences, oppositional ideologies, systemic forces, and unforeseen events.
Further Rational Obfuscation
Parallel with the development of economic rationalism, scientific rationalism,
with its own claim of factual, moral neutrality, assisted greatly in the masking of human
moral agency by its conceptual conversion of American politics and social relations into a
framework of systems and processes. It also facilitated the reduction of moral values ex-
pressed as common public goods to the level of subjective individual and group interests
that can only be aggregated and compromised within government. Its advocates accom-
plished this first by reducing shareable truth to facts that are verifiable only by empirical
observation or experimental replication. Such knowledge is, in itself, virtuous and its
pursuit noble, or at any rate necessary. More important, it is only by theories developed
and tested by these means that our knowledge of what is and what can be, based on the
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trends of past results and current data, becomes comprehensive, more complete. This is
not to suggest that everyone concerned with politics or with science agrees that science
has emancipated fact from value, only that scientific rationalism and its theoretical prog-
eny, rational choice, have come to dominate our expert culture.
Our individual thinking about politics, society, and the self has also been increas-
ingly informed by scientific rationalism. Those components of Enlightenment Man that
are amenable to observation and experiment have been tested, and his Lockean human
nature largely confirmed
.
84 We are, few now doubt, most predictably motivated by indi-
vidual, typically economic self-interest, as well as by the drives associated with pleasure
and the avoidance of pain. There are, however, three problems with this behavioral as-
sertion:
First, an explanation of current behavior, even behavior carefully observed over
time, does not explain how it developed. For such answers, science, like all other disci-
plines, must resort to history, individual experience, and conjecture;
Second
,
those who rely upon such methods can only theorize from conflicting
factual inferences, along with the rest of us, concerning the primacy of self-interest and
the resulting priority it occupies in our lives. We know, for example, that war, depres-
sion, natural disaster, rapid socio-economic change and other exigent events have
markedly changed the content of our customary attitudes. There have been periods of re-
active individual and collective mean-spiritedness, alongside intervals of widespread
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heroism and altruism, with belief in greed’s necessity in obvious decline.
Perhaps, however, such meanness and generosity are more exceptional than our
typical reactions to such events, and this possibility, together with our observable ten-
64
dency to focus on personal gain and pleasure in ‘ordinary times’ each confirm Locke’s
theory. We are, to credit his insight, isolated in fundamental ways, and it may be our exis-
tential insecurity which both brings us together arid divides us into hostile groups.
It can further be argued that we act from mortal fear, except where peace and
prosperity dull our awareness of our immutable, uncertain destiny. Either is possible,
given our fear-based passion, and our varying capacity for enlightened rational judgment.
As already noted, if this is what we feel, what we believe about ourselves at such inter-
vals, then that is who we are at least becoming.
In any event, due to the persistent limits of scientific rationalism in proving mo-
tive, the answer we give to ourselves remains private unless or until we are seen in action
upon its premise. Even our public demonstrations must be carefully assessed, however.
Our words and behaviors are often intended to dissimulate, to mask the noncomformity of
our actual but inner nature from the disparaging eyes and potentially adverse reactions of
those who so clearly embrace the apparently dominant alternative.
The third problem, related to the second, is the primary reliance of social science
on statistical methods to aggregate behaviors and determine our nature as a collective
probability. As Hannah Arendt noted concerning the use of this method to explain his-
tory and politics:
“The laws of statistics are valid only where large numbers and long peri-
ods are involved, and acts or events can appear only as deviations or fluctuations.
The justification is that deeds and events are rare occurrences in everyday life and
in history. Yet the meaningfulness of everyday relationships is not disclosed in
everyday life but in rare deeds, just as the significance of a historical period shows
itself only in the few events that illuminate it. The application of the law of large
numbers and long periods to politics or history signifies nothing less than the will-
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ful obliteration of their very subject matter...”
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The shape of society and government, including their moral content, are the prod-
uct of human agency, of actors and actions that deviate beyond the standard deviation
from the norm, in either direction. Knowledge of common behaviors or prevailing opin-
ion may be useful, practical, even determining at times; however, as Berlin reminds us.
At root, history deals with human motives and intentions and choices.” He does not
suggest that the search for cause and effect should be abandoned, or that non-human fac-
tors, institutional constraints, and unintended consequences from complex interactions
should be ignored:
But to try to reduce the behavior of individuals to that of impersonal ‘so-
cial forces
,
not further analysable into the conduct of men, who even according to
Marx, make history, is reification of statistics, a form of ‘false consciousness’ [of
those] who close their eyes to all that proves incapable of quantification ...”87
Enlightenment Man may explain less of who we are than what many of us have
become. Our current period of detectable unease, amid prosperity with record level in-
come and wealth disparity, may be attributable to chronic mortal anxiety, to an enhanced
awareness that life is isolated and fragile. Another possibility is that we are at least
somewhat aware that life with and as Enlightenment Man in America - in the contempo-
rary version of the Lockean liberal republic - is distractingly loud, enervatingly shallow,
dangerously misguided, and, in the absence of major crisis or other moral challenge, de-
void of substantial meaning.
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liberal private sphere where they (and their distinctive innocent virtues) are protected
from the need to contend with men in their “fallen state”, which is the inevitable, “neces-
sary” task and human consequence of engaging in politics and government. Caring,
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CHAPTER 3
ENLIGHTENED COMMUNITY
“If terms like 'populism ' and ‘community’ figure prominently in political discourse today, it is
because the ideology of the Enlightenment, having come under attack from a variety of sources,
has lost much of its appeal .... The Enlightenment’s reason and morality are increasingly seen as a
cover for power, and the prospect that the world can be governed by reason seems more remote
than at any time since the eighteenth century.” - Christopher Lasch
1
Whatever the future may have in store, one thing is certain. Unless local communal life can be
restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify itself.”
- John Dewey
“It is sad that men who feel a desparate need for communion have been so deeply affected by a so-
ciety whose life and thought deny it, that they can conceive of community only as an ‘image’, an
illusion no less ephemeral for being willed.” - William Carey McWilliams 3
Defining Community
Communitarianism is one recent attempt to recover or recreate something that its
proponents believe is injured and dying in America under the onslaught of Enlightenment
Man s dominant individualism and the related offensive by the highly organized, instru-
mentally rational structures he has created to govern the state, the economy and society.
That something is “community,” a term that today is most often used to capture a set of
attributes that are associated with traditional patterns of living together that many of us
value deeply. One of these characteristics, the one for which communitarian scholars and
philosophers particularly long, is the capacity to identify and seek common goods.
In their broadest popular understanding, those traits associated with community
are widely seen as forming at least part of the essence of the good life, of connection
with, participation in, and control over the content of family and social life, local gov-
ernment, and at least some portion of the provision of material needs. Most important,
communities are seen as essential locales and institutions for the nourishing of our moral
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nature. They function as moral anchors, as places where a morality of common goods is
most effectively taught, observed, practiced, and preserved in a tradition
.
4
Conventional uses of the word community in America are good places to seek a
fuller understanding of its attributes and its status as a public philosophy in our culture.
In routine references the concepts of place and belonging are most evident. The brief
phrase, “my community,” when spoken by many of us who live in rural areas and in some
suburban and urban enclaves, means much more than the place where we live, although
that is included, along with ownership of tangible, “real” property - an exclusive piece of
a larger personally known space. It is more a statement about a place whose geographic,
legal, and political dimensions are further defined by a sense of attachment and belong-
These comforts are also partly informed by experiencing that one is among actual
and potential family or friends, and others with whom we share at least some deeply held
values in common. It is a mode of living that is closely associated with home and
neighborhood, with being known, accepted, even appreciated for who one is rather than
solely what one does.
We also use community to talk about certain activities and functions that are im-
portant to us, in order to convey something about the qualities we want each to possess.
Schools, recreation, and policing are, for example, thought of quite differently when com-
munity is their modifier. In addition to place and belonging, other qualities, such as
safety, order, exclusion, participation, co-operation, and control are more clearly present
in the mix, although we often vary widely on their respective priority and means of provi-
sion. This form of usage further implies behavioral standards, criteria for our belonging
that are, to some extent at least, locally defined, imparted, and enforced.
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Community, as Amitai Etzioni asserts, imparts much more than a “warm, fuzzy,
comfortable” place . 5 It is a locus of obligations and other expectations made more en-
forceable by social ties and pressures. At this point, we - some of us more than others -
are further reminded that community can also be a place of oppressive discomfort, invol-
untary exclusion, and physical violence for those who will not, or cannot conform. These
latter qualities are not mentioned to suggest that Etzioni and other communitarians ad-
mire them; however, to the extent that community is connected with the inherent
particularity of place, ownership, and belonging, the potential harms of exclusion and so-
cial coercion must be taken into account.
Thus far, the selected uses of community have also carried with them, as first al-
luded to, an implicit connection with the past that is at peril in the present. For some,
present experience or images from personal childhood experience are associated, while
for others learned traditions and other images from other less direct, more distant sources
are triggered. Carried along with these connections is the identification of communities
as places of relative equilibrium, stability, continuity, tradition, and status quo. Many of
us value predictability, a steady rhythm in our daily lives, provided that the content is not
stultifying or enslaving .
6
Communities are also still understood in much of America as places that can mu-
tually assure collective liberty against external threat and more subtle outside pressures,
such as those imposed by our pervasive, marketized, mass commercial society and cul-
ture. One suspects that there are few admirers of Tocqueville who do not share his
appreciation for what he saw as the delicate communal liberty of the township:
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“It is not by chance that I consider the township first. The township is the only as-
sociation so well rooted in nature that whenever men assemble it forms itself. ... But
though townships are coeval with humanity, local freedom is a rare and fragile thing..
A civilized society finds it hard to tolerate attempts at [local] freedom.... However, the
strength of free peoples resides in the local community.”7
More recently, community has been widely employed to describe newer, less
physical, more segmented places, from which one can confirm the continuing importance
of the concept thus far discussed and parse out other attributes. For example, there is the
“listening community” whose place is a particular FM radio frequency. If the signal is
assigned to a typical commercial station, the phrase is lightly intended, largely as a com-
ponent of a marketing package; however, where it is allocated to a public non-profit
station the usage may be apt . 8 Such a station, in principle at least, is one to which we can
belong, not just as a listener, but as a formal member and by virtue of opportunities to
volunteer and become a more active participant. In addition, the staff solicits and an-
nounces our financial and volunteer support. They offer programs that we value and
enjoy, and offer democratic or other satisfactory reasons when they do not. Between fund
drives we listen, offer our praise and criticism, which they broadcast or report, with
mimimal editing and a serious attempt to be representative. The relationship is interac-
tive, directly and vicariously affective, mutually informing, and voluntary. Because of
the last quality, we are free to opt out, to move to a new place on the FM spectrum or at
least stop pledging and volunteering. We often do so when we come to feel that we no
longer belong, that the community has become more virtual than actual, and it no longer
represents or includes us.
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Professionals, ethnic, gender, and racial groups, environmental, religious eco-
nomic, and other segmented groups of all types are likewise frequently referred to as
communities in ways that are considered legitimate by members and non-members alike
.
9
The apparent purpose is to denote commonalties that are more than external characteris-
tics, although, as with communities of place and belonging, external, readily detectable
evidence of membership remains important. The use of community to modify or explain
such groups implies a variety of things shared by a circumscribed group, which identify
them to others, and promote their self-identification as members. These include a com-
mon history or tradition, shared values and norms, conforming practices, a status rank
among members and within the larger population, a shared language - in short, a distinct
identity or a common sub-culture
.
10
Notably lacking in many of the above segmented group forms, however, are fre-
quent, routine opportunities for the development of authentic, warm, affective
relationships - or even existential tolerance - that stem from frequent contact around
common, daily, generically human life activities, like raising, educating, and protecting
children and routine celebrations of life itself. In fact, the norms of such groups may ac-
tively discourage the combination of affectionate and intellectual interaction, either
outside or within such communities, for the sake of the group’s higher priorities - profes-
sionalism, ideology, some other form of group exclusivity - or as the mere by-product of
the individually instrumental nature of the group’s shared goals. Collegiality, toleration
and other forms of civility may be encouraged, but those are less significant, evanescent
matters, as most communitarians recognize . 11
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As is implied in each of the foregoing, the term community is invariably used in
ways that connect it to the idea of shared values and practices. This is most evident in
one of its largest applications, political community. America is still referred to on occa-
sion as a national community, usually when someone seeks to evoke or promote themes
of national unity, interdependence, loyalty, and solidarity. In our politics, it is an attempt
to describe America as a nation of varied peoples and interests, a pluralistic polity whose
citizens share and exercise a common core of political ideals. It is also a reference to our
history, to conscious efforts by the Founders, Lincoln, and numerous others to build a na-
tional society using the these materials and means. We often forget, however, that the
ideals, values, and practices which we share must themselves have unifying qualities. If,
as has come to be the case in America, the former cohere foremost around the principles
of personal liberty, instrumental pursuit, formal equality, and individual rights, unity may
be more apparent than actual, or circumstantial than durable. Similarly, if the practices -
the acts we are called upon to perform to maintain government and support each other -
are few in number, scant in substance, unevenly burdensome, overly bureaucratized, or
performed in isolation, our sense of community is neither enhanced nor further instanti-
ated.
It is national community, as first suggested, which is the leading concern of main-
stream communitarian scholars. Local community in America has been weakened under
the impact of liberal republican values, no longer compensated for by republican virtue,
nor reinforced by our inadequate practices. As a result, movement in the direction of na-
tional community has stalled, even reversed. We have failed, as Tocqueville urged, to
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integrate communal freedom,” a positive understanding of liberty, into our “national
ideas and habits .” 12
Modern Communitarianism
It is apparent from the above that community in both its traditional and modem
usage is related to society. In fact, contemporary communitarians intend just that. They
use community as a concept to capture in our society the attributes of place, belonging
and other affective comforts, as well as order, interdependence, shared purposes,
volunteerism, and autonomy. Each is seen as a necessary, therefore moral quality that
should be present in the mix and balance of society — a social content that is appropriate
to our time and setting. They share a telos
,
which is move us in the direction of the
“Good Society,” 13 an America that exists as a “community of communities ... a set of
attributes, not [just] a concrete place .”
14
Unfortunately, however, their concept of society,
and their corresponding views of community, human nature and individual moral capacity
within it - if we accept them as true - leave us without the individual and small group
strength to directly seek, let alone generate movement in the direction they point toward.
Real Society; the Master Entity
The emphasis on community as a moral framework for our nation is based on the
foundational communitarian belief that society itself, regardless of its configuration and
moral content, plays a critical role in our individual and collective lives. For modem
communitarians in particular, society is not employed simply as a useful meta-perspective
from which to observe and categorize human interaction. It is also not enough to con-
ceive of society as a set of institutions that relate to various aspects of human activity and
which play a role in shaping and constraining our behavior. From a communtarian per-
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spective, society is a_distinct realm of reality, something that has evolved from humans
interacting with each other and with the world within particular confines of space, time,
and historic circumstance. Its institutions - community being only one type or form -
have grown to encompass all forms and areas of human activity. They “mediate the rela-
tions between self and world," giving in the process a certain form or identity to the self
and the world . 15
American communitarians, as the foregoing suggests, have strong sociological
roots. As social historian, Chrostopher Lasch observed:
Communitarianism has its intellectual antecedents in a sociological tradi-
tion, initially a conservative tradition, that found the sources of social cohesion in
shared assumptions so deeply ingrained in everyday life that they don’t have to be
articulated: in folkways, customs, prejudices, habits of the heart.” 16
According to Emile Durkheim, a principal founder of modem sociology - con-
ceived by him as the parent social science - a legitimate government presupposes and,
therfore, can only reflect a healthy, cohesive society. Societies are the fundamental, es-
sential human context, the largest realm of shared understanding and practice. They
possess a reality, a nature, a life of their own .
17
Each contains a distinctive set of func-
tional institutions and their particular practices of living, working, and governing. In its
fullest understanding, society is a comprehensive, interrelated, complex entity
,
the essen-
tial master system for all aspects of human life within its purview. At its most highly
developed, robustly integrated, cohesive best, it is a vastly more powerful agent than any
individual, group, or institution within its all-encompassing ambit. Its agency exists pri-
marily in the fact that it informs and therefore shapes virtually all human understanding.
Society is what makes us both human and particular.
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Society as Morality and Soul
In its most abstract conception, society is a particular “composition of ideas, be-
liefs and sentiments of all sorts, which realize themselves through individuals.” 18 Chief
among them are moral ideals, a set of core beliefs that are seen by a society’s members as
its (and their) raison d etre. Morality in its profound and mundane forms is part of the
essence of a society, and their content reflects our state of social dependence. 19 However,
while these ideals, beliefs, and associated feelings result from the interaction of individual
conscious minds, and are dependent on them for their existence, they are not reducible to
them.^ Thus, although “sociology is defined as the science of societies, [and] human
groups
. . . are the immediate object of its investigation
. . . society can only exist if it pene-
trates the consciousness of individuals and fashions [them] in its image and
resemblance.”21
Writing in 1914, Durkheim exuberantly proclaimed the fullness of society’s pene-
trative strength. It was the source of our sense of soul or transcendence, the higher voice
of our inner-conflicted human nature. 22 With this positivist master stroke, he dissolved
the conflict that Hawthorne and Emerson had debated in the nineteenth century - the at-
tempt to reconcile mortal man with his desire for transcendence. He sided with
Emerson’s view of history as inevitable human progress, while locating the grand design
of mankind - and the possibility of progress itself - in society, a place that Emerson, a
robust individualist, would have detested:
“The painful character of the dualism of human nature is explained by this
hypothesis. There is no doubt that if society were only the natural and spontane-
ous development of the individual, these two parts [consciousness of self and of
“something else”] would ... adjust to each other without ... friction.... In fact,
however, society has its own nature, and ... its requirements are quite different
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from those of our nature as individuals: the interests of the whole are not necessar-
ily those of the part. Therefore society cannot be formed or maintained without
our being required to make costly and perpetual sacrifices. Because society sur-
passes us, it obliges us to surpass ourselves ...”24
Over time, society acts to separate, to filter out the dross - ideas and practices
seen within its own frame of reference as base, trivial, or inferior. What remains is stored
in its collective consciousness,” or more localized “communities of memory .”25 Both
are accessible to all members through their involvement in its institutions - its functional
patterns of belief and behavior, formed by our history of regularized interaction. In turn,
they constitute our living and being framework, that which renders us as human and par-
ticular. Having accomplished our initial formation, our institutions guide us through life,
accepting our modest discrete inputs as feedback in the above process of refinement and
adjustment that is ideally continuous and accretive. The moral content of society is some-
thing we can only indirectly and secondarily affect.
To assist in the transmission of moral ideas and behaviors, society carries within
its institutional memory models of individual human behavior in the form of characters
and practices associated with roles, together with lesser group and an overarching collec-
tive identity, developed over multiple generations. Characters, such as literary and
historical heroes, serve a broad societal moral educative purpose, furnishing us with the
ideal contents of character or virtue. They are a society’s “great men,” its moral exem-
26
plars, those whose greatness depends on our approval even as it inspires our ownf
Institutional roles impart a more specific, routine morality - that of family, community,
work, and politics . 27 Taken together, they integrate us into the whole, demonstrating not
only who we are, but also where and how we belong.
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To summarize the communitarian claim thus far, societies, the communities and
institutions contained within them, are an observable phenomenon in all human develop-
ment: the geographically, historically, circumstantially varied expression and, most
important, the formative force of our identity and our nature. Institutions are the essential
intermediary links connecting us to each other and to the whole
.
28 We require society to
provide us with the vital information of who we are, what we are capable of achieving,
together with the information - knowledge of methods and means - and the opportunity —
to go about doing it.
If a society is to perform these tasks well, if it is to become a “Good Society,” it
has, as Durkheim argued, functional needs that must be addressed. According to Etzioni,
social order and autonomy are the twin requirements that are universal to all societies, to
their successful, systemic operation - “the contributions of the parts to the needs of the
whole. ’ From a “value neutral” viewpoint, there are alternative “responses” or methods
for meeting these needs; however, if we are to move toward a good or communitarian so-
ciety, “an order that is aligned with the moral commitments of [its] members,” we need to
be mindful that some responses are better than others . 30 The need at any given time and
context is to attain and maintain equilibrium between order and autonomy, a task that is
best accomplished by methods that are consistent with the fundamental values of the par-
ticular society. In America, this requires primary recourse to voluntary compliance and to
Q 1
democratic practices as opposed to state coercion.
Robert N. Bellah et al., are less comfortable with the communitarian label, due
apparently to Etzioni’ s candid call to balance or condition freedom with the need for so-
cial order, and his implicit refusal to eschew coercion. Instead, they seek to restore the
86
“moral ecology” of American society through institutional reform
.
33
They acknowledge
our strong cultural resistance to the implications of their empirically based belief that we
are socially, institutionally dependent, attributing it to the fact that “some of our institu-
tions have indeed grown out of control and beyond our comprehension. But the only
answer is to change them, for it is illusory to imagine that we can escape them .”34
Our Social Human Nature
As is implicit in the foregoing, the core ontological assumption underlying the so-
ciological communitarian model is the a priori social nature of man. It is a nature that is a
combination of fundamental needs and abilities that enable us to meet those needs. In
sharp contrast to Enlightenment Man — to liberal republicanism — the communitarian fo-
cal point for the development of human nature as a work-in-progress is the external locus
of social relations and social formation, not the inner world of self-conscious isolation or
the outer world of atomistic striving.
Democratic theorist Carole Pateman acknowledges with empirical integrity that
the original order of human formation “cannot be known;” however, she responds to the
liberal republican claims of natural autonomy by asserting that “individuals may be 'bom
free and bom equal’, but they are neither bom as full-fledged persons, nor are they bom
outside of a network of social relationships .”35 The composite, individual-social interac-
tive formation of human nature that Pateman suggests, however, is not the stuff that
Communitarian Man is made from. He is inherently
,
not just initially dependent on oth-
ers for the content of his life. His language and thought patterns, his relation to others and
the physical world, his beliefs and values, his unique personal identity - all are furnished
to him by family, community, and other social institutions. Each shapes man into who he
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is, and, in turn, informs him what he should do. In one of the strongest statements of the
communitarian position, Etzioni states, “communitarians have shown that individuals do
not exist outside particular social contexts ... it is erroneous to depict individuals as free
agents .”
36
In contrast, Pateman is keenly aware that individual and intentionally organized
power affects the structure and moral content of society, and that Enlightenment Man is,
if not in his theoretical origins, today as much a social product as is his communitarian
counterpart. Mere socialization, in other words, is only a process that stems from our so-
cial nature. Its content, in the short-term at least, can be decidedly anti-social .37
If communitarians are correct, American Enlightenment Man now suffers from a
major mental malady, the self-aware delusion of individual freedom. Thus misinformed,
he is spurred on by his mortal unease - a feature common to both models - to boundless
material and sensual striving. He seeks the impossible, to bypass society except for per-
sonal comfort and limited instrumental support. He turns to the false voice of inner-
informed reason to define his virtue, establish government, and adopt laws to maintain
order on a pluralist playing field of individual opportunity.
Under the communitarian model our self-awareness is itself socially informed,
the product of group life as institutionalized in a particular time and setting. Our free-
dom, as Socrates saw his life in the polis
,
depends on citizen support and is therefore
bounded within its limits. Stable order exists not simply because of fear as Hobbes saw
it, nor is it primarily a Lockean instrumental response to both fear and the drive to pursue
personal happiness. Further, it is not the product of a rationally prescribed political re-
gime - Hobbesean, Lockean, or any other. Social order develops from “deep-seated
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sociological and historical need .”38 It is durably achieved by the development of a system
of beliefs and supporting sentiments in a cohesive society that set limits to what its mem-
bers can do .39 Only in such a society can common goods be identified and pursued. To
be sure, such pursuit, if it is to be generally available, requires the practice of human vir-
tue; however, virtue itself, along with the concepts of good and evil, right and wrong, is
defined, reinforced, and transmitted by society. Conforming habits, patterns of behavior
supported by the mind and the heart are the driving force of virtue
.
40
They must be both
taught and practiced with some constancy. Virtue, therefore, depends upon society and
its institutions, just as society requires virtue and habit for its cohesion or vitality.
Our Inherent Moral Nature
The social nature of Communitarian Man must be further examined if we are to
understand his moral capacity. Clearly, to the extent that we intrinsically value rather
than merely depend upon the many forms of social interaction, we are more comfortable
with society and more inclined to acknowledge our dependence on its key institutions -
and our moral duty to support them. Accordingly, it is important to discern the traits or
abilities that motivate and enable us to enter into relationships and maintain them for their
own sake. It also seems important to do so if we are garb the autocratic emperor that is
communitarian society with rational dignity. It therefore seems important to arm Com-
munitarian Man with an inherently social nature, one that is at least strongly motivated to
act socially. We must do so unless we are to assume that society predates men living to-
gether, or that learned behaviors cannot be unlearned.
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David Hume
The insights of Scottish enlightenment philosopher, David Hume, have been a
substantial influence on the construction of the American communitarian model. His
concept of our moral nature seems, at first, to differ substantially from that at the base of
liberal republicanism. His distinctive emphasis on the social dimension of human nature,
not only in terms of the formation of human personality, but also in the development of
moral capacity and the defining of morality itself, is certainly helpful. In doing so, Hume
offers a social and political actor who is motivated by more than mortal fear and conse-
quential self-interest. He discerns within us sympathy or fellow feeling and appears to
strengthen - even ground - morality with this inherent sentiment. Moral principles and
virtues are both received and derived from our social life by the placing of utility judg-
ments upon human character and actions . 41 They are more than logical conclusions
drawn from reason, yet Hume observes “that reason and sentiment concur in almost all
moral determinations and conclusions ...”42 He points in the following to an apparently
essential role for sentiment or human feeling in determining the moral:
“Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favor of virtue, and all
disgust or aversion to vice; render men totally indifferent to these distinctions; and
morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives
and actions .”43
It soon becomes apparent, however, that the sentiments that Hume has detected at
work are little more that a rewarding complement to virtues that are themselves rather
modest, akin to those called for in the contemporary discourse on civility .
44
They are
feelings that are short-lived, impulsive, and “...geared to the ordinary life of human-
ity.”
45 More substantial moral topics, such as the principles of justice, are as rational as
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Locke’s formulations and similarly grounded
.
46
Further, they are intended to lend utilitar-
ian support to a liberal republican social and political order, which relies more
significantly upon the devices of Hume’s contemporary and colleague, Montesquieu, for
its preservation.
Hume, as noted, does somewhat improve upon the exclusive rationality of
Enlightenment Man by adding social feeling, supported by a moral intuition or instinct, to
the rational mind as framers of morality. However, he rejoins other enlightened political
thinkers, as Adam Smith would do a generation later, by concluding that the passion of
acquisitiveness, as well as other “selfish” drives, strongly outweigh man’s capacity to act
virtuously.
7
In doing so, Hume ultimately places personal morality or virtue on weak
inner-pleasure and social approval footing. Finding that “...morality is determined by
sentiment,” he relegates virtue to “whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator
the pleasing sentiment of approbation.” - in other words, to the equivalent of receiving an
Academy Award for film-makers and actors, or the pleasure of attending a ‘feel good’
movie for a mass audience .48
Hume finally divorces us from any residual expectation that the moral instinct or
social nature he has observed has any real breadth or depth by assigning the job of build-
ing support for the new, rationally determined liberal political order to a cadre of
unsentimental, rationally enlightened leaders. It would seem that both the virtues and
supporting sentiments that are required in the enlightened social and political order, must
be inculcated and nurtured in the populace .49 His moral sentiment may be grounded in
man’s inherent nature, and constitute an ineluctable component in his moral judgment;
however, it is too weak to obligate man to act, except where “...an agreeable sentiment, a
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pleasing consciousness, a good reputation” will suffice
.
50 To construct Communitarian
Man, particularly in our time, from such insight is even more enervating than the Lockean
alternative. Hume places the socially attached, moral sentimentalist under the thumb and
Machiavellian tutelage of those from whom he has modeled his elite version of Enlight-
enment Man. The hearts of the populace must be educated along with their minds to
support the liberal republican framework and to live in an atomistic, pluralistic society
held together by rational virtue, soft affection, and a common love of individual freedom.
Unfortunately, this elite-driven approach is quite compatible with the calls for institu-
tional reform that are favored by modem communitarians, just as they are with
Durkheim’s urging that we, in modem society, should defer to the “natural superiority” of
our “great men .”
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Contemporary Views
As indicated above, contemporary advocates of the popular communitarian model
either share Hume’s view of our moral nature and capacity or subscribe to a close func-
tional equivalent. Robert N. Bellah and his colleagues, in their widely discussed study of
American middle-class mores, Habits of the Heart
,
view human moral nature in terms of
our inherent social need and our capacity to learn. Thus armed, we are able to form good
habits that “establish a web of interconnection by creating trust, joining people to family,
friends, communities, and churches, and making each individual aware of his reliance on
the larger society.” Civic virtue or one’s commitment to some larger public good, must
be learned in concrete “communities of memory.” This phrase is intended to softly con-
vey their belief in the necessity for strong institutions, “real communities” which have a
history - a “constitutive narrative” that is regularly retold .
53
In such communities - they
92
mention churches, as well as ethnic and racial associations - we learn about who we are,
acquire a collective sense of history, and, most important, we learn the “practices of
commitment
. . . the patterns of loyalty and obligation that keep the community alive .”54
While Bellah, et al. clearly favor certain institutions, primarily mainline protestant
churches and others that promote the classical tradition of civic friendship, they are silent
as to the nature of their (and presumably our) capacity to distinguish between “good” and
“bad” communities of memory
.
55
Further, although they place Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. firmly within the embrace of such communities, they fail to account for the either the
manner or the narrow, often shallow extent of his inclusion. There were, for example,
only a scant few white churches or denominations in either the South or the North that
either opened their doors or emptied their coffers to support the southern civil rights
movement, even at its apogee in the mid-nineteen sixties. African American churches in
the South were hardly uniform in their support, although their reluctance was certainly
more justified. There were, however, individual clergy, members and groups within such
organizations who did commit their time and money to King, often against the wishes of
fellow members and the directives of church and denominational elders . 56 The same was
even more true of most civic institutions at the local, regional, and national levels.
It is further important to note that most of the formative influences gleaned by
Bellah et al. from their interviews of social and political activists, came from individuals
- parents and other exemplars - who demonstrated virtues that were exceptional and fre-
quently opposed within the communities and the larger institutional environments where
they lived and worked . 57 They also acknowledge a few such persons among their inter-
viewees, but seem puzzled, unable to account for them other than as highly virtuous
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exceptions. In one instance, a woman, labeled by Bellah as a “professional activist,”
traces her initial sense of social responsibility to her grandfather, “a member of the social-
ist Wobblies (Industrial Workers of the World) and of the Catholic Worker Movement ”58
Both were fringe groups which he joined either at their founding or in their early stages.
More important, each was organized in stark opposition to the prevalent social mood -
and social structure - of their era . 59
Another interviewee, an environmental activist who abandoned traditional Ca-
tholicism during her adulthood, is portrayed as “remarkable in the scope with which she
defines her community: ‘I feel very much a part of the whole - of history. I live in a spec-
trum that includes the whole world...’.” Bellah and colleagues expressed concern for the
health of this woman — that her “adoption of the ‘whole world’ [as] a community of mem-
ory and hope” will adversely affect her well-being. “In trying to give substance to what is
as yet an aspiration by defining her community as the whole world, she runs the risk of
becoming detached from any concrete community of memory.”60 One wonders if they
are aware of the numbers of “communities of memory” that would never have come into
being if their founders had not sought to achieve their aspiration, their “far out” vision of
larger community. One also questions whether labeling such persons as exceptional does
not have the effect of limiting the scope of moral capacity to that which is consistent with
the stable, predictable, incremental mode of tradition and institutional constraint.
Ultimately, Bellah et al. rely more on Hume’s version of enlightenment human na-
ture and moral capacity than they are willing to acknowledge .
61
Although their strong
sociological perspective leads them to conclude that we are more fundamentally depend-
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ent on society for our moral content than Hume allowed, they suggest that we (some of
us) are at least able to rationally discern this empirical fact for ourselves. Our rational
faculty further informs us of the importance of civic association for the common good,
although we might, at first, become engaged primarily for reasons of self-interest
.
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However, once we become involved, committed to the pursuit of larger goods, we experi-
ence the deeper forms of satisfaction and friendship that come from service to others .63
As Hume suggested, psychic rewards reinforce our behavior, define it as virtuous, and
encourage us to perform civic duties as a matter of preference and habit. Unlike Bellah
et al., Hume also detected a moral sense, an inherent fellow-feeling that somewhat moti-
vates us to act in the first place.
The communities of memory that Bellah and other more classically informed
scholars conceive of still leave us with the inertial dilemma of liberal republicanism: vir-
tuous souls supported and nurtured in communities and societies separated by their own
group-formed concept of the good, each vigorously engaged in efforts to oppose the
common good sought by the other and to install its own version . 64 Their struggle is un-
ending because no deeply shared truth, nor any common virtue or capacity exists to bring
the communities together, except for the liberal republican rules of engagement and the
occasional rational perception of some common crisis or other instrumental need. Tran-
sient psychic rewards can result equally from service performed for the exclusive benefit
of their member group, even service that is geared to deny those benefits to outsiders.
To extend beyond the confines of group pluralism, Bellah et al offer only the hope
of a gradual, broadening “cognitive awareness” of our mutual dependence on one another,
a sort of social intelligence that sounds quite like the rational capacity for enlightened
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self-interest relied upon by John Locke 65 They hint at a further solution in their brief
discussion of classical or civic friendship; however, they construe such friendship, with
rare exceptions, as another learned virtue, dependent on the existence of “face-to-face”
community, and other pluralist institutional supports whose demise in America they de-
claim.
66
It seems not to have occurred to them that friendship and fraternity might not
—*
3
u ^re the intervention of institutions, but only their practice among individuals acting
and responding on their own initiative. They do so on the strength of their inherent, nur-
turable disposition for affectionate relationship, their belief in inclusive ideals, and their
capacity to imagine the potential for such relationships among others whom they have not
yet had the opportunity to befriend.
Etzioni and James Q. Wilson see the problems of agency and group moral relativ-
ism left unresolved by Bellah and associates in their exclusive reliance on social
formation and institutional reform to properly constitute our moral nature and to furnish
its content. Etzioni recognizes the fallacy of the implied assumption underlying much of
our contemporary discussion about values, “that once people are brought up right, they
will be good people, as if they have been equipped with an internal virtue rod that suffices
to energize their good behavior.” He further notes: “The sociological fact is that values
do not fly on their own wings, that more ... is required for the values of a society to real-
ized, to be reflected in behavior, to guide a people’s life.
In what seems at first to be an effort to escape the circularity of encompassing so-
ciety that mainstream communitarians seem unable to escape, Etzioni balances the
“external moral voice” of society with an “inner moral voice” of conscience. It soon
becomes apparent, however, that the purpose of the latter is to serve the former. “Most of
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us need not consult a sociological or psychological study to know what this inner voice
is.... Typically [it] takes the form of statements that contain ‘I ought to’ as distinct from
‘I would like to’.”69 This voice fosters moral behavior in a manner that follows both
Hume and Bellah et al. “by according a special sense of affirmation when a person ad-
heres to his/her values” and a sense of unease when they are ignored.70 For this process
to occur most effectively, the moral content of the inner and outer voices must be the
same. Society and the individual must be on the same page. This is most effectively the
case at the level of the community where members are encouraged to abide by community
values, and censured when they are not. The “moral voice [of the community] ... is sub-
tle, and highly incorporated into daily life. It often works through frowns, gentle snide
comments (and some that are not so gentle), praise, censure, and approbation.”71
Etzioni clearly has not afforded us with the means for either resistance or escape
from society. It is not surprising that he finds the nineteen-sixties to have been the ful-
crum of an episodic swing toward social anarchy, or that he takes comfort in his belief
that, “beginning with the 1990s, a regeneration has begun to set in.”7 “ One wonders if he
has detected the uncanny parallel between the moral voice of community and life in the
rural South during Jim Crow.
A Communitarian Realist
James Q. Wilson is comfortable with order and conformity, but not with society
as it has evolved in America. He blames science and “intellectuals” for modem relativ-
ism, stating that “the spirit of the age has been one of skepticism [where] science has
challenged common sense.”
73
Morality is seen as mere opinion, as culture specific cus-
tom, and man is portrayed as having no nature apart from that imparted through culture.
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Seeing his task as a continuation of the work begun in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries by Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and others from the Scottish
Enlightenment, he seeks to add to this tradition ... a knowledge about what the biological
and social sciences have learned about what they were the first to call the moral sense .”74
For Wilson, the moral sense is something that most of us possess. It is formed out
of “the interaction of [our] innate dispositions with [our] earliest familial experiences .”75
He defines it as “an intuitive or directly felt belief about how one ought to act when one is
free to act voluntarily.”
76
Our moral sense has several aspects, each of which are detect-
able by observation of and inferences drawn from the universal social practice of judging
others. Sympathy, fairness, self-control and duty are four which he identifies and dis-
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cusses.
Average Americans, according to Wilson, are losing confidence in the sources and
importance of their moral sense. He sees many causes for this shift (in addition to those
above-noted), but claims one of them is “the collapse in legitimacy in what was once re-
spectably called middle-class morality - but today is sneeringly referred to as ‘middle-
class values’.” With this otherwise unexplained connection between the moral sense
and a particular shared moral code, Wilson appears to join the communitarian camp and
its project to replicate the moral stability of traditional society. In his effort, however, he
reaches too far back even for those who seek to recapture time with science and institu-
tional design. His membership is further brought into question by his emphasis on the
role of family and kindred rather than society as the primary agents for the development
of a child’s moral sense through bonding and control .
79
Although he does look to local
communites to assist families in order to furnish the necessary “group-centered” as op-
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posed to “individualistic’' child-rearing norms, he does not look to society to play a mor-
ally helpful role.
80
Ultimately, Wilson finds himself uncomfortable with either the contemporary
communitarian or enlightenment models. Human nature is social, yet he believes that
kinship and small communities still set the outer limits of our social nature and largely
determine the range in which we apply our moral sense. Outside of family, friends, and
other face-to-face intimates, destructive human passions that are facilitated by our indi-
vidualistic culture readily trump our inner motive power. In his final paragraph, he arrives
at Hume’s position:
“Mankind’s moral sense is not a strong beacon light... It is, rather, a small candle
flame, casting vague and multiple shadows, flickering and sputtering in the strong
winds of power and passions, greed and ideology. But brought close to the heart
and cupped in one’s hands, it dispels the darkness and warms the soul.”81
Wilson somewhat resignedly accepts the liberal republican framework, with its
embrace of civil society, “as the best available system to safeguard against the various
tyrannies that are formulated either in the name of narrow community or authoritarian-
ism. As did Reinhold Neibuhr, Wilson appears to conclude that while society is real, it
is hardly the locus of the soul or of immortality. Man, within its heavily tempting modem
embrace is irredeemably frail, blessed only with individual grace and the rational capacity
to give government the power to protect him from others - and from himself.
Concluding Thoughts
Communitarianism leaves us in a state of “Catch-22,” wondering how or to what
extent we can change something that we are so dependent on, that has grown beyond our
control or comprehension, and from which there is no escape. Fortunately, both society
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and its institutions are decidedly less real in the sense of autonomy, coherence, and power
than either Etzioni or Bellah portray them. Neither possesses the agency to maintain
themselves, except to the extent that we furnish our support.
A long, broad view of history informs us that society and its institutions are both
intentionally produced and - particularly at the intimate, familial level - organic or spon-
taneous unions of human desire and need. Society and its larger components are formed
and changed by a wide variety of agency and upheaval, and are maintained by power in
its many forms, as well as law, habit, and conformity. Most important, its institutions can
be radically, purposively altered as well as escaped from, either by those willing to accept
the potential consequences for their nonconformity, or by those with the means to impose
new behavioral standards on others.
Communitarian calls for the reform of institutions in order to foster moral com-
munity, to instill an Aristotelian ethos of common pursuit, are weakly framed,
misdirected and out of sequence. Those who occupy institutional seats of authority in our
liberal republican regime, in the economy, and in supportive civil society are free to ig-
nore such calls - or to warmly endorse them - largely without peril. Major institutional
reforms of the type that foster a deeper, more inclusive community ethos in America are
the last events of major social and political change. Social and political transformation
begins with individual and small group actors acting directly for change, living while they
do so as though society - and community - are something quite different than either past
traditional forms or the sociological version that now prevails. Such actors will not suc-
ceed, however, if we accept the idea of socially determined human nature and moral
capacity as valid. It may be difficult to persuade each other authentically, one-by-one;
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however, it is misguided at best and mass manipulative at worst, to focus our reform ef-
forts on entities that only exist in unreflective individual consciousness. Given the
communitarian view of human nature - not theirs, but ours - they are constrained to util-
ize the latter approach. Society must be manufactured, its components carefully crafted
and repaired by outside experts, those with the rational expertise to detect its flaws. The
fact that they undertake this task with a preference for local democracy and a Humean
heart offers only the faint comfort that they will continue to depend upon us for their psy-
chic rewards.
101
Notes
Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy(New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) 93.
2
John Dewey, The Public and its Problems
. (1927; Athens OH: Swallow P/Ohio
UP, 1997)216.
3
McWilliams 621.
4
MacIntyre 258.
5
Amitai Etzioni 123.
6
Lasch 27.
7
Tocqueville 62-63.
8
In the case of WAMC, an Albany, New York affiliate of National Public Radio,
the usage is apt.
9
This use does not include the assignment or use of labels or classifications by
one group to define or isolate another.
10
Etzioni 127.
11
Robert N. Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991)
12 .
12
Tocqueville 62.
13
Bellah et al. The title is taken from the title of Walter Lippmann’s book, The
Good Society (Boston: Little-Brown, 1937).
14
Etzioni 177-178, 6.
15
Robert N. Bellah, et al. 287.
16
Lasch 92.
17
Emile Durkheim, On Morality and Society: Selected Writings , Robert N. Bel-
lah, ed (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1973) 16.
102
18
Robert N. Bellah, introduction, Emile Durkheim, On Morality and Society ix-
X •
19
Bellah, intro, Durkheim, ix-x; Durkhein, Bellah, ed. 135.
20
Bellah, intro, Emile Durkheim, xix-xx; Durkheim, Bellah, ed. 15-17. 128.
-1
Durkheim, Bellah, ed. 149.
22
Durkheim, Bellah, ed. 149-163.
23
McWilliams 280-89, 301-27.
24
Emile Durkheim, Robert N. Bellah, ed. 163.
25
Bellah, intro, Emile Durkheim, xix; Bellah et al. 153.
26
Durkheim, in Bellah, ed. 25-33. Cf. MacIntyre 258
^
MacIntyre 27-28.
28
Bellah et al. 287-288.
29
Etzioni 6.
30
Etzioni 6-7, 12. Bellah et al. similarly loosely define a good society as “an open
quest [for the common good] actively involving all its members. The common good has
“no pattern . . . that we or anyone else can simply discern and then expect people to con-
form to.... [T]he common good is the pursuit of the good in common.” Bellah et al., 9.
31
Etzioni 12-13.
32
Bellah et al. 6.
33
Bellah et al. 5-6, 287-290.
34
Bellah et al. 6.
35 Pateman 25.
36
Etzioni 6.
37
Pateman 177-178.
103
38
Etzioni, xvi. He does not explain either further. Presumably, he intends merely
to restate that we are social by nature, we prefer the company of others. The reference to
history is likely to our progressive interdependence stemming from learned patterns of
cooperation.
39
James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: The Free Press/Macmillan
Inc., 1993) 14.
Robert N. Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in
American Life
, 1985 (Berkeley: U Cal P, 1996).
41
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals . Charles W.
Hendel, ed. (1751; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957) VI, Part I-II, 58-73.
42 Hume I, 6.
43 Hume I, 6.
44
Carter, Civility (see Ch. 1, note 31).
45
Pangle, Spirit 7 1
.
46
MacIntyre 229.
47
Pangle Spirit 7 1
48 Hume, Inquiry
, Appendix I, 107. Cf. MacIntyre, 230-231.
49
Pangle, Spirit 71-2.
50 Hume, IX, pt. D, 102.
51
Durkheim 32-33.
52
Bellah, et al. Habits of the Heart 251.
53
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 152-155.
54
Bellah et als., Habits of the Heart 154.
55
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 114-116, 219, 237-243.
56
Charles Marsh, God’s Lone, Hot Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights
(Princeton: Princeton U P, 1997) 3-9; Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights
Movement: Black Communities Organizinfi for Change (New York: Macmillan,Inc./Free
104
Press, 1984) 68-73. The intent here is not to devalue the role of institutional religion in
the struggle for civil rights in the South, or in any of the major peace and social justice
campaigns waged in America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is in-
tended, however, as a reminder that, with few exceptions, our large-scale religious
institutions have often been divided, if not outright opposed to the initiation of morally
informed social and political change. Often their support has been dependent on the ef-
forts of core actors to persuade members and church leaders to re-examine their teachings
and redirect their resources and energies.
57
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 158-161.
co
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 193.
59
The IWW, a militant socialist industrial union, was founded in Chicago in Janu-
ary 1905. Wobblies were a primary target of the period of harsh political repression
following WWI. Many of its leaders were arrested, jailed, and deported in the reactive
aftermath of the November 1917 Russian Revolution. Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs:
Citizen and Socialist (Urbana IL: U of Illinois P, 1982) 205-6; 288.
The Catholic Worker Movement was founded by Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day
was founded in 1933 in New York’s lower east side “to encourage Christian Pacifism,
forthright defense of those who suffer [from] social injustice, and dedication to ‘personal-
ise social action.” Never formally affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, it has
functioned to date as a highly de-centralized, broadly ecumenical, grass roots radical
movement. Cooney and Micalowski, eds., The Power of the People: Active Nonviolence
in the United States 85-87.
60
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 158-159.
61
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 80.
6
“ Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 167-169, 174.
63
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 192-195.
64
Pangle and MacIntyre. Explain.
65
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart
,
163-177.
66
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart 194-195.
67
Etzioni 1 19-120. Emphasis added.
68
Etzioni 120-122.
105
69
Etzioni 121.
70
Etzioni 121.
71
Etzioni 123-124.
72
Etzioni 73. Cf. 64-73.
73
Wilson, intro, vii-viii.
74
Wilson, intro, xiii.
75
Wilson 1.
76
Wilson, intro, xii.
77
Wilson, intro, xiii.
78
Wilson 10.
79
Wilson 142-148.
80
Wilson 148.
81
Wilson 251.
82
Wilson 246-247.
CHAPTER 4
THE CAPACITY TO ACT:
A PAIR OF NINETEENTH CENTURY CORE ACTORS
The doctrine must be understood through the deed. It is the only possible way not only to stir
others into action, but to give the message itself a sense of reality.” - Jane Addams 1
.
[I]f I literally cannot make my character or behavior other than it is by an act of choice (or a
whole pattern of such acts) which is itself not fully determined by causal antecedents, then I do not
see in what normal sense a rational person could hold me morally responsible either for my charac-
ter or for my conduct.” - Isaiah Berlin 2
“The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that
he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And ... this is possible only because each man
is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.”
- Hannah Arendt 3
The Importance of Intentional Action
Nothing reveals the content and reach of human social and political nature more
fully than our intended actions. Our habits, customs, and other unreflective behaviors,
although more common and therefore more predictable, are less reliable indicators of who
we are, both individually and collectively, and what we are capable of doing. When ex-
amined in their well-established forms, whether from the perspective of a society or a
self, they are revealed as the acquired product of past purposive action, sometimes our
own, but more often someone else’s. As such, they serve as a pattern for living, a routine
way of being in the world as it has been perceived and acted upon largely by others. Seen
in this light, both Enlightenment and Communitarian Man are, at least somewhat, crea-
tures of acquired habit.
Our shared habits, our routine enactments that comprise so much of our interac-
tive selves and our social and political institutions, are always subject to change - or
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reinforcement - when their meaning, purpose or utility is called into question, whether by
reflection on individual experiences or our reactions to broader events. At such times, it
is our individual and collective capacities to consciously - concretely and imaginatively -
experience and encounter life, to learn profoundly and to act congruently, and our related
ability to overcome our tendency to conform automatically to existing patterns of percep-
tion, conception, action, and reaction that constitutes our maximum mortal reach. These
capacities, and others which they implicitly embrace, further constitute our sole potential
for individual, social, and political growth — for generally discernible moral progress, as
opposed to some shape of merely detectable development - in a world of dynamically
changing conditions.
Our world, the context in which we act, is a ‘known’ place of potentially infinite
dimensions, in a constant state of being and becoming. Our experience of this world, in-
cluding our interactions with each other, aided where necessary by personal reflection,
imagination, and the sharing of learned results, moves us beyond the narrow realm of
facts and stimulates in us our senses of mystery and beauty, horror and ugliness, to name
only a few. These states of mind are evident in our profoundly felt need to learn, unlearn,
and learn anew. In this process of living and learning, including learning about the past,
we are able to sense and increasingly detect not only the matter and energy that constitute
the reality of ongoing extra-human creation, but also our increasing capacity, for better
and worse, to participate in that reality, to shape and alter both matter and events - in-
cluding our own nature and existence - by intentional as well as habitual human action.
In such a world, our earnestly held ideas, beliefs, aspirations, needs, and feelings -
whether inner and private or public, institutionalized, and iconic - lack vitality unless
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willed to life and sustained by congruent acts in some context where they can matter. It is
our capacity to act purposefully, consistently, and persistently, both alone and together; it
is our willingness, desire, and ability to implement that which we have powerfully learned
with deeds and with words, which enables us to offer to others an actual, living model of
the world, including our relationship to it, and to others within it .4 The results, particu-
larly of our initial efforts, may not resemble the world that we then inhabit, but the only
possibility that they ever will consists of our intended actions and the possibility of a con-
gruent, strong, durable response from others.
Demonstration and Initiation; A Moral Dynamic
By our purposeful deeds and explanations, we demonstrate as we enact something
of our worldview to everyone and upon everything in our ambit. In doing so, we disclose
to others our consciously-held moral values and priorities, our most profound sense of
who we are, what is most important to us, of what life for us is about. Part of that disclo-
sure, a message embodied in the nature and quality of our acting much more than in our
words, is our informing others what we think of and feel toward them.
The type of action that is the focus of this effort is initiatory or non-conforming
social and political action, morally informed words and deeds by core actors who seek to
fundamentally change prevailing law, practices, and other employed beliefs that they see
as inadequate, unjust, inhumane, or simply wrong. It is the exceptional nature of their
efforts, the fact that they are the first to act on their conception in some public setting -
that they initiate, demonstrate, or lead and thereby make further
,
congruent action more
likely and possible - that necessitates our recognition of them as core actors.
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This quality of action, while it sets core actors apart in the social and political con-
text of their actions, should not elevate them from our midst or suggest our incapacity to
join their ranks, whether as followers or as co-initiators of lesser or greater reach. It does,
however, necessitate separate discussion and a corresponding, potentially misleading di-
vision into “us” and “them.” This bifurcation is, however, artificial in the sense that the
essential capacities for some form of sustained, morally informed action lie within each
of us. Many of us, one suspects, are already uncomfortably aware that this is so.
The Variety of Moral Information and Initiatives
There are, of course, some core actors who do not want our company — except,
perhaps, on terms that they determine. Just as some are by no means morally informed in
their action, seeking only to increase or maintain some advantage or to satisfy some drive
or need, those who act upon their moral beliefs initiate with some variety. Their action
takes in the gamut of human interaction, ranging from broadly altruistic, affectionate, and
sacrificial acts of inclusion, to dogmatically conceived acts of terror, forced conversion,
categorical ranking, and exclusion. Many at both extremes are undoubtedly certain of
their grasp of truth; however, only the doctrinaire acts as though truth is somehow sepa-
rate from and more important than life itself. Interestingly, the quality of their action, in
terms of its effects upon others, is little different than action by those who find meaning
only in themselves and their own mortality. In both cases, it is the exclusive nature of the
truth each claims, and their irreducible ontologies of self and other, which informs their
action.
The dominant characteristic of the initiatory acts of the core actors focused on
herein is their use of methods, as a matter of intention and belief, which explain, demon-
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strate, and seek to persuade, rather than obfuscate, manipulate, coerce, or avenge. Their
foundational moral beliefs are, as just suggested, firmly held - often remarkably so - but
are typically not rigid, institutionalized, exclusive, or doctrinaire. The content and
grounding of such beliefs, and the related question of how these actors come to possess
them, are highly important and will be more fully addressed in the final chapter. The
point at this juncture is that their methods are neither exclusively instrumental nor fully
determined by the social and political logic of nonconformity in an effort to establish a
self or group identity in a given oppressive setting. Rather, their choice of means is ani-
mated by the same world-view and convictions - knowledge seen as profoundly simple
truths - that inform their goals. This suggests, at a minimum, a strong optimism stem-
ming from the nature and quality of the insights that have informed and motivated their
action, and the related pleasure that they derive from their active engagement with life
itself.
Their actions further convey their conviction that we - ultimately most of us - are
capable of achieving consensus on values and priorities, of arriving at a shared elemental
perception that what they are demonstrating and calling for lies at the heart of what life,
for each of us, is all about. Moreover, their choice of means reveals their belief that we
are somehow intrinsic to their efforts, a highly desired and valued part of their world, and
therefore worth the risks to self that are inherent in standing in the open, unarmed, outside
conventional or acceptable standards of behavior.
Finally, their actions convey the belief that we, in our potential to learn, to know,
and to act, are as capable as they of initiatory action in our respective domains, whether
larger or smaller. They have mostly become aware that the success of their efforts to
111
achieve lasting social and political change depends upon a chain of initiation and re-
sponse that has usually preceded and must extend well beyond the time and place of their
action. They have learned from past accomplishments by others and their own experience
that a great many of us are capable, at any given moment, of core activism and that
enough of the rest us can at least be persuaded in the direction of reform.
It is from these common premises that core actors seek to convince us by non-
violent means, except where institutionalized and other violence, directed either against
them or others who are unable to protect themselves, overwhelms personal freedom and
thereby denies the substantial possibility of peaceful persuasion. At such moments, core
actors evidence the existential moral conflict posed by opposing violence with violence, a
dilemma that exists only when one understands and values life more inclusively than
one’s opponents.
The Quality of Authenticity
If initiatory actions by core moral actors are to be deeply persuasive to those who
witness or reliably learn about them, they must first be discemibly authentic. In most so-
cial and political settings, authenticity involves a consistent pattern of speech acts that
disclose what the actor believes or intends, combined with some type of actual perform-
ance that confirms the earnest quality of the words . 5
Non-conforming words that are merely uncomfortable to listeners, such as occa-
sional calls for racial harmony made from the pulpit of a de facto segregated church, lack
the ring of hard currency in all but the most hostile settings, unless accompanied by con-
gruent acts that are substantial in their context. Where, as is so often the case with actors
who occupy traditional institutional moral roles, significant action is neither taken nor
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attempted, the words are weighed accordingly and the moral dyspepsia of the congrega-
tion quickly, safely subsides. The gap between the ideal and the actual has been
reinforced, strengthened by the implicit message of mere speech.
In a similar manner, words and deeds by social and political actors who disguise
or who hide themselves from public view cannot be reliably judged for authenticity. To
be discemibly genuine, to be a potentially durable as well as contagious expression of the
beliefs and proposals of an individual or group, there has to be a willing disclosure of in-
dividual and group identity under conditions that assume some risk of social or political
accountability. Those of us — most of us — who follow and build upon the moral social
and political initiatives of others need the embodiment of new, presumptively unpopular
ideas in personified action. We require the actors' self-disclosure, not necessarily to in-
form us that the change that they urge upon us is desirable - we may already know that -
but to demonstrate that it is possible in the life of at least one other tangible actor. Some-
one has to speak and act first before some public, and, accordingly, at personal peril,
before others will likely act at all. Upon close examination, apparently spontaneous so-
cial change is revealed as a close temporal sequence of initiation and response, the end
game of a much longer, more local interactive process.
Actions that meet the foregoing criteria may not possess all of the qualities neces-
sary to persuade us to alter our existing, habitual thoughts and behaviors, but we at least
know that the actors who demonstrate them are committed and capable of disclosing
something new in our portion of the world. By their authenticity, they also inform us that
they are seeking more than praise or distinction. With only minimal reflection, we are
aware that there are many safer, more prosperous, and better-lit avenues for such pursuits.
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Conditions. Human Variety, and Perspective
Morally informed non-conformists must, by the very nature of their action, initiate
change under social, political, and material conditions which limit the impact, but not
necessarily the authenticity or other disclosing and persuasive qualities, of their actions.
As long as they are able to add their actions to some context, they alter it, even if only in
the memory and conscience of a public that consists of one other potential core or sup-
porting actor. No testimony better demonstrates the elemental truth of this proposition
than that of those saved from the Holocaust by the actions of lay rescuers, many of them
total strangers, in Nazi-occupied Europe. As students and survivors of that systemic hor-
ror have attested, it was virtually impossible to take such action in total secrecy. Just as
there were collaborators with the Nazi regime, as with southern slavery, so there were
both active and passive collaborators, active or at least acquiescent supporters of rescuers’
efforts to save lives and preserve humanity
.
6
In every time and setting, from isolated local moments to national and transna-
tional eras, it is the observed and recounted, authentic, morally informed initiatory acts of
a few which demonstrate to the rest of us what we, as persons or a people, are actually
and potentially capable of conceiving and doing in the world. We may not, at a given
moment, be able to match the courage, strength, or particular talents that characterize the
actions of the core moral actors whom we learn of or encounter; however, we can respond
to their initiatives by emulating, supporting - or opposing - them in ways that retain the
essential social and political qualities of morally informed authenticity .
7
This, after all, is
the ordinary manner in which they began their initiatives, never knowing where their ac-
tion would lead or who, if anyone, it might inspire.
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Congruence and Consistency
As suggested in the foregoing, inconstancy and variety are two of the human con-
ditions that we must take into account, for both core actors and ourselves. Our individual
and collective records of all forms of action, our life narratives and our shared history, if
honestly constructed, reflect both. Harmony between our core values and actions - our
fundamental beliefs and our capacity to live them in the open - often yields in encounters
with the immediate and particular. Yet action that is heroic, far-reaching, or otherwise
exceptional in the self-comparisons of many is already ordinary for at least a few. As
such, exceptional, nonconventional action should be seen as a possible harbinger of what
will later, often much later, become ordinary for most.
For the above reasons and others, the consistency of all forms of morally informed
individual and small group action, including that of core actors, should be judged over
lifetimes and its persuasive effect assessed over generations. Moreover, consistency
should not be the sole criterion for moral strength or reach, particularly of a single life. A
brief interval of exceptional courage or sacrifice may have a familial, social, or political
impact - a capacity far greater than that demonstrated in a lifetime otherwise spent tend-
ing to self-focused need. Alternatively, a life that is consistently well-lived, discemibly
authentic and filled with daily initiatives, but which is only local or familial in scope, may
affect others who then visibly add to the moral quality of their nation and beyond. Thus,
as suggested, life narratives and longer, broader context historical accounts offer the best
evidence of our capacity for initiatory moral action and its rippling, persuasive effects.
Again, when seen in this light, core actors become decidedly less exceptional, more ordi-
nary or human - in fact, quite like us.
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Efficacy and Power
It is unfortunate that it is necessary to set forth an argument for the social and po-
litical efficacy of morally informed agency and for the essential role of core actors in the
process of morally-conceived change. Few would argue that purposive action backed by
power lacks such causal strength. When action utilizes power in any of its conventional
coercive, ultimately life-threatening forms, social and political conditions can change rap-
idly and dramatically.
It is equally apparent, however, that the greater efficiency of power, even when
harnessed to some more inclusive moral purpose, has long-term repercussions that con-
firm its limited utility in the achievement of individual, social, and political gains.
Having accomplished visible, external conformity by coercive means, its partisan wield-
ers must now instantiate and otherwise defend their product against those who now are
preoccupied with action to resist, reverse, or ameliorate its effects. Competing, newly
invigorated ideas, purposes, and visions, each dependent for their vitality on motivated
actors and various forms of action, will linger and emerge until the social, political, and
physical landscapes are again detectably altered. It is only a question of time and circum-
stance, even where power is employed with moral reluctance, accompanied by the
extensive, authentic efforts at moral persuasion.
The above process results in a frequently vicious, ongoing cycle where individual
and group coercions are the dominant methods of social and political action. As battle
veterans, historians, and others familiar with action at the outermost margins of our uni-
versal capacity for good and evil can attest, death or total impairment are the only
outcomes that preclude all opposing action - and then only by the dead and fully disabled.
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Students of Machiavelli may admire the modem political aesthetic of skilled,
technologically enhanced, swift suppression, preemption, and artful manipulation, even as
they miss the larger point that has lingered in the Italian landscape ever since. In social
and political action, all methods and means employed to promote change or preserve a
status quo contain moral qualities that will invariably affect the content and viability of
the resulting product . 8
Rational Idealism and Realism
The essential connection between means and purpose, the quality of action and the
achievement of durable, morally progressive results is no less true in the contemporary
era. In America, thanks to our prevailing liberal republican mindset, the overriding qual-
ity of most social and political action is now instrumental, whether rational and self-
serving, rational and communal, conservative or liberal. Even American political ideals,
a set of moral qualities and limitations on action which, when authentically employed
have historically demonstrated their potential to ameliorate the cycle of conventional
power-driven change, lack the necessary embodiment to end it.
Under the influence of enlightened rational thought and action, our lexicon of val-
ues - political equality, democratic participation, fairness, toleration, and justice under an
impartial rule of law - have been defined in increasingly sterile, secular, theoretical and
legalistic terms. Artificially detached at the outset from their historical origins as the
blended, life-enhancing products of self-pursuit and sacrificial, morally informed action,
they are now largely excluded from our official and social realms of speech and action.
Today, they precariously exist in the thin atmosphere of generic political rhetoric as
amorphous, political-cultural ideals, or in the narrow jurisprudential confines of individ-
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ual nghts
- Meanwhile, we largely fail to detect their dynamic substance in the actions of
core actors in our midst.
Liberal republican realists, from Madison to Reinhold Niebuhr and E.E.
Schattschnieder, have long understood the inadequacy of rationally weighed or endorsed
political ideals to achieve lasting moral consensus - to serve, in other words, as a plat-
form for shared action . 10 In their enlightened, pragmatic world-view, our values are
employed along with our interests in ongoing power struggles and negotiations among
competing groups, coalitions, and communities, with their public moral content — the cur-
rent status quo of rationally constrained, aggregated past action - at stake.
The contest process has worked only to the extent that group power remained sus-
ceptible to rational structural constraints that limited both the contagion of belief and the
ability of a minority to deny all other competing claims. Unfortunately, the Madisonian
version — our large republic and its “auxiliary precautions” — has been out-organized and
largely overpowered by economic and political actors whose self-focused perspective is
legitimated by the rational moral philosophical underpinnings of the institutional frame-
work that they dominate . 1
1
Neither the rational idealists’ nor the realists’ views are adequate. Before any ma-
jor change in the concrete expression of our values is the subject of a final round of
negotiation, it is first the object of action. If the action bears only the quality of rational
persuasion premised upon ideals understood as self-entitlements, group enhancements,
and prior compromises, efforts to achieve reform will invariably fail, except at the mar-
gins. Such efforts on behalf of weak constituencies, as advocates for the poor and
incarcerated can attest, will often not even get their proponents to the realists’ bargaining
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table. Just as political goals must be more profoundly understood than as rational enti-
tlements by those who support them, political methods and their underlying values must
be the product of much deeper grounding than instrumental common sense if major
change is to be possible.
The realist approach - action to mobilize, organize, realign, coerce, and manipu-
late by means of conventional political and police power — carries with it the same
cyclical qualities that have threatened not only our capacity to deepen and expand our
values, but also the viability of our liberal republican framework from the beginning.
Those who are defeated in a process that equates all morally grounded assertions with in-
terests know that they have lost to power, manipulation, and artifice (all rationally moral
strategies) in a contest where some coalition of private interests and traditional communal
values typically enjoys the incumbent advantage.
Rare victories for rights claimants who act within the perspective, rules and out-
comes of rational persuasion or pluralist engagement are usually the first to be reversed.
Rationally informed reform coalitions are quintessential^ fragile, subject to easily formu-
lated strategies of division and defeat. Changes in conditions - unforeseen peace,
escalating crime, a declining economy, some new external threat
- inevitably alter the premises of instrumental accommodation and the practical tolera-
tion of dissent. Value-driven change can only succeed and endure when sought by actors
whose willingness to work for and support change is informed by more than rational in-
dividual and group interests, however benignly practiced.
Acting instrumentally from the ontological premises already discussed, the ear-
nest promoters of our system - dominant liberal republicans and complementary
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communitarians - have failed to institutionalize the ideas, values, and congruent practices
that are necessary to fully engage us or to durably provide us with more than the modest,
incremental reform proposals that either group supports. While our lives have become,
on average,’ remarkably better under this structure than some other, more predictably
autocratic option, we find ourselves, once again, profoundly dissatisfied over our inability
to reliably construct and maintain a more just, unified, democratic, active, and purposive
public life.
At no time in our recent history is this more evident than at the current moment.
In the long-lingering wake of a brutal, massive terrorist attack, many of us look for ways
to act on our tragically reinforced desire to become more deeply related to other citizens
and the world. Meanwhile, our political leaders devote most of their attention to seeking
the best combination of techniques to identify, locate and destroy — perhaps even exploit
— externalized evil and to providing the technologically enhanced vigilance, including
domestic surveillance - as prophylactics against future attack . 12 In sum, we have returned
to Machiavelli for strategies to avenge and protect us while we focus on the chimera of
improving our security by the exclusive means of overwhelming power and enhanced ra-
tional designs. Once again, it is a particularly difficult time to be a core moral actor and
to initiate action intended to inform and redress the injustices that are so banally perpe-
trated in our national name and interest.
In order to move away from these and other perils of our conventional pragmatic
wisdom, we must learn to look in the present for the counterparts of those whom we have,
at best, been taught were only somewhat significant in our past. We need to examine the
lives of core moral actors for the type of social and political action that has originated and
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sustained profound, morally driven change in America. 14 By doing so, we can learn more
about our own nature and capacity. Our deep, congruent reactions to their words and
deeds - like our recent response to more conventional public safety heroes recently redis-
covered in our midst - offer confirmation of our own actual and potential nature. Their
initiatory actions and our varied yet resonant reactions are indispensable components in
the dynamic of morally driven change that has significantly shaped our history.
Looking back at a Pair of 19th Century Actors
As suggested, it is easier to detect our potential deep resonance with core actors in
the present by first examining the words and deeds of those who have acted in our past,
and connecting their actions to our own moral framework, similar to theirs, in the present.
This concurrence facilitates our ability to consider openly the nature and quality of their
action, as well as the capacity and role of such actors, in the context of their respective
eras. It also helps us to overcome our personal, culturally reinforced bias against the core
actors in our midst. In large part, this is due to our propensity to either dismiss or mix
admiration with ambivalence toward those contemporary actors who act in ways that ex-
press a moral outlook which we find discomforting. By looking first to the past, and
finding moral comfort in the present, it is possible for us to at least identify some of those
who were at the moral forefront of their place and time.
Accordingly, the task of persuasion begins in our past with a pair of actors who
are generally accepted as connected to past moral achievements. Elizabeth Cady Stanton
(1815-1902) and Frederick Douglass (c. 1817-1895), capture the essence of moral action -
the “grand battle of individual liberty against unjust authority” - as framed in America in
the heart of the nineteenth century.
15 As is characteristic of American peace and social
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justice activists in every generation, their lives intersect throughout their long activist ca-
reers, as mutual supporters, friends, and agonistic colleagues. 16 Each became widely
visible during the 1840s, Stanton in the area of women’s rights, Douglass in the cause of
abolition. As is also evident for almost all the actors relied upon in this project, historic
and contemporary, the scope of their activism and concern was much more encompassing
than the causes with which we now associate them. 17
Activism, in the sense of altruistic, justice-seeking, morally informed behavior,
describes their lives, their persistent orientation to the world, not simply their public per-
sonae. Stanton and Douglass, for example, were active advocates of the other’s primary
cause and generous supporters of a wide variety of other reforms, ranging from temper-
ance to penology and from child-rearing to poverty and labor reform. 18 Stanton, a New
York state native, became an ardent abolitionist during the 1830s, apparently influenced
by her older cousin, Gerrit Smith, a prominent leader of the political wing of that move-
ment.
19
She married an anti-slavery activist in 1840, and spent the first part of her
honeymoon at the first World Anti-Slavery Convention in London. After Stanton and
other women delegates elected by American anti-slavery societies were denied their seats
by the male majority, they used the opportunity to become acquainted with each other and
to focus on the issue of women's social and political status. Stanton met Quaker activists
Lucretia Mott, Lydia Maria Child, the Grimke sisters, and other core actors with whom
she would later work to organize the 19 th century movement for women's rights in Amer-
• 20
ica
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Radical Freedom
All core actors demonstrate with some regularity the radical freedom of self and
societal transcendence. Frederick Douglass uniquely displayed this quality, having strug-
gled for liberty almost from the moment that he first understood its meaning. He was
bom into slavery on the Wye River Plantation on Maryland's Eastern shore, “a secluded
. .
.
place,” largely out of the reach of “public opinion [which] is, indeed, an unfailing
restraint upon the barbarity and cruelty of masters, overseers, and slave-drivers, whenever
and wherever it can reach them.'" 1 He recalled the early questions of his youth, such as
Why am I a slave?” or “Why are some slaves and others masters?” together with his
inability to accept the religious fatalism and simple resignation of many older slave
children and adults/- Thanks to the confluence of early affectionate raising by his
grandmother, a few brief, furtive visits from his mother, isolated caring and mentoring
acts by others, a remarkably strong dose of the varied potential with which we are all
bom, the courageous action (for a slave) of self-improvement, and the circumstances of
good luck, Douglass escaped some of the harshness of a plantation slave upbringing. 23
On the further strength of these gifts, he escaped to the North as a young man, asking for
and receiving help on at least one occasion from a white stranger.24
It is difficult to comprehend the full extent of Douglass’s activism. In the context
of his era, however, there is little doubt as to its authenticity. Beginning in slavery, he not
only acted to become educated against the dictates of harshly enforced law and conven-
tion, but also assumed the risk of educating other slaves under conditions where the risks
of exposure were always considerable.
23
Less than three years after escaping to the con-
tingent freedom of the North in 1838, he had already begun speaking publicly - under a
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pseudonym that he later kept as his surname, but totally without institutional support -
against slavery in New Bedford, Massachusetts, where he then lived and worked. A Uni-
tarian clergyman from Nantucket, having heard him speak at a local African American
church, invited him to address an anti-slavery convention to be held on the island. He did
so and was promptly recruited as a full-time orator by the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery
Society (the Garrisonians). 26
For the next twenty years, Douglass spoke, debated, and wrote for abolition. In
one early campaign in 1843, he traveled while still encumbered by runaway slave status,
as far as Indiana, where, after speaking to an unusually hostile crowd, he and a fellow
speaker were assaulted and almost killed/ 7 In the first of three autobiographies, pub-
lished in 1845, he assumed even greater risk in order to buttress his authenticity,
furnishing the details of his life in slavery, including his birth name and that of his former
master. As he explained in his second autobiography, he did so because people doubted
his ‘credentials’ as a former slave. “They said I did not talk like a slave, look like a slave,
nor act like a slave.”
28
To become publicly active in the social, legal, and political emancipation of
women, actors like Stanton did not have to overcome the conditions of slavery, or, for
that matter, poverty. They did, however, have to assume the burden of widespread public
opposition from virtually every tier of society and government. To be a woman’s rights
activist - and a woman - was to invite widespread scorn and ridicule, from women as
well as men.
In addition, many, including Stanton, had to contend with obdurate opposition
from family and other intimates. 29 Accordingly, one should not use economic status or
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other summary means to lump Stanton and other radical reformers with Utopians, roman-
ticists, transcendentalists, religious revivalists, and other idealists of the antebellum
reform period. 30 While each reflected the social, political, and intellectual ferment in
American life that existed during the two or so decades that preceded the Civil War, it
was the ceaseless agitation and coordinated action of core actors like Stanton and Doug-
lass that furnished the momentum in the direction of actual social and political reform.
Neither should we diminish their nonconforming, initiatory agency with explanations of
newly possible leisure opportunities for an expanding middle and upper class. 31 There
were, one can readily imagine, many things that someone with leisure and means could
engage in that were less contentious and more conventionally rewarding.
Speech, Publication, and Organization as Action
It is difficult for us to imagine the key formative social, and political roles played
by public speakers in nineteenth century America. “In a time undistracted by television,
the cinema, radio, or quick sound bites, audiences were prepared and willing to listen ....
[0]ratory was an important source of education, information, inspiration, and entertain-
ment ...” For the same reasons, people were also eager to read - to expand their local
informative reach - an appetite greatly stimulated during the antebellum period by the
new technology of mass publication. These circumstances, together with the develop-
ment of railroads and the telegraph, furnished actors like Douglass and Stanton, who were
skilled in both arenas, with access to a broad, cross-sectional audience. Opportunities to
increase the potential efficacy of non-conforming action, however, do not explain either
the decision to act or its contagion. It is the actors themselves, the nature and quality of
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their ideas, their willingness to convey them, and the manner in which they do so that
matter first, and therefore most.
Other forms of action are much easier to comprehend. Then as now, “holding a
meeting was a characteristic response among reformers,” when the fervor generated by
injustice, perhaps further heightened by some recent event, stirred core actors to gather
and act. 34 It was that stimulus that had cumulated in the World Anti-Slavery Convention
that Stanton had attended in London in 1840, which led to her mentoring friendship with
Quaker activist Lucretia Mott, a Philadelphian resident some twenty years older than
Stanton.
A similar impetus, combined with the unadorned wish to strengthen a friendship
that had been maintained for over eight years by occasional letters, prompted Mott in
mid- 1848 to invite Stanton to join her at a social gathering with Mott’s sister and two
other Quaker friends in Waterloo, New York, near Stanton’s home in Seneca Falls. Ac-
cording to Stanton biographer, Elizabeth Griffith, the five women were not extraordinary
in many respects. Most notably, “[a]ll of them were married; all of them had children.”
Along with Stanton, most of them had probably attended temperance and various other
reform meetings; however, only Mott had previous experience “as an organizer, delegate,
or speaker. In terms of women’s rights, [the organizers] of the first women’s rights con-
vention were all amateurs.”
35
In her autobiography written years later, Stanton recounted her state of mind when
she and the other four women decided that day to organize the Seneca Falls convention:
The general discontent I felt with woman’s portion as wife, mother, physician, and
spiritual guide, the chaotic conditions into which everything fell without my con-
stant supervision, and the wearied, anxious look of the majority of women
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impressed me with a strong feeling that some active measures should be taken to
remedy the wrongs of society in general, and of women in particular...My experi-
ence at the World Anti-Slavery Convention, all I had read of the legal status of
women, and the oppression I saw everywhere, together swept across my soul, in-
tensified now by many personal experiences ...”36
The Seneca Falls Convention was, by any definition, a radically nonconforming
event. The Declaration of Rights and Sentiments, signed by just over one hundred of the
three hundred or so attendees, was prepared in the tone and format of the Declaration of
Independence, calling for the redress of grievances that encompassed virtually every as-
pect of women’s social, legal, and political status. It was nothing less than a direct frontal
assault on the “woman’s sphere” mindset that dominated gender relations in America
throughout the nineteenth century. The most contentious provision was the call for po-
litical suffrage, a demand insisted upon by Stanton. It was so controversial that Lucretia
Mott, the rest of the organizing group, and Stanton’s husband vigorously opposed it.
Stanton refused to yield, however, and the measure was brought up for debate. With the
notable rhetorical support of Frederick Douglass who traveled from Rochester to attend,
“the resolution barely passed.”37
News of the convention and editorials on its Declaration confirm that the capacity
of actors like Elizabeth Cady Stanton to “go public” with clear, authentic expressions of
opposition to prevailing public moral wisdom defines the true prevalence of that wisdom.
In this instance, it was almost immediately apparent that Stanton and her cohort had
tapped into an artery of dormant, widespread discontent among hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of women and sympathetic men. While “very few newspapers cheered the effort,”
most reported it, although from a common perspective of derision and ridicule.' At the
time, most major papers were quasi-official arms of the major political parties, institu-
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tions that have not Proved quick to lead in the direction of fundamental reform in Amer-
ica.
Two weeks after the Seneca Falls Convention, a similar forum was held in Roch-
ester where Douglass was then living. Over the next two years, women in Ohio,
Massachusetts and elsewhere organized women’s rights groups and held conventions.
From 1850 to 1861 (except in 1857), national woman's rights meetings with delegates
from state and local groups were held annually in various locations. However, the de-
mands of travel associated with organizing and speaking - combined with an equally
sincere belief that domestic, maternal roles were critical tasks that they performed with
unique competence — largely constrained women with young children, like Stanton, from
acting beyond their communities or regions. 39 This is not to suggest that Stanton was not
active or that all of her action was entirely local in contact or effect. She was, however,
fiercely tom between two roles that she clearly enjoyed and deeply valued - that of
mother and reformer.40
Like other core actors of her era, Stanton’s home life was filled with action. She
corresponded widely, wrote letters to the editor, drafted speeches - many to be read at
temperance and women’s rights conventions that she was unable to attend - and wrote
articles for reform journals on a wide range of social and legal reform topics. In 1852 she
served as the President of the Woman’s State Temperance Society, using that forum
somewhat instrumentally to enlist supporters of women’s rights.
In 1854, at age thirty-eight, she was the first woman to address a joint committee
of the New York Legislature. Speaking in the Senate chamber, spoke eloquently, pas-
sionately, and candidly as she “described the legal position of women in American
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society as woman, wife, widow, and mother,” and called for broad, fundamental re-
forms in each venue. 41 Again adopting the rhetoric of the American Revolution, she
continued:
Gentlemen, in Republican America, in the nineteenth century, we, daughters of
the revolutionary heroes of 1776, demand at your hands the redress of our griev-
ances - a revision of your State Constitution - a new code of laws.”
She assumed their shared opprobrium of plantation slavery, and used it to confront them
with a powerful gender analogy:
“It is impossible to make the Southern planter believe that his slave feels and rea-
sons just as he does - that injustice and subjection are as galling to him - that the
degradation of living by the will of another
. . .dependent on his caprice, at the
mercy of his passions, is as keenly felt by him as [by] his master. If you can force
on his unwilling vision a vivid picture of the negro’s wrongs, and for a moment
touch his soul, his logic brings him instant consolation. He says the slave does
not feel this as I would. Here, gentlemen, is our difficulty: When we plead our
case before the law-makers and savants of the republic, they can not take in the
idea that men and women are alike; and so long as the mass rest in this delusion,
the public mind will not be so much startled by the revelations [of women’s injus-
tices] as by the fact that she should at length wake up to a sense of it ...”42
As the following excerpt from an article in the Albany Register
, commenting on
her speech confirms, Stanton's impeccable moral logic had angered many:
“While the feminine propagandists of women’s rights confined themselves to the
exhibition of short petticoats
. . . and to the holding of conventions and speech-
making in concert rooms, the people were disposed to be amused by them, as they
are by the wit of the clown in the circus... But the joke is becoming stale.... dis-
gust is taking the place of pleasurable sensations.... People are beginning to
inquire how far public sentiment should sanction or tolerate these unsexed
women, who would step out from the true sphere of the mother, the wife, and the
daughter...”
43
During the pre-Civil War era, Frederick Douglass, if anything, pulled fewer ora-
torical punches than Stanton in his efforts to persuade his white audiences of the equal
competence and common humanity of African Americans and the corresponding moral
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evil of slavery. Having obtained his personal freedom with the help of English supporters
in late 1846, he returned from an eighteen month stay in the temporary safe-haven of
England, where he had found himself “regarded and treated at every turn with the kind-
ness and deference paid to white people.”44 Like Stanton, he was aware that the greatest
barrier to the ending of slavery or any other system of subordination was neither political
nor economic.” It was “the low estimate
... placed upon the negro as a man, that because
of his assumed natural inferiority, people reconciled themselves to his enslavement and
oppression as things inevitable, if not desirable.”45
The content of initiatory action to end deeply institutionalized injustice was at
least as well understood by Douglass as by Stanton. He was keenly aware that moral per-
suasion, to be effective, had to be authentic, truthful, discomforting, and unceasing.
“‘Agitation,’ he constantly reiterated, ‘is the life blood of all moral reforms.’”46 In his
famous 1852 Fourth of July speech in Rochester, New York - a public address he was
invited to give in order to celebrate the holiday - he conveyed the intensity of that convic-
tion:
“At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed.... For it
is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder. We
need the storm, the whirlwind, the earthquake. The feeling of the nation must be
quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; the propriety of the nation
must be startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed...”47
In one of many scathing passages, his identity and his oratorical genius combined,
one can imagine, with devastating intended effect:
“Fellow Citizens! I will not enlarge further on your national inconsistencies. The
existence of slavery in this country brands your republicanism as a sham, your
humanity as base pretense, and your Christianity as a lie. It destroys your moral
power abroad; it corrupts your politicians at home. It saps the foundation of relig-
ion; it makes your name a hissing and a by-word to a mocking earth. It is the
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In contrast with the Garrisonian abolitionists who had furnished him with his first
organized support, Douglass understood from the outset that his activism, if it were to be
maximally effective, would have demonstrate its own, free-standing human compe-
tence. As Stanton had argued in her 1 854 speech, it was not enough to evoke sympathy
by detailing the horrors of slavery or the particulars of other injustice. The core actor had
to refute, by the actuality of embodied words and deeds, the claim of racial or gender su-
periority upon which slavery, racial and gender paternalism were based. Toward that
purpose, Douglass had moved his family to Rochester from Boston in 1847 and, with the
further help of English supporters, expanded his activist reach beyond public lectures by
publishing his newspaper, The North Star
. While he continued to travel and speak inces-
santly, the paper was published weekly, with a subscription base of three thousand, from
December 1847 until 1863, the year that Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.
For her part, Stanton had “long believed that [for women] ‘radical reform must
start in our homes, in our nurseries, in ourselves,’ rather than in conventions.”50 Her re-
form philosophy mirrored her own experience as one who had struggled with the
pleasures, challenges, and exigencies of attempting to balance marriage and parenting
with her activism. 51
Stanton’s first extended speaking tour, undertaken in 1860, less than a year after
the birth of her seventh (and last) child, was a several week venture throughout upper
New York State, as part of a campaign calling for immediate abolition and for Lincoln’s
election. Her effort, and that of her activist colleagues, took place at the height of the ex-
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treme national tension leading to the fall 1860 election and the outbreak of the Civil War
shortly thereafter. As Stanton biographer and historian Lois W. Banner notes,
“the possibility of civil war created fear and dissension among Americans every-
where, and the abolitionist message, implicitly pro-war, elicited violent opposi-
tion. In Rochester and Buffalo, angry throngs made so much noise that her
speeches could not be heard. In Albany, the Mayor sat on the platform with them
holding a gun in plain view. Police lined the hall inside and out to maintain or-
der.’
As the slavery-union crisis erupted in civil conflict in the months prior to Lin-
coln’s election, Stanton and other women’s rights activists were generally willing to
subordinate the moral primacy of their claims to the higher moral priority of ending slav-
ery. The Civil War, however, spent the momentum of women’s reform - and of social
and political reform more generally - that had been gathering since the 1820s. As a re-
sult, by the end of the 1860s, progress toward equality and political inclusion for African
Americans and women stalled with the end of slavery and the formal recognition of citi-
zenship and suffrage rights for black males only. Over three decades of extensive social
agitation, organization, and political action by women such as Stanton seemed to have
accomplished little for their cause.
By 1869, with her seventh child old enough to be left in the care of others,
Stanton made speaking on behalf of suffrage and women’s rights her primary mode of
persuasive action. She saw doing so as part of the same reform philosophy - as, in effect,
taking “woman’s rights into the homes and lives of the American people.”53 She was also
undoubtedly influenced in that direction by her utter frustration and anger over the partial
reversal of state-level woman’s rights reforms during the Civil War; moreover, she was
bitterly disappointed by the failure of most abolitionists, including Frederick Douglass, to
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join with female co-activists in insisting that women - African American and white - be
enfranchised along with black males
.
54
Persistence
At such histone junctures, the identity of core reformers is further revealed by
their capacity to adjust and persist. For the next ten years, Stanton, now in her fifties and
more radical in her feminism than the younger generation of women reformers, distanced
herself somewhat from what was becoming a more mainstream political reform move-
ment focused on suffrage. Announcing her plans in the final issue of Revolution
, a
publication started by her and Susan B. Anthony a few years earlier, Stanton declared her
intention to “spend her future ‘teaching woman her duties to herself .”55
Taking advantage of the postwar lyceum phenomenon and her unique talents as an
orator, Stanton spent eight to ten months each year on paid speaking tours, mainly in the
mid and far West. She usually spoke once a day and twice on Sundays .”56 Using the
lecture circuit to frame her itinerary, help educate her children, and support her broad
feminist reform agenda, she also “spoke before church congregations and reform societies
[and] often scheduled afternoon lectures
... [to which] only women were admitted” in
order to “teach independence and avoid embarrassment.” Her separate lectures “often
lasted three hours or more ‘and then they hunger still. The new gospel of fewer children
and a healthy, happy maternity is gladly received ’.” 57 Some might also have enjoyed her
often expressed belief that married women had the ability and right to both enjoy sex and
to refuse it at their discretion
.
58
Elizabeth Cady Stanton persevered into her eighties, continuing to demonstrate
her primary strengths: those of a female exemplar, radical educator, and consciousness-
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raiser for women and men. When her age and health made frequent travel too difficult,
she returned to writing as her next most effective means of moral reform. During the last
two decades of the century, she wrote almost as prolifically as she had organized, lobbied,
and spoken dunng the previous thirty plus years. As her authorship of The Woman’s Ri-
—
m 1895 demonstrates, she never lost her capacity to challenge the fundamental issues
of justice in America, and to call for changes in its most basic texts and institutions.
Frederick Douglass evidenced the same capacity for sustained authentic action
that enable one to identify core moral actors over time and changing circumstance. It is
difficult to imagine the deep personal frustration that Douglass experienced as he worked
to build upon the hard won gains represented by the Civil War Amendments, only to wit-
ness them reduced to complete inefficacy with the collapse of Reconstruction marked by
the Compromise of 1877. He had attained personal stature, a measure of respect, ap-
pointed federal office, and material comfort in the aftermath of the war. Notwithstanding
his new comforts, however, he “continued to lash out at racial injustice...”59
Speaking in 1876 as the featured orator at the dedication of the Freedman’s Me-
morial Monument, intended to honor Lincoln, with President Grant and virtually all of
Washington’s officialdom in the audience, he criticized the statue for “showing] the Ne-
gro on his knees when a more manly attitude would have been indicative of freedom.”60
He then reminded the audience that Lincoln, whom he had come to know and respect dur-
ing the Civil War, was nonetheless “in his interests, in his associations, in his habits of
thought, and in his prejudices ... a white man.”61 Conveying subtly, yet forcibly and with
irony, his understanding of what was happening and what was to come for blacks in the
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South, he claimed the monument for not only Lincoln but ‘'the black man as well,” as he
decried the resurgent power of racism:
“When now it shall be said that the colored man is soulless, that he has no appre-
ciation of benefits or benefactors, when the first reproach of ingratitude is hurled
at us and it is attempted to scourge us beyond the beyond the range of human
rotherhood, we may calmly point to the monument we have this day erected to
the memory of Abraham Lincoln. 62
The unfortunate truth of Douglass’s remarks was confirmed a little over a year
later when, shortly following his appointment by President Hayes as U. S. Marshall for
the District of Columbia, he gave a speech lashing out at Jim Crow laws and practices in
the Capital, declaring the city “a most disgraceful and scandalous contradiction to the
march of civilization ...”63 In response, the New York Times after noting the accuracy of
his published remarks, “which everybody knew to be true,” took him to task, as might a
parent with a disrespectful child, for criticizing the “conservative element” of Washington
who had supposedly acquiesced in his controversial appointment as part of a political deal
that Douglass was assumed to have agreed to. The editorialist archly observed:
When a class of men consent to let bygones be bygones, every consideration
should be shown their tender feelings. If they have consented to receive a colored
office-holder, after due protest, as a man and a brother , it stands to reason that he
ought to walk very softly before them. He is, in a manner, on probation. But the
conduct of this dark-skinned official was simply monstrous.
. .. It was clear that he
did not realize his position as an olive branch and a token of reconciliation .”64
As with Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Douglass continued to act by writing, speaking
out, and demonstrating his superb competence under the vastly changed circumstances of
the post-reconstruction era in America, until the day of his death . 65 Each had acquired
extraordinary stature and national visibility, a public status as elder exemplars created by
their own protracted, authentic efforts to achieve change. More important and less fortui-
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tous, each had helped to achieve some instantiation of moral progress against long con-
ventional odds.
Although each would contribute to the process of morally driven change until
their deaths, their place in the vanguard was inevitably altered, a transition not always
performed with tact or accepted with dignity. Regardless of their respective moral
strengths and the acknowledged necessity, at least by the departing generation, for cumu-
lative achievement where fundamental values are at stake, the imperfect accomplishments
of one generation are passed on, like all human knowledge, imperfectly to the next.
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CHAPTER 5
MORALLY INFORMED ACTION
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
By the 1880s, a new generation of core actors had emerged, influenced not only
by mentors and exemplars like Stanton and Douglass, but by the context of accelerating
change and newer forms of old injustice that were erupting across the American land-
scape.
Eugene Victor Debs (1855-1926) and Jane Addams (1860-1935) began their ac-
tivist careers just as Stanton’s and Douglass’s were ending. They came to maturity in an
era characterized by the extremes that were generated by raw, unregulated human energy:
wide-ranging optimism and utter despair; enhanced economic organization and concomi-
tant social chaos, an explosion of specialized knowledge and the exploitation of massive,
willful ignorance; the burgeoning of American nationhood and world power status. Each
was justified by the cultural hubris and mythology of Anglo-Saxon superiority, reinforced
by the appropriation of early evolutionary science to link power with fitness, fitness with
survival, and survival with moral necessity. In the cultural and inner ether emanating
from the energy and products thus generated, one could also detect a nagging sense that
“communities were passing [and] men were becoming small units of a great system.... It
was, in short, an age disquieting to all Americans.” 1
Ordinary Beginnings
Debs and Addams were each prototypes of rapidly expanding Middle America.
Their families could serve as economic bracket points and cultural exemplars for the
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broadly defined middle class in the latter half of nineteenth century. Further, as with
Stanton and Douglass, there was nothing sufficiently remarkable in the background or
upbringing of either to suggest their subsequent adoption of non-conforming activism as
their life work. Adjusted for time and circumstance, each of the four was merely bright,
talented, and, except for Douglass, consistently loved and nurtured by one or both parents
throughout childhood. In common with most of their contemporaries, again excepting
Douglass, they were raised in large families, and imbued with values which were well
within the mainstream for their time, place, and status. In sum, we cannot attribute their
subsequent exceptionalism to some pattern in their early formation that was not shared by
many of their contemporaries. Few of us are raised to be radicals, and neither Debs nor
Addams were exceptions in this regard. Historian Anne Fior Scott’s observation regard-
ing Addams applies equally to Debs: “This was a radicalism that began with experience,
not with doctrine.” 2
Debs, at the low end of the middle class spectrum, was bom and raised in Terre
Haute, Indiana, “the third of six surviving children” of parents who had immigrated to
America from the Alsace region of France in 1849. 3 They moved to Terre Haute from
New York City within a year, seeking, in a pattern familiar to many immigrants, to facili-
tate their future among at least some who might still share their native language. 4
After failing in various efforts to support his family as a laborer, Debs’ s father
achieved modest, small business success and community respect as a retail grocer.
Young Debs attended private, then newly opened public schools through the ninth grade,
leaving school at age fifteen (against his parents wishes and concerns) to work for the
Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad. 5 His entire railroading career spanned four years,
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ending after being laid off as a locomotive fireman during the depression economy of
1874. His father convinced him to take a job as an accounting clerk for a wholesale gro-
cer in Terre Haute, a position he held for several years. In 1875, evincing his fondness
for railroading - and for the hard-edged, masculine fraternity of railroad workers - he be-
came a charter member and recording secretary of Vigo Lodge, No. 16, of the
Brotherhood of Local Firemen. 6 He was bright, highly personable, and ambitious for
conventional success and reputation.
Within five years he had moved from these modest beginnings to the appointed
posts of Secretary-Treasurer of the national Grand Brotherhood and editor of its maga-
zine. In these and many other respects, Debs was imbued with the American
enlightenment and cultural ethos.
‘Natural’ Harmony
His initial view of unionism was one of general harmony with management. He
saw his local lodge and the Brotherhood “less as a labor organization agitating for justice
than as a sifter of personnel for the railroad corporation" and as a benevolent association
for its members. 8 In the aftermath of the first nationwide railroad strike in 1877, in a
speech to the 1878 Grand Brotherhood national convention, he “denounced, as ‘sheerest
folly’, accusations that his union would conspire against the railroad corporations, since
its ‘interests are so closely aligned with those of their employers’.” Although state militias
and federal troops had been called out against the strikers from his own local and else-
where, he sought to counter the growing radicalism of some Brotherhood members with
the conservative, individualistic craft union “moral argument that placed the onus of
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maintaining harmony directly on the members,” calling upon them to be “a class of men
worthy of confidence and respect.”9
Various Lessons from Experience and Setting
Only gradually did Debs detect the shape and magnitude what was then unfolding
in the relationship of industrial labor to corporate industry in America. As political scien-
tist Stephen Skowronek observed for a different purpose, “The years between the
nationwide railroad strike and the Spanish American War define an era of labor violence
unparalleled in any other industrial nation...” 10
Growing Disharmony
Labor violence was only the second, largely reactive part of the change equation,
however. Debs was slow to perceive the first - the pernicious effects of newly organizing
capital and its powerful alliances with America’s increasingly professional, largely sym-
pathetic political, financial, and judicial elites. The emergence of class conflict in
America ran contrary to the ethos of individual striving, success based on effort and merit
within an overall harmony of equal, plentiful opportunity for free men of varied talents
with which Debs - and most in his generation - had been imbued. 11
He had vigorously opposed his local’s participation in the 1877 strike and contin-
ued to oppose strikes and to work for labor-management harmony as well as for skill-
separated labor fraternity through much of the next decade. He regarded William
McKeen, the local developer-owner of the spur railroad that ran through Terre Haute, as a
personal exemplar, ‘“the model railroad president’ who believed in ‘honest pay for an
honest day’s work ’.” Further, he consistently argued that workers “must actively accept
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such men [implicitly including himself] as models, for left to themselves they tended to
degenerate.” 12
Jane Addams, bom and raised in northern Illinois was the eighth of nine children,
four of whom lived to adulthood. Her father and mother settled in the then unincorpo-
rated region in the mid- 1840s. By her birth in 1860 “he was a successful miller, a large
landowner, and a leader in public affairs in the region. 13 He was also an abolitionist,
elected to the state senate on the old Whig ticket in 1854, shortly thereafter joining with
Lincoln in the new Republican Party. 14 When he died unexpectedly in 1881, he left an
estate estimated at $300,000.00, of which some $50,000.00, the 1998 equivalent of one
million dollars, went to his daughter. 15 In sum, Addams’s father seems to have been a
man of strong republican and philanthropic virtue.
Much like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Jane Addams enjoyed the early advantages of
an upper middle class upbringing in a supportive family. Her father endorsed the evolv-
ing version of a traditional education for young women of talent and means, serving as
Trustee of nearby Rockford Seminary for Women, founded by Congregational and Pres-
byterian clergymen in 1847. 16 Operated on the Protestant egalitarian and work ethic
model of Mt. Holyoke College in Massachusetts, Addams received a fairly rounded lib-
eral arts and science education at Rockford within its somewhat rigid religious regimen
and its strong evangelical and missionary emphasis. Years later, she would recall her
"singular unresponsiveness to the emotional appeal of religious evangelism” and her en-
during resistance to all forms of religious institutions and dogma. 17
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Informed Unease
Upon graduation in 1881, Addams entered young adulthood with a good moral
and intellectual education and a vague sense of unease. Reflecting on the several years
prior to her opening of Hull House in September, 1 889, she described herself as being
absolutely at sea so far as any moral purpose was concerned, clinging only to the desire
to live in a really living world and refusing to be content with a shadowy intellectual or
aesthetic reflection of it.'’ 18 She was aware that she had been both equipped and trained
to do something useful in the world, and imparted with a sense of both Christian and re-
publican duty to comply; however, Addams, like others of her class and gender, were left
with few approved avenues for meaningful direct engagement with the great, pressing
social and political issues of the day.
Hampered at first by the emotional and physical impact of her father’s sudden,
unexpected death as well as a prolonged convalescence following major surgery to cor-
rect a curvature of the spine, she spent the next six years travelling in Europe, first with
her stepmother and later with friends, as well as visiting and corresponding with family
and friends in this country. Then as now, travel, particularly in Europe, was seen as part
of the cultural finishing process for a young woman “.
. .who had money and education,
but nothing to do.” 19 Her journal notes reflected her angst over the incongruity between
the material comfort of her life and that of her travel companions and the living and
working conditions of rural and urban poor that she observed in Ireland, East London, and
Germany.- She was especially moved by the Dickensian conditions she observed during
a host-guided tour of the slums of East London - enough so that “for the following weeks
[she] went about London furtively, afraid to look down narrow streets and alleys lest they
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disclose again this hideous human need
... [and] bewildered that the world should be go-
ing on as usual.” She was further troubled by "the assumption that she herself had
nothing to do toward satisfying this human need,” and felt “mocked not only by a sense of
her own uselessness, but by the realization that she was not expected to do anvthino ”21
Democratic Immersion
Entries in her personal journal and other accounts of Addams's second trip to
Europe in 1888 permit two inferences: first, she was already aware that conditions for
European immigrants and others mired in poverty in Chicago and other major American
cities mirrored those in Europe; second, at some point prior to or during the trip she be-
came determined to act on her concerns. While travelling in Spain she confided “her
scheme" to her close friend and college classmate, Ellen Gates Starr, who immediately
offered her enthusiastic support.” Returning to London, she arranged a “letter of intro-
duction” to the head of Toynbee Hall, a new facility for helping the poor, located in
Whitechapel, one of the most downtrodden neighborhoods in East London. 22
According to Gertrude Himmelfarb,
[The] “chief purpose of Toynbee Hall,” founded in 1884, “was to humanize and
civilize charity. The settlement 'implied no denial or even denigration of the dis-
tinctions of wealth, occupation, class, or talent. It was meant rather to be a civic
community, based upon a common denominator of citizenship... a citizenship that
made tolerable all those other social distinctions which were natural or inevitable,
but which should not be exacerbated and should not be permitted to obscure the
common humanity of individuals. [It] was not an experiment in socialism; it was
an experiment in democracy - which was no mean feat at that time and place.”23
As first conceived, Toynbee Hall was as much “an aid and outlet to educated
young men” as it was of intended benefit to the poor of East London.
24
Staffed initially
by fifteen male “residents,” all of them recent college graduates, its avowed aim was to
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avoid the class separation inherent in traditional institutional philanthropy. The task of
the residents was to provide “people of Whitechapel with the kinds of services that would
uplift them’.” This included “giving lectures and classes to workingmen and their fami-
lies on hundreds of subjects,” ranging from practical and health-oriented skills to all
forms of cultural and educational enrichment, including courses in science, language, his-
tory, art, and literature. 25
Toynbee Hall served as the model “by which, and against which,” Addams and
Ellen Starr founded Hull House in Chicago in September, 1889. Located on Halsted
Avenue, “a long north-south thoroughfare abutting the stockyards and shipbuilding opera-
tions and running through one of Chicago’s worst slums,” the old mansion was
surrounded by ethnic enclaves of Italians, Germans, Polish and Russian Jews, and Bohe-
mians. 26
Unlike Toynbee Hall, the American settlement houses founded in its immediate
wake were characterized by “less of noblesse oblige
,
less confidence that the upper
classes were giving to the lower.’”' 7 For her part, Addams moved into Hull House with
the intention of learning from her neighbors. She came to realize, however, that she and
the other the Hull House founders initially shared the well-intentioned hubris of educated
idealists of middle and upper class experience, varying only from the other American set-
tlement models in Addams ’s and Starr's intent from the outset that their settlement would
be run by college-educated women, not men. 28 She quickly learned, however, that this
learning included not only the scientific gathering of facts, but also the gamering of
knowledge in the form of practical, democratic wisdom that she, herself, did not yet pos-
sess.
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Debs and Addams drew distinctly different lessons from their activist experiences
during the 1890s. During that decade, Hull House grew exponentially
- physically and in
terms of residents, volunteers, and philanthropic supporters - as Addams and her col-
leagues launched a senes of programs and reform initiatives, each undertaken in the spirit
of what Gandhi would later refer to as “experiments with truth.”29 Truth, in other words,
was not something static and objective to be simply sought, but rather a reality that was
both actual and potential, something that could only be learned, reaffirmed, and expanded
upon by each generation, by living life engaged with others and the world. Further, as
Addams came to understand it, the process of learning from others was mutual by nature
and necessity
,
and therefore inherently democratic.
By the early 1900s, there were few urban-related issues which Addams and the
other residents had not learned about, acted upon, and achieved results: daycare, adult lit-
eracy and formal education, neighborhood playgrounds, garbage, sanitation, and other
aspects of public health, juvenile criminal justice, woman and child labor, industrial
safety, and others. In the process of doing so she had broadened and reinforced her nas-
cent belief in the common humanity, dignity, and democratic capacity of her new
neighbors, co-residents, and benefactors alike.
During the 1890s, Eugene Debs, like Addams, broadened his vision of social and
political fraternity - but only to a clearly defined point. The change was marked by his
two radical transitions during this period: first, from craft to federated and, ultimately, to
industrial unionism; second, from union building to socialism and fulltime political ac-
tion. Demonstrating the quickening pace of his activism, in the wake of an unsuccessful
strike against the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad in 1888, he was instrumental
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in organizing a federation of the rail craft and trade unions later that year, only to see it
dissolve in internal conflict in 1892. 31 Confirming his growing awareness that the rail-
roads and their financial and political supporters were both better organized and
economically inclined to be more instrumental than fraternal in their dealings with labor.
Debs joined the more radical ranks of industrial unionists. In February 1893, the Ameri-
can Railway Union was formally established, with Debs its key organizer and president.32
Stimulated by a sharp depression as well as the tireless work of Debs and his colleagues,
within just over a year the ARU comprised some 465 lodges and 150,000 members. 33
Commenting indirectly on Debs’ s role during this period, sister labor and political
activist, Kate Richards O Hare is said by one Debs biographer to have observed:
For weeks, even months at a stretch, Gene would be dashing around from one
city to another.... Sometimes at the end of grilling weeks of frantic labor he would
come home utterly exhausted only to be called out again by urgent messages be-
fore he had enjoyed a single day of home and rest.”34
The key event in the building of the new union was its successful strike in April,
1894 against the powerful Great Northern Railroad. In the strike’s immediate aftermath,
membership burgeoned, as noted, and Debs “came to personify the American Railway
Union and its efforts to develop an alternative to the corrupt policies of both the [union]
brotherhoods and the [railroad] corporations.” 35 In the process, Debs had become and
would remain a national figure from 1894 onward.
The lives of Debs and Addams publicly intersected for the first time only a few
weeks later during the Pullman Strike of 1894 when the confluence of corporate and po-
litical power at the national and state levels crushed the fledgling ARU. In the process,
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Debs was jailed for civil defiance of a court injunction, an event that directly contributed
to his radical conversion to socialism. 36
Neither Debs nor Addams was an admirer of George Pullman, the owner of the
company struck by the ARU. According to Debs biographer, Harold W. Currie, “even
before the 1890’s depression, the reputation of Pullman was odious in labor circles.”37
Prior to his completed transition from trade unionism, Debs already felt a growing ani-
mosity toward powerful owners, including Pullman. Writing for his union’s magazine in
1887, he attacked the sleeping car manufacturer in an editorial, claiming that “The term
Pullman ... has become ... the synonym of almost anything odious that heartless, crush-
ing, degrading monopoly suggests to the minds of honorable men. Assailing Pullman’s
wealth, autocratic management, and top-down paternalism, he confirmed his then con-
tinuing position in the mainstream of American anti
-radical conservatism, as he observed:
It is such vindictive practices that breed unrest and vindictive spirit abroad in the lands
that furnish anarchists and socialists with the raw material for their diatribes against law
and order...”38
An Ideological Conversion
Within two years of serving his six month jail sentence, Debs had become an en-
thusiastic convert to socialism. He accepted, without qualification, the Marxian analysis
of the historical inevitability of class struggle, and, from that point forward, was a pas-
sionate foe of capitalism in general and capitalists in particular. His early, received belief
in the American organic fraternity of man, superceding class, was abandoned for the nar-
rower fraternity of labor. The socialist revolution that he now believed in, must be
constructed through the inculcation, by awakened leaders such as himself, of class-
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consciousness imparted with authentic moral persuasion. From this point forward, the
focus of his activism reflected his customary salutation to his activist colleagues in labor
and socialist politics, to potential working class converts, even much of his private corre-
spondence with his father. His new greeting was “Comrade,” not “Brother.” He would,
however, remain committed with equal authenticity to democratic values and nonviolence
as he sought nothing less than an elite led, working class controlled social, political, and
economic democracy.
Democratic Engagement versus Pluralist Confrontation
In 1894, at the time of the Pullman Strike, Jane Addams was already well-known
in Chicago. Before opening Hull House in 1889, she and Ellen Starr had spoken, met,
and networked with many of Chicago’s social, political and philanthropic elite, soliciting
and obtaining support for their new endeavor. In particular, she enlisted the financial and
volunteer support of college-educated middle and upper-class women, facilitated in this
regard by the rapid growth of women's clubs and civic associations that coincided with
her arrival. 39
Addams ties to Chicago's upper echelons through her background, her work with
the poor, immigrant neighbors of the settlement house, and her brief efforts to intervene
in the Pullman Strike afforded her the opportunity to view the controversy from several
perspectives. Through her extensive engagement with her new neighbors in the early
1 890s, she had strengthened her existing sympathy for the aims of the labor movement.
Forming friendships with the muckraker journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd and several
labor activists, “she was an early defender of the right, even the necessity, for labor or-
ganization.” Supporting her belief with concrete action, “in late 1891 she helped to form
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two women’s [textile worker] unions” in Chicago 40 She further utilized the resources of
Hull House to support efforts by labor organizers to unionize and to provide a variety of
services to workers and their families affected by lock-outs and walk-outs and strikes.41
Jane Addams, was certainly more radical concerning the needs of labor than the
trade unionists, such as Samuel Gompers (founder of the American Federation of Labor -
the AFL), and the politically liberal pluralists of her era. She took the opportunity, for
example, in 1899 to publicly declare it deplorable that unions were “the [only] ones work-
ing for shorter hours, decent pay, healthy conditions, [and] the prevention of child labor
...things that were the responsibility of all society.42 As for corporate power and its anti-
democratic influence, she was also in front of all but the socialists in the labor movement,
in her calls for democracy in the industrial workplace.43
At the time of the Pullman Strike, Jane Addams was involved in an effort by pro-
gressive “good government” reformers among Chicago’s civic elite to resolve labor
disputes by arbitration. Prior to the initial walkout, she had been appointed by the board
of the Chicago Civic Federation, a progressive betterment group, to serve on its newly
formed Citizen s Arbitration Committee,” specifically intended to help resolve labor-
management conflicts. Her group met with the Pullman workers and with ARU represen-
tatives in Pullman, the ‘model community’ built by George Pullman to house some of his
factory workers. After securing their agreement to have the dispute arbitrated by the
committee, the “male members” of the committee met with Pullman who flatly refused to
consider either arbitration or mediation 44
A few months after the defeat of the strikers and the collapse of the ARU, Jane
Addams presented an essay to the Chicago Woman’s Club and the Twentieth Century
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Club of Boston containing her reflections on the strike, and, indirectly, on the lessons she
had learned during her five years at Hull House
.
45
Her already prolific work with the
poor in Chicago, her prodiglous efforts to raise funds and educate the social conscience of
Chicago’s elites, her investigations into the conditions underlying the strike, her efforts to
mediate its resolution, and media accounts of the extensive assistance given by the set-
tlement house staff to striking workers and their families, gave her words the ring of
authenticity. Unlike Debs who is reported to have called her speech “just another attempt
to put out fire with rosewater,”46 Henry Demarest Lloyd, a reformer respected by both
Addams and Debs, found her critique of George Pullman so strong and implicitly broad
that he advised her not to attempt to have it published in its current form
.
47
With devastating effect, Addams compared Pullman to Shakespeare’s King Lear,
relating his reputation as a generous, progressive employer and benefactor to the paternal
beneficence Lear had afforded his daughter, Cordelia. In fact, she continued, Pullman
had been criticized by Wall Street several years earlier when he had used extensive corpo-
rate funds to construct a model community, on his solely conceived, minutely detailed
physical and social design, for Pullman Company employees on the outskirts of Chicago.
Of the strike, she observed that Pullman, “like King Lear, could not imagine that
his child [his workers] ’should be moved by a principle obtained outside himself,” or
have acted so ungratefully
.
48
She carefully crafted the analogy to show how industrialists,
including those like Pullman who claimed the mantle of enlightened philanthropic virtue,
were really engaged in individual, primarily ego-gratifying pursuits, creating a dependent
social order not only in the factory, but the form in which in which [their] workmen
were living .”
49
Referring to Pullman’s stubborn refusal to either arbitrate or negotiate in
158
the face of the strike's massive national and local human impact, she inferred his sincer-
ity, concluding that “he must have been sustained by the consciousness of being in the
nght. Only that could have held him against the great desire for fair play which swept
over the country.”50
Addams’s essay was far more than a critique of the excesses of what she and most
other progressive reformers acknowledged as the new industrial order in America. For
her the Pullman Stnke was evidence not simply of structural growing pains, but of a
growing social disorder,” which needed to be understood “not alone in its legal aspect
nor in its sociological bearings, but from those deep human motives , which, after all, de-
termine events ." 51 The strike affirmed for her the evidence of class warfare that now
informed Debs s action; however, unlike Debs, she refused to treat it as either a normal or
inevitable part of the American system. Further, although she weighed in strongly on the
side of labor in her appraisal of the resulting injustice, she strongly felt that class warfare
itself was only the latest version of man’s primitive, gendered state.
In Addams s view, class struggle was part of the recurring cycle of arbitrary asser-
tion of self-interest by some elite and the reactive violence of those oppressed by a newly
configured coercion - one that high-handed benevolence, however well intentioned,
could not adequately soften. The culprits were wrongly informed human agents, both or-
ganized and individual, not society or some diaphanous force of history.
For Addams, the counter-mobilization of organized self-interest by labor, while
understandable, even justified and noble given the magnitude of the injustice, was equally
primitive, likely to descend into violence, and inadequate in its social motive. Both par-
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ties, each convinced of their legitimacy, were isolating themselves from the other, each
regarding the other with increasing contempt.
In her first book, Democracy and Social Rthirs, a collection of speeches and arti-
cles published in 1907, Jane Addams addressed more fully what she saw as the need of
her generation, particularly its powerful elites, for a new social ethic. She attempted to
share with an educated and privileged audience what she and her activist colleagues had
learned as they worked at and from the Hull House venue during the preceding decade
that had included the Pullman Strike. 5 ~ She aimed her argument at those of her strata
who, as she had been, were “unhappy in regard to their attitude toward the [new] social
order; toward the dreary round of uninteresting work, the pleasures narrowed down to
those of appetite ... who are denied the relief that sturdy action brings....”
Her solution was simple and direct: the individual, perhaps once enlightened, mo-
tive of rational self-interest that governed the existing order needed to be abandoned, or at
least subordinated to a broader, more inclusive social motive. We must “cast our experi-
ences in a larger mould if our lives are to be animated by ...larger social aims.”53 What
was needed was a conscious seeking by those genuinely disaffected of broad, democratic
experience, “a wider acquaintance with and participation in the life about them.54 By
bringing one’s self into contact “with the moral experiences of the many,” she argued,
one is more readily, and naturally able to “procure an adequate social motive.”
[Such] experience gives the easy and trustworthy impulse toward right action in
the broad as well as in the narrow relations.... Our social ideals are developed
through our ability to . . . reflect on experience and our strength to attain them is
secured from interest in life itself.” 55
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Acting for Peace
Jane Addams’s activism, informed by early, ongoing learning from her Hull
House neighbors and the often hotly discussed proposals of her sister (and fellow, such as
John Dewey and many others) residents and colleagues, was constant, local as well as far-
ranging, and frequently controversial during her first twenty years. No single aspect of
her career, however, generated more conflict and, by necessary inference, greater evi-
dence of her authenticity as a core social and political actor, than her unqualified
opposition to World War I.
As Addams understood it, pacifism and nonviolence were merely logical exten-
sions of the democratic social ethic, the emotional and rational product of the
“cosmopolitan” experience of one’s active engagement with life - most especially with
those on the margins of society, such as in Chicago’s immigrant neighborhoods where she
lived and worked. They were also qualities that women, she believed with Stanton,
learned more predictably than men, through their nurturing and affectionate relationships
their parents and with their own children. Accordingly, it is not surprising that she voiced
her opposition to war at the first opportunity, during America’s intervention in Cuba and
the Philippines at the turn of the century. 56
In 1907 she set forth her arguments for peace, grounding them neither in the em-
pirical nor romantic principals of human equality and universal rights that had
characterized 18
th
century political thought, nor in pragmatism that justified peace se-
cured by international law as a rational, less costly alternative to international violence.
While she saw both as signs of moral progress and as important rationales, she under-
stood that neither contained the necessary motive force to enable us to withstand the
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primitive and selfish urges that led to conflict. She also found the parallel arguments of
many pacifists - appeals to human pity or sensibility based on the horrors of war and ar-
guments of prudence or good sense that sought to avoid war by setting forth its cost “with
pitiless accuracy” - truthful, but inadequate
.
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In her analysis, she came down on the side of human emotion informed not by ab-
stract principal but by democratic, social experience which, as she had encountered it,
deepened pity into compassion and abstract equality into equality based on mutual rela-
tionship, interpersonal affection, and respect. She fully understood the lure that war held
for many, perhaps most, men in America. The spirit of war animated them to heroic ac-
tion, furnished them with a moral raison d’etre by stirring “the nobler blood and the
higher imagination of the nation, and thus free[ing] it from moral stagnation and the
bonds of commercialism .”58
Addams’s solution, as she had proposed for ameliorating the clash of labor and
capital, was the substitution of a new motive force, a “virile good will” as she artfully
called it, at least equal to the spirit of warfare and its corresponding moral claim on the
hearts and minds of men, yet as “compatible with their spiritual natures, as war has
proved itself to be incompatible .”59 She deeply believed that man was an evolutionary
creature, uniquely equipped to learn from such experience, supplemented with formal
knowledge, such as she had gleaned from - and brought to - the Hull House neighbor-
hood. She detected in her own social learning, and the similar education she had
observed among her colleagues and immigrant neighbors, as evidence that this “substitute
motive” was already taking hold in America at large:
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We care less each day for the heroism connected with warfare and destruction,
and constantly admire more that which pertains to labor and the nourishing ofhuman life. The new heroism manifests itself at the present moment in [the]
...determination to abolish poverty and disease, a manifestation so widespread
that it may justly be called international.”60
As Addams biographer Daniel Levine observes, her growing “respectability” in
the mainstream-entering current of Progressive Era reform was essentially unaffected un-
til the entry of America into World War I in April 1917.61 As with Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, she had become an activist at what we can now easily discern was a propitious
moment in our history, enabling her to tap into the moral discontent and search for mean-
ing that she had experienced and detected in many others of her generation. Accordingly,
her qualified, pragmatic support for Roosevelt’s Progressive Party candidacy in 1912 was
solicited and welcomed. 6“ Even her pacifism was shared as an ideal, or at least tolerated,
by many reformers and conventional actors. They included Woodrow Wilson, who saw
the outbreak of war in Europe as anachronistic - a spasm of first generation, unenlight-
ened nationalism, enhanced by modem means.
During 1914 and 1915, Addams ’s participation in efforts, organized by men and
women, to end the war in Europe was prodigious. In September, 1914, only weeks after
the outbreak of hostilities, she met with members of various American and international
peace societies in New York, searching for ways to keep America out of the conflict and,
if possible to end the war itself. The group decided upon the strategy of organizing a
purely women’s peace group, based upon the belief, strongly shared by Addams, that
“there are things concerning which women are more sensitive than men, and one of these
is the treasuring of life.”
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Upon her return to Chicago, Jane Addams worked with noted suffragist, Carrie
Chapman Catt, to organize a large national peace congress in Washington in January
1915. The convocation was attended by some three thousand women, primarily delegates
from existing national women’s organizations. The Woman’s Peace Party (later the nu-
cleus of the American branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom) was formed at the congress, with Addams elected as its chair.64
Later that spring, Addams traveled to Europe, heading a delegation of the WPA,
to attend an international congress of women at The Hague, together with 1136 women
from 12 countries. The organizers, members of the international suffrage movement, had
invited Addams to chair the meeting, intentionally comprised of delegates from both neu-
tral and warring nations.65 Following the congress, she and other delegates spent the next
several weeks travelling with great difficulty through Europe, meeting with belligerents
and neutrals alike in an attempt to convince them to participate in a neutral nation media-
tion of the war. Addams took on the toughest challenge, travelling to the capital of each
of the principal warring countries, attempting (and sometimes succeeding) to meet with
key state leaders.
Addams continued her efforts for peaceful resolution and to keep America neutral
in the war for the next several months. In the 1916 election, she supported Wilson, given
his overall progressive record and his pledge to maintain American neutrality. However,
in early 1917, as Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare and President Wilson
shifted rapidly with growing public sentiment to enter the war, Addams quickly found
herself “on the radical fringe of society, a troubled outcast.”66 Nonetheless, she perse-
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vered, testifying before Congress against both the Espionage and Conscription Acts, as
Amenca formally entered the war and war fever quickly became an epidemic.67
The low point arrived in June 1917, two months after America entered the war,
when she delivered one of several speeches she had given that spring on the subject of
Patnots and Pacifists in Wartime,'’ this one to an audience at the First Congregational
Church in Evanston, Illinois.68 Her speech, which was greeted with awkward silence,
confirmed both her unalterable opposition to the war and her awareness of the personal
cost of standing largely alone. According to her nephew and biographer, James Linn, she
observed with personal and gendered irony:
The pacifist is making a venture into a new international ethics. He is afforded
an opportunity to cultivate a fine valor ... for new ethics are unpopular ethics
[Yet] the pacifist must serve his country by forcing definitions if possible .... He
should insist that the United States declare its refusal to regard the deliberate star-
vation of the woman and children of any nation [a reference to the then
widespread effects of the total naval blockade imposed by the allies at the begin-
ning of the war] as a proper war measure.”69
Moral Adjustment
Addams was one “of only a handful of urban progressives who opposed American
participation in the war,’ throughout the war. She stood in opposition not only to over-
whelming American public sentiment and reactive war hysteria, but also to a majority of
her Hull House colleagues and supporters, including her close friend John Dewey.70 Re-
alizing that speaking from a principled stance alone was ineffective as a vehicle for
promoting peace in the midst of the patriotic, sacrificial fervor of war, she sought a new
means of concrete action to define and express her wider moral view. As she had written
several years earlier, she understood that
165
action is indeed the sole medium for the expression of ethics
...that speculation
in regard to morality is but observation
... that a situation does not really become
moral until we are confronted with a question of what shall be done in a concrete
case, and are obliged to act upon our theory.”71
By the last months of the conflict she had turned to food aid for starving children
and women in Europe as both an urgent need and the most effective means to promote the
social ethic of cooperation and mutual aid and to highlight the heinous consequences of
war. She found a new national voice travelling the country, speaking to women’s groups
in particular, in support of an expanded vision of the federal government’s wartime food
program.
Addams joined in the official call for public food conservation and increased pro-
duction, and especially in the plea for international institution-building to aid the starving
in Europe and to stave off what many saw as a looming world food crisis.72 Her further
reflection on experience had triggered a new insight, based in part on women’s primal,
life preserving roles as child nurturers, agriculturalists, providers of basic sustenance, and
their corresponding empathy for suffering children:
“As I had felt the young immigrant conscripts caught up into a great world
movement which sent them out to fight, so it seemed to me [that] the millions of
American women might be caught up into a great world purpose, that of conserva-
tion of life; there might someday be found an antidote to war in women’s all-
embracing pity for helpless children.”73
After the war and the subsidence of the reactionary events of 1919-1921, Addams
spent the next decade in relative anonymity, until, like Stanton, her age and the renewed
association of her name with the institutions - juvenile courts and the University of Chi-
cago School of Social Work among them - that had been built upon her once
controversial initiatives, restored her name to one that socially-minded organizations
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“wanted on their letterheads.”74 She continued to write prolifically and to speak out for a
new, more inclusive social morality, urging American ratification of the League of Na-
tions treaty, humanitarian relief for war-ravaged Europe, and endorsing various battles
being fought by others seeking social justice. As with Stanton and Douglass, she was for-
tunate to live long enough to again be seen as safe and saintly by the media and the state.
In 1931, three years before her death, she was awarded the Nobel Prize, donating most of
the honorarium, much as she had done with her inheritance in the founding and early op-
eration of Hull House, to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. 75
Another Form of Nonviolent Action
Following his conversion to socialism in 1895, Eugene Debs devoted the rest of
his life to raising the “public conscience” of “[t]he heart of the country,” which he
equated with the proletariat or working class and their families.76 Having discovered the
general course of historical development, his goal was to lead the vanguard of the Marx-
ist-conceived class struggle in America and to establish a “working-class republic” via a
democratic revolutionary victory over the capitalist plutocrats to be achieved at the ballot
box.
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To his credit, the working class that Debs identified with and sought to persuade
included both women and African Americans as political equals. 78 As with Stanton,
Douglass, and Addams, he saw women as playing a vital moral role in any politics of re-
form. He also believed that their emancipation and enlistment in the socialist cause as
voters and party workers were each essential to the movement’s democratic success in
America.
167
His support for African American political equality, as well as greatly improved
economic freedom also appeared to be supported by sincere belief, although clearly sub-
ordinated to his efforts to build the Socialist Party in a strongly racist labor environment.
In a 1903 article, for example, he unequivocally condemned the injustice of slavery and
its racial aftermath, in a simple declaration: “The history of the Negro in the United States
is a history of crime without parallel." He focused his sharpest critique, however, on the
South where it was evident that neither unions nor socialism were likely to take root. At
the end of the piece he accepted both the reality of social discrimination, although decry-
ing the injustice of its causes, and acknowledged that his party “had nothing special to
offer the Negro.
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Socialism, as Debs saw it, was inevitable throughout the industrial world; its
peaceful democratic evolution - as a process and an outcome - was not. For Debs, de-
mocracy was inseparable from socialism, not simply the most practical way, given the
conservative individualism with which he had earlier been imbued and which he knew
was endemic in American labor. In fact, he counted on the American revolutionary spirit,
and to the radical individualism that informed it for socialism’s ultimate success in this
country. Awakened by experience and the educative persuasion of actors like himself to a
proper understanding of the cause of the lack of freedom that they had come to live with,
reminded and prodded to assert their revolutionary “manhood,” American workers would
organize economically, politically, and nonviolently - unless required in self-defense, as
at the American Founding.
Like Addams, Debs’ s efforts to achieve his above goals were immense and over-
whelmingly authentic. He headed the Socialist Party and ran as its presidential candidate
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from 1900 to 1912, helping to build its active member base from less than 10,000 in 1904
to its peak of 1 18,000 in 1912. In that year the Debs ticket garnered 900,000 votes, some
six percent of national presidential total. 80 In each campaign, he traveled, spoke, wrote,
organized, and often struggled with internecine conflicts over doctrine, strategy, and egos
to the point of physical exhaustion.
The second aspect of his strategy, seen by him as indispensable to the “socialist
movement,” was the organization of industrial unions. Writing in 191 1 concerning strat-
egy for the upcoming election, he stated with typical clarity:
“Of far greater importance than increasing the vote of the Socialist party is the
economic organization of the working class. To the extent, and only to the extent,
that the workers are disciplined and organized in their respective industries can
the Socialist movement advance and the Socialists party hold what [it gains] by
the ballot .... Each industry must be organized in its entirety, embracing all the
workers, and all working together in the interests of all, in the true spirit of soli-
darity, thus laying the foundation and developing the superstructure of the new
system within the old, from which it is evolving, and systematically fitting the
workers, step by step, to assume entire control of the productive forces when the
hour strikes for the impending organic change.” 81
It was at a point of maximum exhaustion, in the waning months of
World War I, that Debs demonstrated the full depth of his sincerity for all to see. In the
late summer of 1917, following America’s entry into the war and the first major wave of
arrests of his leftist radical colleagues under the new national Espionage Act, he had “suf-
fered the third major collapse in his activist career and entered a sanitarium. 82 As one
would expect, he had openly, strenuously opposed both the war and Wilson’s policy of
preparedness alongside neutrality.
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Unlike Jane Addams, his opposition was not based on opposition to all forms of
organized hostility, but “to ruling class war,” national conflicts commenced by the ruling
class, whether characterized as offensive or defensive, “or what other lying excuse may
be invented for it.”83 Much as Douglass had accepted the necessity of the Civil War,
Debs saw the necessity of violence in the class struggle for nations, such as Russia, where
democratic persuasion and confrontation were not possible.
That summer was also the nadir for American socialism, much as it was for ef-
forts to promote the democratic, nonviolent resolution of international disputes. Late that
fall, he was buoyed by the success of the Bolshevik-led Russian Revolution, praising
those who “by their incomparable valor and sacrifice added fresh lustre to the fame of the
international movement. His enthusiasm was tempered, however, by his awareness that
“the movement in America would face further persecution, for capitalists as well as So-
cialists understood that ‘the truth alone will make people free’.”84
In early June, 1918, determined to demonstrate his solidarity with his comrades
and to lend personal testimony to the importance of his cause, Debs left his sick bed, “ex-
pecting, even anticipating his arrest,” under the Sedition Act adopted by Congress the
previous month. Within two weeks he was successful, following his delivery of an im-
passioned speech to a crowd of one thousand state party members in Cantonsville, Ohio.
It was an address carefully calculated to inflame both his supporters and his enemies,
without stepping over the line of national disloyalty. 85 He was tried that September and
presented no defense other than an eloquent, passionate closing argument to the jury. The
following day, he was found guilty. At sentencing, he addressed the court, informing the
judge that he “sought no mercy and ... [pled] for no immunity.” He continued to predict
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that the course of history, the foreseeable interaction of economic structure and human
nature theorized by Marx, would ultimately prevail, as he gave his percept.on of the pre-
sent and prophecy of the future:
“Y°ur honor I realize finally that the right must prevail. I never so clearly
comprehended as now the great struggle between the powers of greed and exploi-
in7so^,ttic
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I can see the dawn of a better day for humanity. The people are awaken-ing. In due time they will and must come to their own.” 86
The judge “acknowledged Debs’s sincerity and courage,” as he sentenced him to
ten years in pnson, implicitly condemning him along with “those 'within our borders who
would strike the sword from the hand of this nation while she is engaged in defending
herself against a foreign and brutal power’.”87
Eugene Debs served over three years of his sentence at hard labor in federal peni-
tentiaries in West Virginia and Atlanta before his sentence was commuted by President
Harding in 1923. In his late sixties when incarcerated, with his health already largely
spent for his cause. Debs died in 1926. Notwithstanding his decades of effort, his skilled
rhetoric, and his dogged persistence, the American working class was not ready to heed
the call to revolution by Debs and his numerous socialist core actor contemporaries.
That many millions listened to his call and that a great many of those chose to act
in response, is, in the context of early twentieth century America, powerful evidence of
two things, first, that authenticity is a prerequisite to moral suasion; second, that authentic
action, even when accompanied by unusual will and skill, lacks the full human content
necessary to overcome power, whether supported by individualism or some variant of
communal conformity - or both, as in America.
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CHAPTER 6
SOME CONTEMPORARY ACTORS
If we are to understand the nature, capacity, and effect of core actors in our midst,
it is helpful, as earlier argued, to first look back at earlier periods of social and political
reform, to achievements that conform to our fundamental moral outlook and prionties in
the present, and to the actors associated with such accomplishments. Hav.ng endeavored
to do so, we are now more prepared to identify such actors in the present, to consider the
nature and potential impact of their action, and to determine what this reveals concerning
our own moral nature.
The difficulty of understanding our actual and potential individual, social, and po-
litical nature by recourse to history should not, however, be minimized. To do so requires
that we imaginatively enter the lives, past circumstances, and understandings of others
who are no longer available to witness or interview. Our task is to convert them from ab-
stractions - words and visual images - into breathing actors or agents who, like us, were
influenced by the results of past action, who in turn acted in ways that influenced their
time and ours . 1
This is a difficult task for many since we are commonly taught to regard imagina-
tion as a false conscious or pre-rational path to ignorance - a reverie that leads only to
unicorns - and our capacity to imagine is therefore often woefully undeveloped. More-
over, our effort to understand ourselves with the assistance of the past inevitably requires
that we contend with narrative mythmaking and scholarly bias that either artificially en-
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hances or diminishes human accomplishment, often omitting entire sets of actors and fre-
quently misreplicating the stage on which they performed.
Finally there is the problem of our own ontological perspective. If, for example,
we are of the view that human nature is somehow fixed, predetermined, and essentially
static, or that it is determined and dependent upon structures and forces that reflect our
nature but which are beyond our control, then our history is only useful as a tactical man-
ual or as a developmental chronology of a species sub-group. If history is to offer us
inspiration, it must offer evidence of individual and socialized moral learning and growth
at the onginal instance of identifiable human actors. Fortunately, to the extent that we
can shed our liberal republican and communitarian blinders and discern the full range of
our own moral nature, the other distortions can be overcome and we can discover a past
that offers hope through our genuine enlightenment in the present.
The task of discovering inspiration and hope in the present - of identifying core
actors and understanding their actual and potential role in our lives - is much more diffi-
cult. In addition to the personal moral discomfort that their words and deeds so often
impart, there are the following factors to contend with:
1 ) Our still-growing attraction to rational methodology which limits our compre-
hension and discussion of non-elite individual and group action to aggregated,
quantifiable, highly qualified facts and equally qualified mid-level structural-
behavioral models and theories that are mildly predictive, at best; 2
2) Our concept-of-the-year social and political, moral and ethical discourse by
privatized observers that so largely comprises the commercial “marketplace of
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ideas” for intellectual consumers, and offers only a short-lived tonic of clever
surface analysis for their malaise 3
;
3) The ongoing political and rabtdly corporate, market-driven closure of democ-
ratic informational space, exemplified by the imposition of scant, often
misleading, media coverage of authentic moral activism unless accompanied
by violence or expressive anarchistic disruption, together with an almost vir-
tual guarantee of public anonymity insured by the group characterization of
core actors; and
4) Our now pervasive Enlightenment-informed, postmodem-enhanced, systemi-
cally structured social, political, and ontological isolation from authentic
engagement with one another, even as we rationally acknowledge, with singu-
lar cultural reluctance and resigned irony, our increasing instrumental
interdependence and mass conformity.
Although it has never been easier to overlook, mischaracterize, or dismiss core
actors, or to perceive them as ineffectively scattered here and there, they continue to work
among us and, therefore, potentially to persuade and include us, living and acting authen-
tically at all levels of our social and political landscape. In and near the Pioneer Valley of
Western Massachusetts, where, for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 1, their numbers are
likely higher, their activism is more visible, although by no means abundantly apparent.
In the Tradition of Stanton and Addams
At age eighty when interviewed, Frances Crowe is one of the oldest and likely the
best known peace and social justice activists in the valley. The range and duration of her
activism — of most of her adult life - is suggested by her most recent, ongoing effort “to
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get her life in a manageable shape.”4 Although much earlier like efforts had led her to
avoid doing “much international work,” she has traveled and acted extensively in this
country, in the course of which she has “met people, and you network, and [attended] na-
tional meetings.” She neglects to mention that she made dozens of these trips to engage
in nonviolent protests. Frequently, these have included intentional acts of civil disobedi-
ence, many of which led to her arrest. In an article published several months earlier,
covering her trial with five others for her most recent civilly disobedient act at the Ray-
theon defense plant in Andover, Massachusetts, the journalist overheard her hosts at a pot
luck supper on the night before her hearing asking Crowe if she was “afraid of going to
prison. Well, ’ she replied, “I have been in jail a number of times; to be honest, I've
stopped counting.”5
At this point in her life, the engagingly direct, unfailingly polite, physically di-
minutive Crowe described something of her philosophy as she reviewed her efforts to cut
back. I just [have always] felt, I’m trying to live simply so that others may simply
live.” Referring to her decades-long work with the American Friends Service Committee
(AFS(I-), a Quaker-founded organization established in 1917 “as a practical expression of
the philosophy of William James,
... [and] a prototype of the later Civilian Conservation
Corps and Peace Corps, she mentions the changes she has made since ‘retiring’ as direc-
tor of that group in 1994.
6
“[N]ow that I m retired from the AFSC, I’ve picked up some pieces from the
AFSC office ... focusing on economic justice and youth empowerment. But I also
feel strongly about this situation in Iraq - lifting the sanctions - and started a
weekly vigil and [helped form] a local committee to look at the sanctions and stop
the bombing.... And then, when we were bombing Yugoslavia, we included [that]
in our campaign. And I’m active in another group I started, the Nuclear Weapons
Abolition Task Force— I’m a member of the Atlantic Life Community, which is
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the east coast people who are working
the things that I really focus on now.”
... resisting nuclear weapons. So, those are
Judging from the phone calls during her interview, the far from museum-like ap-
pearance of her basement office (the former location of the AFSC regional office in West-
ern Massachusetts), and the number of times that her name was mentioned in other
interviews, though Frances Crowe may, like Stanton and Addams before her, have slowed
down in her later years, morally informed action continues for her to be fully a part of life
itself.
Her activism began at least as early as high school in Carthage Missouri, when she
became upset that girls couldn’t take physical education, and started a petition drive that
succeeded in getting the matter considered by the school board . 7 She recalled being bom
and raised in that town as part of a large, middle class family (four children), in which she
expenenced love, relationship, mutual support, and interdependence. She credits her par-
ents for furnishing her with a good “moral education,” and for imparting to her and her
sisters a sense of their competence to act, “always saying [to them] you can do something
with your life.... Life is what you make of it.”
Asked to further explain the origins of her activism, she displayed only a trace of
impatience as she observed: You don t just sit down and decide what you are going to
be. We get sort of propelled along. Evidencing her understanding of expanding moral
awareness, she continued: and if we live good, lengthy, thoughtful, conscious lives,
that s what happens.’ In her case, the more generic early propulsion in that direction was
a combination of full-blown adventuresome youthfulness and her strong desire to leave
Carthage, which she saw then (and now) as a conservative community, “with a lot of ra-
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cism and classism. I think that really bothered me a lo,
... you know, really wanttng to get
out
... and get to know some very interesting people ... who aren't living on who their
Grandparents were.” The latter reason further suggests the influence of an already ex-
panding, inclusive world-view.
After graduating from Syracuse University where she majored in psychology, she
moved to Columbia, Missoun to do student personnel work at Stephens College. At
about this time, the attack on Pearl Harbor spurred her to action. She left Stephens, feel-
ing that “I just had to get out of there and get involved in the war effort in some way.
After considering the military and other service options, “I chose [the] war industry.” She
took a special summer course offered by Mount Holyoke College “in engineering science
war management training,” and “ended up at Bell Laboratories.”
Now living in New York City, she was also exposed to "new ideas” from reading
a local progressive newspaper, and from living at International House, a well known
group residence, and doing part-time graduate work at Columbia.
And then I switched from Columbia to [evening classes] at the Hunter School for
Social Research, and was getting lots of ideas, so that, by the end of the war, I was
developing a lot of anti-war feeling, feeling that war was not the answer and that
we had to figure out something else.”
Married and living in New Orleans toward the end of the war, while her husband
served as an Army Medical Corps surgeon aboard a ship whose home port was in that
city, she recalls with utter clarity the moment when she learned that America had dropped
a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, an event that strengthened her predilection toward nonvio-
lence into a strong conviction:
“Tom [her recently deceased husband] was ... on a ship that went between Pa-
nama and New Orleans. He heard a lot about the bomb from his contacts, so we
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She recalled with gentle, self-deprecating humor her naivete in reaction to that
news, and her determination that she must tmmediately do something about it:
Orleans'
^
TdTfT"8 P6aCe Cemer [lauShin«) - a‘ a storefront in New. ... I id find a used bookstore..., I asked the man if he had any books onthe peace movement, and he wisely sent me to Tolstoy's writings. So I started
reading about nonviolence.” 8
Whtle living in Rochester, New York after the war, Crowe and her husband were
exposed to Quakerism through friends. Shortly thereafter, around 1951, they moved to
the Pioneer Valley so that their son, second of their three children, could attend the Clark
School for the Deaf in Northampton. They decided to seek out a Friends' meeting in the
area and became active members. 9 It was this decision, motivated by a combination of
spiritual need, an evolving, quickening concern over issues of peace and social justice,
and the simple human desire for local friendship that facilitated her transition into what
would later become a support network for her fulltime activism.
During the 1950s, the living and learning process continued for Crowe and her
husband, as they gradually became more morally informed and active. By the early
1960s, judging by the actions each took, they had incorporated activism into their respec-
tive life routines. The primary social and political issue for Crowe, now in her early
forties, and her husband continued to be the bomb, in particular the recently-discovered
concern over nuclear atmospheric testing and its effects on human health. Her husband
became an early member of Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), a group founded
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by several nationally promtnem physicians in 1961 to act on this and related nuclear con-
cents, and organized a local chapter in the valley. 10
Searching for a means to work on the same issue, Crowe learned through another
mother and Quaker friend about the still-active Women’s International League for Peace
and Freedom (WILPF), which, as previously noted, Jane Addams had been instrumental
in founding and leading two generations earlier. In the tradition of Addams and Stanton
before her, Crowe and her friend decided to start a local chapter of WILPF by inviting
seventy-five women to come to her house for tea. Looking back at that moment, she re-
called. Anyway, we started - and [all] seventy-five people came... It was really
incredible! So we started a very active chapter here. It was the fastest growing chapter
... in the country. We did all kinds of wonderful things.”
Shortly thereafter, she helped organize a local chapter of the SANE Nuclear Pol-
icy Committee, a national organization established by long-time Saturday Review editor
and noted social philosopher, Norman Cousins, and others to address the wider issues of
nuclear weapons and to call for disarmament. However, when SANE’s steering commit-
tee decided to adopt the government-fostered policy of requiring its members to sign
statements declaring that they were not communists, “we decided, you know, we weren’t
going to work with them anymore.”
As was the somewhat the case with each of the four historical actors, Crowe has
remained most persistently active in her first cause, the effort to ban the use of nuclear
weapons and to eliminate the weapons themselves. Never content with the mere commu-
nication of her moral stance to others, she has acted repeatedly, speaking out, organizing,
writing, demonstrating, and getting arrested to call attention to this fundamental moral
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t0 lnform and Persuade others to see for themselves the truths that underlie her
view.
As with Addams, new learning from events, extensive contacts and relationships
w* °therS
’
and further experiences have led Crowe to oppose war much more broadly.
In common with many of us, Vietnam was another watershed event in her life. William
Norris, a local long-time lawyer-activist, was a fledgling attorney when he first met her in
1967. Crowe had decided on draft counseling as a local strategy, part of a national effort
just then getting underway. Hoping to obtain legal expertise for the cause, she publicized
"an open invitation to all lawyers in Hampshire and Franklin Counties to meet First
Church in Amherst to discuss draft counseling for young people opposed to the Vietnam
War. I was the only attorney to show up.” 11
Crowe enlisted Noms to help with draft counseling and set up an office and meet-
ing place in the basement of her home, conveniently located in the “five colleges” region
of the Pioneer Valley. Prior to doing so, she attended a week long training course in draft
counselling at the Philadelphia headquarters of the Central Committee for Conscientious
Objectors, a Quaker-affiliated organization like the AFSC, having its roots in the imme-
diate post-World War II era.^ Its policy called for potential draftees to be counseled
individually and confidentially, in the rights tradition of American liberalism. Again
reminiscent of Addams, Crowe recalled,
“I had always thought that this one-on-one thing was wrong
. . . that you can best
find yourself in the group process.
. .. I could tell them about the draft law, but the
personal decision he had to make — and it was ‘he’s’ — about who he was, and
where he was going, and why
. . . had to be done in a group setting.”
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For the next few years the Crowe house, even by their usual standards, was a busy
place. She and her volunteer staff worked hard and creatively, going repeatedly to the
University of Massachusetts, Hampshire and Amherst College campuses, and elsewhere,
throughout the valley and Western Massachusetts to both recruit students and run work-
shops. They reached out to inform young men about the war, to encourage them to reflect
and consider their opt.ons, and to offer, in a sea of apparent overwhelming conformity,
the refuge and support of a small group community that she had created at her home.
Crowe, herself, recalls travelling the main road between Amherst and Northampton, pick-
ing up young male hitchhikers. “They all had the draft on their minds. ” In one year, she
proudly recounts “we had 1776 visits in this office.”
In all, approximately one hundred and fifty young men applied for CO status. “As
far as I know, no one was denied.” In the process, in response to a petition from her
neighbors, the city council ordered “no parking” signs posted along her upper middle
class cul-de-sac street. “That’s right,” she wryly remembers, “They had too many kids
with motorcycles and long hair coming in here.”
Learning and Adapting
Frances Crowe and her home office remained at the center of peace and social jus-
tice activism in the region for the next two decades. Following the pattern of many
couples of their generation and circumstance, her husband, although continuing his work
with PSR, performed a largely supportive role, providing the family’s economic means
that allowed Crowe to devote herself to the position she had grown into, that of a core
social and political actor.
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As she became aware, informed, and active on an increasing number of issues of
national and global concern, matters where she concluded that her sodety and state were
ignorant, in the wrong, or at least could do much better, she drew in part from her experi-
ence with anti-draft activism to develop a strategy to reach and involve more people.
Now running the regional AFSC office from her home, she sought out and encouraged
existing and new activist colleagues to form and join specialized, long-term and ad hoc
working groups” utilizing the administrative, informational, and other support she could
offer through AFSC and otherwise. Starting with nuclear energy and disarmament, she
helped form similar groups and, whenever possible, to connect them with others to form
coalitions and task forces. Among the efforts mounted in this manner were those to end
apartheid, to change American policy in Central America, the Balkans, Iraq and the Mid-
dle East, address the devastating effects of economic globalization, and act on other
issues of national and world-wide import. Commenting on the change, she observed:
[T]hey met separately and sometimes, you know, I was more or less involved.
When I got busy, I didn’t go to all their meetings, but I knew what was going on,
and I could give them information that came from Philadelphia and other avenues.
So [now] we always work this way, as a collective within the group.”
Although a great deal of what kept her busy led to her frequent arrests, most of it
came from other forms of her prodigious activism. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example
she worked extensively with her AFSC affiliated local Disarmament Working Group and
others in the Western Massachusetts First Congressional District, then represented by a
powerful long-term Republican, Silvio O. Conte. 13 She helped organize and coordinate
drives to place four different non-binding questions on local ballots in the district, the
best known of which was the “nuclear freeze” initiative undertaken in 1979. In another
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such effort, a resolution calling on the Massachusetts congressional delegation to vote
against funding for the Reagan administration’s Star Wars program, they prevailed in a
majority of towns in Berkshire County, including Pittsfield, Conte’s hometown.
Crowe had developed somewhat of a relationship of mutual respect with Conte.
Her persistence and overall authenticity in her dealings with him - including a well-
publicized sit-in at his Holyoke office several years earlier after his repeated unwilling-
ness to meet with her group to discuss American policy in El Salvador - likely helped to
foster this relationship. According to her clearly relished story involving the “Star wars”
campaign, she had arranged a small group meeting with him at his Holyoke office, bring-
ing along a map of Berkshire County that she had garnished with “gold stars” to
graphically depict the number and location of cities and towns whose voters had sup-
ported the question. Conte, surprised (and quite possibly pleased) by the compiled
evidence that so many constituents were opposed to the Reagan policy, voted against the
appropriation and helped to kill funding for the program from his influential position as a
ranking minority member on the House Appropriations Committee. About a year later,
when Crowe met with him on other concerns, “he really leveled with me:”
You 11 never know what that vote on Star Wars cost me,’ he said. ‘I’m glad I
did it, but these things are not free. Just last month I was invited by President
Reagan down to [New York City] ... and they were honoring [the Centennial] of
the Statue of Liberty, and they [the administration] had a destroyer in New York
harbor.’ Reagan was on [the battleship] and he [Conte] had been invited on board
with his family on Fourth of July evening to see the fireworks. So he got his chil-
dren, his grand children, his mother ... and they all got down there on the
gangplank to go out, and they were told that their tickets were no longer honored.”
Conte concluded, as Crowe undoubtedly has many times over her forty plus years
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of activism much of it highly unpopular - “ ‘ That’s what happens when you do the
nght thmg ’”' °ne can imaSine her core actor forebears both informing and echoing the
same sentiment, often from positions much more difficult to endure.
Core actors, like the rest of us, are imperfect models of what they would like to
be. In response to a question of whether she had ever experienced the moral political di-
lemma posed by Michael Walzer in his essay “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty
Hands,” 14 Crowe recalled two instances where she and others who shared her beliefs
“seized the moment,” using tactics that gave her what has become, in our time, a frustrat-
mgly rare opportunity to express her views to a larger public audience. In one, a well
publicized speech at Smith College, in 1979, to be given by a “high government official
... involved in the military aid program in El Salvador...” she recalled: “I was working
with the Central American working group and they wanted very much to stop that
speaker. Concerned over a shift in U.S. policy away from democratic reform to leftist
suppression in the wake of Somoza’s overthrow by the Sandinistas in neighboring Nica-
ragua, the group worked hard for several days in an unsuccessful effort to get the
college to rescind the invitation, seeing it as yet another attempt at official disinformation:
They worked out this plan. They had all of these slides that they wanted to show
about what was really happening in El Salvador, and [wanted] someone who
would stand up and speak. So the plan was, they went in [into the hall] and I was
there helping them leaflet .... Just before he was to speak, they ... turned out the
lights
. . . turned on the projector — it was my slide projector — [and] projected the
slides. They got up on the stage [and] they took over. And I started talking about
what was really going on in the slides. Well, it really broke up the [planned]
meeting of course. I mean, people really listened to what [we] had to say. So the
speaker didn’t get to speak at all.”
Crowe’s democratic discomfort - still implicit in her above selection of personal
nouns - and her concern over the likely harmful effect that such tactics would have on her
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ability to reach and authentically persuade an even broader audtence, were outweighed
this instance by her moral outrage and pragmatism. She acted order to enlarge the pub-
lic space available to actors with unpopular views, to surmount the overwhelming
absence of authentic debate, and to overcome both the official intentional withholding of
vital democratic information and the powerful dissemination of misinformation and out-
right lies when official silence is pierced or deemed inadequate.
.Varied Backgrounds. Talents, and Forms of Persuasion
As suggested in the first chapter, morally informed core actors come from the
same variety of life circumstances as the rest of us. Some, like Frances Crowe are blessed
with a relative abundance of favorable circumstances of birth, comfort, and moral nurture
through to adulthood. Others are more rudely introduced to life. As a result of this diver-
sity of circumstance, early received experience, and predisposition they may enter
adulthood more immediately aware of what life should not be, which itself implies that
they have somehow acquired a foundation of affirmative knowledge as well.
Those core actors who have been abruptly, directly awakened to social and politi-
cal injustice at a point in their lives where strong passions are easy to arouse and more
difficult to constrain can be powerful nonconformists. Further, even when they informed
by a moral tradition that is ideally inclusive and eschews violence, their early activism, at
least, is also likely to be more impatient, less tolerant, more agonistic, and more intense.
Living the Social Gospel
Donna S. is a forceful example. For the first eleven years of her life, she was nur-
tured and sheltered by her parents, a “very extended family, lots of security, safety, no
money, but we [she and her two siblings] didn’t even know it.” In addition to family,
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much of their life routine was centered in the German-American community of Kingston,
New York, a small city located an hour's drive north of Manhattan, and its fundamentalist
Lutheran church, part of the Missouri Synod.
The abrupt transition in her life was caused by a comb.nation of economically
structured self-interest and the desire of her father to better provide for his family. Re-
peating a story that she was obviously aware had strongly influenced her subsequent life
course, she continued:
My father swept the floor in one of the garment factories there. My mother
worked in a sausage factory. We were happy until he decided to move up That
was when unions were starting to come in, the whole story about why [clothing
manufacturers] left the Northeast and went south...”
Her father was offered a job training low-wage, mostly African American female
workers to perform machine sewing piecework at a newly opened location in the South.
He was likely unaware that his employers did not intend to keep him in one location for
long. Conscious of the Faustian bargain that her father made, and remade, with his em-
ployers, she continued:
“There’s just no question that I am the educated and well-off person that I am to-
day because he went into management. But we moved every year ... from the
time I was eleven until ... I went to college. He trained black women to run sew-
ing machines throughout the South. He was fired four times ... and he would go
crawling back ...so that’s why we kept on moving. They basically just used him to
do this training and then would move him on— Then, when he was sixty, they
just fired him so they wouldn’t have to pay his pension. So, I’m [from] a family
that sort of went kicking and screaming into the middle class, but at tremendous
cost - costs of joy, cost in security.”
Confrontation as Persuasion
Experiencing the deterioration of her father and family triggered her initial foray
into activism. Now married to a Jew, she recalls with irony her adolescent, visceral ha-
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tred, focused on the Jewish owners of the company for which her father worked and suf.
fered his “utter humiliation”:
"I went when I was seventeen to their corporate headquarters in Philadelphta and
walked in and threw things at the guy, and said ‘you know what you’re doing to me and
my family and why!‘
... [At the time] I was not tutored. 1 was just angry because I was a
fundamentalist kid who really didn’t think you should do this to people.” It is impossible
to determine if this, Donna's first direct, confrontational action was at all persuasive.
Perhaps it was, on an individual level, over time. It was, in any event, undeniably authen-
tic.
According to Donna, her father died “a destroyed, angry, ‘Archie Bunker’ Repub-
lican. He could never understand his complicity... I didn’t get it for a long time either.”
Her experience dunng adolescence also provided much of the knowledge and motive
strength of her activism. “I know what economic evil is from a very first-hand experi-
ence, and I know it’s very wide-spread and pernicious. So there is a lot of payback in
what I do. This strikes one as a surprisingly candid self-assessment from someone who
has engaged in much of her activism since her ordainment as a clergywoman.
Her decision to become - and remain - a minister suggests that there is much
more to her radicalism than experience-informed anger. For one thing, she also credits
great mentors, good timing, [and] my faith in God.” Among her mentors she includes
her chaplain at Gettysburg College, the small Lutheran-founded school she attended, who
“very slowly, took me through [the process of] understanding.” The timing she refers to
was a combination of what she sees as her good fortune to have gone to college in the
mid and late 1960s, yet having gone to a school that was relatively detached from the so-
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cal and political upheavals that moved like storm surges across most urban campuses.
"If I had gone to a big school. I would have flipped out. I would have been a casualty be-
cause I was so angry and unformed, but instead I had this extraordinary experience.” She
would later accept his invitation to work with him as an associate chaplain at Yale, and
they remain close friends today.
Learning from Core Actors
In 1970 she entered theological school at the University of Chicago, thanks in part
to a full scholarship from her childhood Lutheran Synod. In short order, she was exposed
to the burgeoning ideas and movements from which she had been somewhat isolated
while at Gettysburg. Soon after arriving, she met her second major mentor, noted urban
social and political activist, Saul Alinsky. 16 Indirectly acknowledging his influence on
her, she observed:
If I had met him while I was still being a fundamentalist Lutheran about the war
in Vietnam and about civil rights - you know, ‘as soon as we tell them it’s wrong, they’ll
stop it’ ... I had no conception of power, and when I met Alinsky and learned [from him]
about power, that, I think, made me capable of the long haul.”
In the process of gaining new insights that included not only a broader social
analysis of capitalism, but also a perspective informed by rapidly emerging feminist
thought, Donna also developed her unusual capacity to inform and lead others in social
and political action and, in the process, to instigate change. The Chicago Divinity School
was her first target for reform. During her first year of classes, she recalls:
I became so impressed with what Alinsky was saying and so unimpressed with
what the professors were saying .... So I basically organized the students (she
was the only woman in her class) not to go to the divinity school [but instead] to
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go down to the Woodlawn Organization (an African American grassroots politicalrgamzation organized by Alinsky several years earlier and located in a dense
P
h T "
ear her Campus)
' ' ' ' So basically we did an action on the Universityand took our whole divinity school work at Woodlawn, and made the professorscome to Woodlawn to teach us.”
Confronted with their moral dilemma - the same one that Protestant social gospel
clergy had confronted their institutions with at the outset of the Progressive Era - the fac-
ulty responded positively:
“[T ] he professors came and taught us there, and Alinsky taught us, and we justbecame his band. I mean, it was incredible. We lived there, took our classes
there, we took the professors around, even to places that we didn't know our-
selves and I just had my mind blown. Just blown... So, for the whole time I was
there I just really saw what was happening.
. . I could never really look at the
world the same again .”
Without elaboration, Donna further explained that the University also “came
around,” awarding her and her fellow activist classmates their degrees on schedule. In the
interim, she and several student colleagues became involved with the Urban Institute, an-
other Chicago-based offshoot of Alinsky’s work
.
17
In the course of performing her
requisite internships at suburban white churches, she “insisted” on taking teenagers on
“urban plunges,” a technique that she learned at the Institute. “Basically [we would] take
twenty or thirty white kids” into a poor neighborhood and guide them through informa-
tional meetings and a brief period of living in the setting and economics of poverty
.
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While she readily agreed to a suggestion that the plunge strategy runs the risk of denigrat-
ing those who are unable to leave when the plunge experience is over, she countered with
the unavoidable dilemma of moral activists who attempt to forge reform in any context of
systemic injustice:
I think we always had a lot of students who basically thought it was just so
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phony to go on a plunge, that it was mantpulative of the poor, that it was deniarating, that it was morally suspect on so many grounds. And. if anything it leavesyou with more of a sense of the rift between rich and poor, as opposed to less Iwould acknowledge every one of those really bad things
... and sot that unlessyou have first-hand experience of the poor, you’ll never care long Lough to lastas aj1 activist. You won’, think it’s real because it is just too easy to live in toworld and never see them.... They are really invisible and their plight is invisibleor we say it’s their fault...” H 6 D
Reflecting on her argument, one is reminded of its resonance with the experience
of others. Jane Addams, for example, might never have chosen to live and work with the
poor if she had not first been moved by the close-up sight of evisceral poverty in her first,
guided tour of East London. Further, she might not have taken and sustained broader ac-
tions on their behalf if she had not first lived in their neighborhood, or if she had not
frequently returned to them after her activism had extended its reach.
Finally, as for the current isolation of the urban poor, one of the more poignant
visual metaphors of that reality is captured in Jonathan Kozof s description of the gov-
ernment-funded painting of beautiful urban landscape murals on the side of vacant
apartment buildings facing Interstate Route 95 as it passes through the South Bronx. The
effect is to disguise the physical, absentee-owned ugliness of poverty that lies behind their
thin veneer for the aesthetic benefit of those of us who are able drive by. 19
The Role of Gender
Donna’s path to the ministry was further complicated by another rude awakening
- this time to the institutionalized social reality of gender. After graduating she contacted
her synod to inquire about ordination, only to be informed that the church that had fi-
nanced her formal religious training did not ordain women. When she asked what they
proposed to do with her, they suggested that she could teach. One can imagine her reac-
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tion. Her ordination committee seemed blissfully ignorant that she had grown her
strength in an all-male environment at Divinity School, at one point requiring her to take
a career aptitude test designed for men and learn,ng that she would make an excellent
“Army general.”
In response, she decided to bring her denomination into the world as she was then
discovering it. “So 1 had to organize the Lutheran Church to ordain women." Using her
newly acquired organizational talent, she spent the next year doing so. She quickly
learned that "there were a lot of other women around [the Missouri Synod] who were like
me . . . maybe twenty or thirty [of them].” Minimizing her own efforts, she continued:
“We found each other and the day they voted [at the Synod’s annual meeting] that they
would ordain women - by a two thirds vote - three of us were on the front page of the
Minneapolis Tribune
... saying ‘yea us’. And the next day I said 'forget it’.” Although
Donna did not say so in so many words, one suspects that she had learned something else
in the process ot acting to reform her church, an institution that had nurtured her in the
exclusive community of her childhood. She had grown to realize
- gender issues aside -
that she no longer belonged.
At about the same time, as she was rapidly gaining new insights from feminism
and personal experience, she briefly became nationally prominent in the movement to le-
galize abortion. Newly ordained in the United Church of Christ (often referred to as the
Congregational Church) and active in a clergy-established network that provided informa-
tion and access to abortion services, she “ended up on all the talk shows... I debated all
the fastidious women on the Oprah Winfrey Show and did all that stuff.”
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In the mid-seventies, she left Chicago, as earlier mentioned, to join her college
chaplain mentor, the newly installed chaplain at Yale where he had succeeded one of
America's best known and most controversial civil rights and anti-war activists of the six
ties, William Sloane Coffin
.
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As Donna summarized it, she spent her time at Yale “taking students into the
community [and] doing plunges of one kind or another. Bought a taxi company, did
some economic development, had a ball. Got fired from Yale.” In fuller garb, what she
had done was to become involved with the Downtown Cooperative Ministries in New
Haven, adding her energy and organizational skills. A conventional institutional view of
undivided loyalty landed her in trouble with Bart Giamatti, then acting President of
Yale. She had conceived the idea of purchasing a local cab company and converting it
to an employee-owned cooperative. To that end, she approached a new friend, a multi-
millionaire retired businessman who had been invited to teach and live at Yale, asking
him to donate the lion’s share of the quarter million dollar down payment. They agreed
that if she could get some of the “well-heeled” downtown churches to invest the first fifty
thousand dollars, he would “put up the rest.” It worked:
“We bought the cab company, we did worker ownership, we were having a ball.
Everyone looked good, even Yale ... which is what I tried to tell Giamatti. But he
didn’t get it, and he said ‘You have violated one of the policies of Yale, [private
fund-raising] when you’re an officer of the University... You are fired’.... Well
[the donor friend] wrote them out of his will
. . . and they lost lots of money.”
According to Donna, when Giamatti learned of this, he reappointed her to a second three
year term as Associate Chaplain, an offer which, upon detecting the implicit quid pro quo,
she characteristically refused.
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If she had accepted the reappointment, with its status and potential for fame,
Donna wouldn’t have been invited to become the pastor of the Congregational Church in
Amherst in the 1970s. She also would not have met Frances Crowe and found herself,
“nine and one half months pregnant,” doing the sit-in, earlier mentioned, with Frances
and an area nun in Congressman Conte’s Holyoke office.
Well, Frances is probably the pre-eminent activist in the valley, has been for all
Thl7ei? Aind Y°u kn°W ’ ’ Ve been here tW ‘Ce ' in two different incarnations,irs ime was here Frances and I were together every day. She did AFSC
and I was involved with the El Salvador group [Central American Working
Croup], and ... we got to know Silvio Conte on a first name basis.”22
She recalls that at the time of their action she was married and expecting her first
son:
You know, I didn’t know how to be pregnant. I was thirty-six... It never oc-
curred to me to stop doing whatever I was doing and Frances was very concerned
that I figure out how to go off and have this baby, but she also needed me for
things we were doing with Conte.”
Commenting on the frequent frustration from being a core actor, she continued:
[What we were trying to do] was tremendously important you know, if regions
have anything to do with national policy, that’s a good story. I always feel like I
haven't really [accomplished] anything, and I think that Frances and many of us
feel the same way. It took us two years of daily harassment of Silvio Conte and
getting literally dozens of others to do the same thing - to break through.”
Action as Existential Hope
After a few vigorously active years in the Amherst-Northampton area, she moved
back to Chicago as director of the Urban Institute, the Alinsky-founded training school
for activist organizers and urban ministers. She then moved to a church assignment in
New York, ultimately returning to Western Massachusetts in 1992 to work as regional
administrator for her denomination. In the process her family grew from one to three and
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the nature and paee of her action changed. She moved away from direct action, explarn-
mg I think I gave up being an out front leader when I had kids.”
Pressed to explain further, she offered other reasons that confirmed her ongoing
effort for rigorous self-honesty, an important component of reflection and the inner coun
terpart of her authentic, confrontational, social and political nature:
And then, there is the theological answer that I do think that I went a little crazy
tVy™g
r
\° Change the world - 1 became quite the idolater and much too full of mv-
T i Pu
Ped God ’ s work and trusted only my work, and I really had toback off of that active and controlling space and [get] into an acting space. So
I ve lost some of the ferocity ... and [right now] I do what I can.”
For the past few years, Donna has tried to apply the Alinsky model in her profes-
sional work in order to encourage individual pastors and church members to become
more aware, better organized and more involved in peace and social justice issues at the
grassroots level. In a related vein, she helped to organize the Pioneer Valley Project, an
ecumenical consortium of large and small religious organizations and non-profit action
agencies to identify and take coordinated action on issues of poverty and race in the
Springfield-Holyoke area.
Near the end of the interview, Donna mentioned that her children were now get-
ting older and, in November, she planned to travel to the School of the Americas at Ft.
Benning, Georgia, to join the years-long protest vigil there and, possibly, to get arrested . 23
At the same time, however, she expressed little confidence that what she and “all the
good people . . . F ve partnered with” had done had made any real difference. At that
moment, however, the personal grit that drives core actors when inspiration fails
emerged.
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As the interview ended she stated that she had no plans to give up, even in the
face of her assessment of the even greater challenges of our current situation. “And now,
the globalization stuff that is going on, it’s unbelievable. What happened to my family,
instead of happening less is simply being enlarged. It’s just enormous.” Without morally
informed leaders
- people such as herself acting at all levels of society - however, she
sees no hope at all. Commenting further, she spoke implicitly of her struggle to gam a
long-term perspective, while searching for new forms of authentic action to deal with
what she perceives as a massive, mounting crisis: “[I]f anything, we need to be doing
more radical things. I would not leave you with the lovely credentials that I have. I
mean, I have wonderful credentials and I’m not ashamed of what I’ve done, but it hasn’t
changed very much.” It is clear, however, from examining the past that she may well be
wrong.
Earlier that day, in the middle of our outdoor interview conducted on a beautiful
morning in an urban downtown park, we had observed a flock of pigeons flying in a ex-
quisite, seemingly synchronic display as they abruptly changed direction in apparent retort
to the shifting wind currents sweeping through the park. In response to my observation,
“There’s organicity to their action,” she replied, “Yes. There’s a leader in there.” Donna
was offering a hopeful human analogy in which individuals who are associated in a
group, each of them aware of their freedom to fly in his or her own direction, could read-
ily discern the authentic leader among them - the best embodiment of profound idea and
dedicated action - and be inspired to move in the same direction. It was further apparent
that for reasons much more profound than personal payback, she had no intention of stop-
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Stopping her own attempts to demonstrate and lead, regardless of her uncertain future
success.
More Mundane Forms of Arfinn
A Quiet Actor
Some of those interviewed, although no less radical in their action from the per-
spective of conventional wisdom, are less dramatic or visible in their apparent reach.
James M. is a good example. Jim lives and works in Berkshire County, the westernmost
county in Massachusetts. It is a region known much more for its cultural and histoncal
attractions and year round natural scenery than for its social or political activism. Jim is a
college-educated carpenter. He is reserved, enduringly modest, and does not think of
himself as a core actor, even when encouraged to do so. Yet, his history of morally in-
formed action confirms that he is.
He grew up in a conservative rural community in neighboring New York, one of
six children. His father worked in a mid-level position for the New York State Depart-
ment of Highways and his mother was a homemaker. He recalls nothing out of the
ordinary in his middle class upbringing, simply that he and his siblings were raised in the
Roman Catholic tradition, taught to cooperate and expected to help out at home, and were
at least adequately loved and nurtured. His father, who served as a member of the local
school board and as a volunteer fireman, also demonstrated that republican duty to one’s
community was important.
After high school, he went to the University of Rochester, according to Jim also a
fairly conservative place during the 1960s, where most of the students were career fo-
cused and somewhat self-centered.” Like most of his classmates, Jim was only
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somewhat politically active in protests involving student rights, and not at all on broader
issues such as Vietnam, although he read and kept himself informed. In fact, he had de-
cided that the war was immoral but did not see how he could do anything to bring about
change.
After graduating in the late sixties, he took a teaching job in Southern Berkshire
County. It was the unlikely event of attending a summer teacher workshop at Central
Michigan that provided him with the opportunity to gain fresh insight and precipitated his
first foray into activism. As he described it,
“I met some people [seminar leaders] who were talking about taking personal re-
sponsibility for [one’s] actions, that it’s not easy to change the world, but it’s a
heck of a lot easier to change yourself. How you interrelate, how you relate to
people, how you relate to the environment
- your participation in things that may
be too large to change - is something you can do today. And maybe [what you
do] will have an impact and maybe it won’t, but that’s not the ultimate value,
that’s not the ultimate test...”
At the end of that summer, in “August 1969“ he precisely remembered, he wrote a
letter to his local draft board, enclosing his draft card and saying, in effect, “I’m not inter-
ested anymore. He explained his action as “a personal decision — certainly moved by
others examples. I didn’t come upon this decision through meditation or self-
examination. It was through conversations, discussion .... It was also a time of growth
[and] reflection.”
Although Jim’s above action was privately implemented, he did disclose his deci-
sion to a few friends and family, as well as his further refusal to accept CO status, which
led to his indictment and trial as a draft resister in the U.S. District Court at Albany.
Around this time, he recalls, “I [also] became involved in demonstrations. Whenever
there was a demonstration going on at the Pentagon, we would go down for that.” He
204
also participated in local and regional protests organized by the War Resistors League and
the AFSC.24 He further attempted to use his trial, “at a minimum, to confront the twelve
jurors with this [moral] question and, maybe, shake [their convictions] a little bit.”
Notwithstanding his attempt, he was fairly quickly found guilty and sentenced to
two years probation, upon terms that amounted to the rough equivalent of the CO alterna-
tive service he had refused. He finally recollected with his typically modest candor that
he
“could have refused that [sentence] but my mother, who could never understand
why I was making such a fuss, was saying very strongly that she didn’t want me to
go to jail. So, the question was how much more was I going to upset her. I de-
cided that I had done a lot of what I had wanted to do...”
After Vietnam ended, Jim’s activism waned for over a decade, “until Reagan
came in which, in a lot of ways, was like Vietnam all over again.” The issue that drew
him back into the fray was American policy in Central America and, in particular toward
Nicaragua. After a few years of mounting concern and frustration over a change “in the
political atmosphere in the United States and conversations in Washington concerning
Soviet [or Cuban] influence in Central America [and that] we were going to have to in-
vade Nicaragua to deal with the problem ... That sounded rather extreme.” At about that
time he came upon a notice in the local paper inviting the public to a meeting to “talk
about the situation and ... to decide what might be done to avert the kind of destruction
[that] we have seen in the Balkans more recently.”
Jim was one of about twenty-four who attended that meeting at the Unitarian
Church in Pittsfield in 1984. Over the next several years he and other members of an ex-
isting group known as the Berkshire Committee on Central America - a likely offshoot of
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the working group organized in 1979 by Frances Crowe and others forty miles away in
Northampton - organized rallies, vigils, leafleting, and protests. In 1986 he took part in a
sit-in at the Marine Corps recruiting office at the modest federal office building in Pitts-
field, resulting in his arrest, with sixteen others, for trespass.
Since the mid 1980s, Jim has made social and political activism part of his life.
As with most core actors, his concerns are much broader than a single people, cause or
region. This is supported by his occasional participation in rallies and civilly disobedient
anti-nuclear and anti
-militarism protests, such as those at the Pentagon and at the General
Dynamics Electric Boat Works facility in Groton, Connecticut, both of which resulted in
his arrest. He is also active in a local affiliate of Habitat for Humanity where he is able to
demonstrate and perform with his carpentry skills his commitment to human betterment.
Although public attention has long since shifted away from Central America, that
region, particularly Nicaragua, has remained as the primary focus of Jim’s activism. In a
rare departure from his customary brevity, he describes his approach to action in practical,
existential terms:
“You see so many things that really aren’t as good as they can be. Some people
say, ‘Well, I don't listen to the news anymore ... It’s too frustrating. There's
nothing I can do about it. And that's one approach; [however], for some other
people, myself included, [we] say, well, let’s see what piece of this we can deal
with, and focus on one . .
.
part of that. Then, being aware of other [issues] that are
frustrating or aggravating or angering, occasionally finding some energy to deal
with some ... of those things as well.”
Like Jane Addams, Jim’s work for justice in Nicaragua is informed and strength-
ened by concrete experience as well as by formal learning and the experiences of others.
In 1985 two of his friends, a retired blue collar union local leader and the managing editor
of the regional paper, decided to travel to that country and learn about the social, eco-
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nomic, and political situation first hand. Already informed and active on the issue of U.S.
involvement in the region, Jim was further educated by the information his friends re-
turned with.
Several months later, upon learning that two professors from the local community
college were organizing a trip to that country, he and his partner decided to go and see for
themselves. The group spent much of its time in Marapasilo, a small city some distance
from the capital. Although he was further powerfully informed by the conditions he ob-
served, it was the mood of many of the people he met that most profoundly moved him:
To see people living in a very difficult situation, without access to health care
and their kids are sick, without access to education ... they’re
— you could find
many people who were not bitter, who were not angry all the time as I think that I
would be if I were in their situation .... To meet people who laughed and had a
good time and wanted to celebrate life despite all they had to live through ... I
think is an inspiration.”
At about the same time, Jim began to realize, as did Frances Crowe, Donna S.,
and others, that direct confrontational action to change official policy, while highly im-
portant, was not solely adequate for the task of morally informed change. He noticed, for
example, how the nuclear freeze initiative had quickly grown into a movement and had
just as rapidly lost traction in the quicksand of congressional inaction and the Reagan star
wars initiative. For these reasons and the simple desire to offer concrete help to the peo-
ple of Marapasilo, he and his colleagues formed Berkshire Amistad. “We [had] to find a
way of sustaining ourselves despite whatever Washington might say. And the suggestion
was made that we start a sister city program.”
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Berkshire Amistad was a way to reach a broader local audience and, in the process
of gathering financial and other support for concrete “self-help” projects, to educate and
raise awareness indirectly but authentically. As Jim put it,
Rotary [clubs], schools, woman’s groups are interested in sister city work [and]
living conditions, and [people] begin to ask [as he did] the same questions of
themselves, after getting engaged in that way... Why is there this poverty? Why
is there such poor healthcare? Why can’t kids go to school? [Then] maybe they
become active, maybe they don’t, but they are at least willing to listen to us.”
The approach has had some success in the Berkshires and has spread elsewhere.
The City of Pittsfield officially established a sister city relationship with Marapasilo,
more than once receiving visiting officials from that city. Together with Amistad mem-
bers, they have spoken frequently throughout the county, mirroring parallel efforts by a
network of such groups throughout New England. Local Rotary clubs and other service
organizations have responded, donating funds to help the city obtain potable water and
enable local residents to acquire a degree of self-sufficiency with a micro-enterprise loan
program funded by the Amistad group
.
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Of at least equal importance to the prospects for eventual morally informed
change, more than thirty county residents have traveled to the community over the last
decade, not including Jim and his partner who have been back on several occasions. Each
time they go there they are renewed in purpose and each time they speak they inform the
minds of many, change the minds of a few, and perhaps inspire one or two to become
core actors, initiators of moral progress in the social and political arena.
Teaching Peace and Social Justice in the Classroom
For two of those interviewed, the classroom has been their primary vehicle for ac-
tion. Karen P. is a public school teacher and school adjustment counselor who, until
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recently, taught social skills in an elementary school in Berkshire County. Father Leo is
the Catholic chaplain and a professor at a small, private Catholic college in Western Mas-
sachusetts. Both were in their classrooms during a portion of their interviews and it was
quickly apparent that each was clearly ‘in their element.’ One quickly notices that they
impart a sense of self-comfort, warm affection, and enthusiasm to their students that is
authentic beyond question. Father Leo was observed teaching one of his favorite sub-
jects, liberation theology, a more recent Catholic equivalent to the late nineteenth century
social gospel theology of Protestantism
.
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It is at once apparent that Father Leo does not accept the various value neutral
models of pedagogy, so prevalent on the American campus today and yesterday. He of-
fers his students his fluent, passionate analysis of how Max Weber and Hannah Arendt
were right in their depiction of the way that modem organization and mass society make
evil seemingly routine and necessary. They do so, he suggests, by diminishing our capac-
ity to think deeply about life and publicly act on what we learn:
“We don’t question our institutions. We don’t question ...what is right or what is
wrong about institutions. We got sucked into believing — and there are more and
more people in prosperous times that get sucked into believing - in institutions
because they just know that they live in a house of cards. If you remove one card
everything collapses, and because they have such prosperity today, financial pros-
perity, folks are not going to [seriously] question the institution, whatever the
institution is.”
To further illustrate his case against modem institutions - and his implicit will-
ingness to challenge the official dogma of his own institutional leaders, he berates our
political elites, using them to illustrate how much easier it is to distance oneself from in-
justice and morality by talking in terms such as “policy” and “options.” Continuing in the
rising and receding tidal rhythm somewhat akin to an evangelist preacher, he describes
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how even our religious instituiions encourage us to depend on them, fostering our moral
passivity:
We don t have to experience pain, so we don't have to experience growth. They
teach us to believe in ‘original sin’, not ‘original blessing’ and this lets us off the
hook. We’re fallen creatures, so what’s the point. With ‘original blessing’ we
have to acknowledge that we’re co-creators with God, [therefore both] radically
free and accountable.”27
Father Leo clearly believes in both as he applies liberal doses of blunt candor to
his students, affectionately chiding them at the same time for their woeful, lazy ignorance.
Using his favorite metaphor for our time, he tells them that they are
“living in tunnels ... of darkness and [your] parents have brought [you] to those
tunnels of darkness by not challenging life, not challenging themselves. They’re
not challenging their offspring, not challenging their children that are now young
adults.”
It is not a Greek philosophical cave he is describing, but rather a cavern of lazy ignorance
— his definition of original sin for our era — self-delusion, and fear.
Pressed to explain his metaphor in more detail, he uses the example of how we
fail to identify obvious issues of human injustice, to connect them to our own hubris, ig-
norance, and misdeeds, and to support core actors who seek to ameliorate them. He
illustrates his concern by using his earlier mentioned colleague and friend, Fr. Roy Bour-
geois, and the general public failure to understand and support his protest outside Ft.
Benning against the “School of Assassins” (his term for the School of the Americas):
“I think that people have given up believing that there’s an alternative and even
that there it is a hope factor, believing that people can gather together and cele-
brate together and trust in celebration that there’s an alternative view. But I really
do believe most people have just dismissed that by saying, ‘Oh, how naive! We’ve
been through that in the 60's, 70’s, 80's’. It’s like saying my father did that, my
grandfather did it, my great-grandfather did it.”
His frustration becomes more evident as he continues:
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‘Tm not saying everyone needs to 'walk the walk,' but they have to be palpable in
their support of those who are . . . not only palpable about supporting them but un-
derstanding why the others are walking the walk, without fear.”
Focusing again on his students and their parents, his tone abruptly changes,
softening in apparent distress as he imaginatively, empathetically re-enters their caves.
He explains:
I mean, they re so frightened, filled with such darkness and fear running through
the cave that they look upon those people [core actors] as lunatics and we have
many more people being looked down upon today as lunatics who are struggling
to walk the walk.”
Based on his analysis of the current conditions in our society - our institutions and
state of mind — he has turned, as have James M. and several other interviewees, to action
that is primarily local and interpersonal in order to inform students by his own example,
the words and action of others, and, to the extent possible, by guided direct experience.
Further explaining, he continued: “We don’t have to be in the city streets trying to get
others to join us he explains. “That kind of classroom ... that’s over, because [it]
didn t work. We thought it worked [but] it failed.' Pointing to one of many cases from
the last thirty years that make his point, he continued, “There would not be an East Timor
today if that classroom was [still] effective. People are not listening [to] the city streets.
We’re not listening today.”
Commenting on the efficacy of mass public protest a year before the World Trade
Organization conference in Seattle, Father Leo is angry and despondent at his nation and
society, and deeply worried about a world that he dearly loves. He seems to have arrived
at a point in his life not unlike Frederick Douglass reached as he experienced the collapse
of reconstruction. Like Douglass, however, he has neither given up hope, nor has he
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abandoned action, only a form of action that he believes has largely lost its effect. For
one thing, he remains actively involved in area social justice work, mostly through small
groups who work with the poor and on human rights concerns in several locations in the
Pioneer Valley. He chooses the organizations that he works with carefully, given his
premise that many have become overly institutionalized, vested more in their own exis-
tence than in serious reform, engaged in “endless meetings” rather than action.
As suggested above, he recognizes that his mere words in a classroom or in his
campus ministry are inadequate to inspire more than perhaps one or two of his students to
shed their ignorance, and discover their capacity as moral agents through action. To fur-
ther stimulate the imaginations of his youthful flock, he brings core actors from his
extensive network of colleagues and friends to campus each semester. In face-to-face en-
counters in his class and elsewhere, students become acquainted with flesh and blood
actors, Father Bourgeois among them, enabling them to discover, as he did, that they do
not match their “lunatic” cultural image.
Fr. Leo knows that the direct encounter approach is effective because it was for
him. He attributes his moral awareness and his turn to activism both to his mother while
growing up and to the “crazy lunatics” - the activists he met while at St. Anselm’s, a
small catholic college in Manchester, New Hampshire, run by the Benedictine monastic
order. He credits his mother — and mothers in general — for teaching both an awareness
of injustice and compassion for the poor and weak. Looking back at the customary pat-
tern of upbringing in his middle working class Irish Catholic neighborhood in Holyoke,
he observes: “When I look at moral development, most often women teach [it]. Men
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teach fear, or legislation, or doctrine, or dogma.... Mom[s] raise questions. Dad[s] give
us periods.”
While at St. Anselm’s he met and got to know several powerful core actors, in-
cluding Catholic Worker co-founder Dorothy Day and fellow Worker Ammon Hennacy
.
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Their effect on him was quick and long-lasting:
“By the time I was a sophomore I saw Dorothy Day as a solid citizen. So my
[childhood] activism from passing out leaflets for Irish Catholic liberal Democrats
[part of his mother’s activism] now became — it’s no longer the Irish Catholic
liberal Democrat; it s a question of morality ... a question of spirituality ... a
question of justice.”
While direct encounters with core actors are highly persuasive, Fr. Leo is keenly
aware that Jane Addams was right: one learns most effectively about the content and
status of justice in our society, state, and world by living and working with those most
affected by its absence - the very poor. About fifteen years earlier, he set out to create
such an opportunity for his students. From a simple initiative - “Just a couple students
and myself and some other campus ministries in the beginning” - it has grown into a
yearly program involving some sixty students traveling to work in Haiti from his campus
alone. In recent years, he has had to turn students away, something that obviously dis-
turbs him; however, from the beginning the program has been carefully built to foster
mutual learning and assistance, not to offer guided tours through slums on a climate-
controlled bus, nor expose students recklessly to the violence that reflects the anomie of
chronic despair. Describing how the initiative developed, he elaborated:
“So we went to Haiti and we had some guidelines. We were going to do whatever
the Haitians wanted us to do. They said they needed to dig a ditch here and over
there and to help us dig the ditch here and over there. We were not going to say
‘well that’s wrong by the way. It should be done like this because we learned
about this [at] the university in America.’ So we dug the ditches the way they
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wanted them dug. But eventually, then, they’d ask us some questions about some
medical intervention or health or something like that and we'd bring in that medi-
cal intervention and the next time we’d have some training done. We would have
some trainers train trainers and then have the Haitians train their own people.”
Building on what Addams had learned almost a century earlier, he described the
common sense, worldly knowledge that the Haitian peasants, lacking in material re-
sources and technical expertise, possessed in abundance. They respond to questions that
students, witnessing extreme poverty for the first time, are stimulated to ask and moti-
vated to learn:
They know more why they’re oppressed than we know [about our own oppres-
sion] in America. They know about [then Secretary of State] Madeline Albright,
they know about the International Monetary Fund, they know about the World
Bank. They re called illiterate people [but] they know who their oppressor is.
They know it s capitalism, they know it’s Wall Street. They know it’s ... Alan
Greenspan ...”
Father Leo is not suggesting that the Haitian people he has encountered are igno-
rant concerning their local thugs and corrupt leadership, or that they exclusively blame
named American officials or America for their plight. He is claiming that they under-
stand the facilitative connection between U.S. policies and their local political and
economic conditions, that the past and current architects and administrators of these poli-
cies have names, and that they are morally accountable for their action and inaction.
A Most Unconventional Elementary School Teacher
Karen P. is likely the most unselfconsciously authentic, unconventionally radical
actor that one might encounter. The locus of her activism, a public elementary school is,
accordingly, all the more surprising. The interview was conducted in her classroom
where, once every two weeks, every class - all the students at her school - spends about
an hour with her. Originally hired to do educational-behavioral assessments, she was ap-
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proached by two other teachers who suggested that most of the students sent to her for
special needs evaluation had behavioral problems that were caused or aggravated by poor
social skills.
The teachers who had approached her were likely aware that she was then teach-
ing a graduate education seminar at the nearby state college, entitled “The Peaceful
Classroom.” As she described it,
What happened in the course, which I absolutely loved, is it wasn’t a course
where we really learned a lot of written material and documented fact. What we
basically did was create the peaceful classroom that we need to experience so that
we can create it for our students.”
Asked to explain the concept further, she continued:
“To me, it needs to be a setting where there’s safety and you're able to share who
you are without the risk of being, you know, ridiculed, misunderstood ... authen-
tically who you are. I would basically start my course with an activity that would
really touch us in the heart and after that first night together we were already like a
family and it happened every single semester.... I probably taught it [for] five se-
mesters... I was amazed because the first year, when it stated to flow so smoothly
and it was so deep, you know, the experiences we were having, I almost didn’t
trust it because I thought can this happen again? Will it happen again if you have
that intention? And you know what? It kept happening and happening.”
In the three years that she has worked in her unique classroom, she has replicated
her approach with adults in her work with children, creating a comfortable, secure place
which they are invited to help define and create. Her credentials for doing so are impres-
sive, extending way beyond her dual teacher certifications and her Masters in educating
the emotionally disturbed that she earned at Columbia. For one thing, she was adopted
into a strong nurturing family, a household full of foster children that was “open to the
neighborhood” as well. For another, there was her early passionate identification with the
needs of others less fortunate than herself, a quality that led her into frequent trouble in
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high school, including trips to the principal’s office for unauthorized fundraising from
fellow students to contribute to humanitarian relief in Biafra during the 1960s.
Finally, she has combined her concern for others with a tenacity to do whatever it
takes to reach students and to broadly educate them. This trait is evident from her ac-
count of the six years that she spent teaching and living in the Park Avenue area of
Hartford, Connecticut, one of the poorest minority areas in a city that has been extraordi-
narily fled from by whites. 29 She describes that experience graphically:
“I mean, I had thirteen year old drug runners in my classroom who came in and
couldn t read ‘Go Sally go.' But you had to validate them for being somewhere
so we basically started. When I first started teaching, I started in an empty class-
room. I asked for the class to be empty [of books and furniture]. People thought I
was nuts [but] I didn’t know what we could have in there that made sense. So the
first few weeks of school with all these Hispanic boys that were bigger than me
and spoke mostly Spanish, we kind of sat around in an empty room and I said
“what do you want to do? How are we going to make this work and help you to
learn?” [After a while] it was incredible the kinds of [educational] things that
were happening. [And] I started to learn about their lives and spent a lot of time
in their homes, walking up urine-smelling tenement buildings and taking the kids
bowling on weekends and showing them that there’s another way.”
Returning to her present classroom, filled almost beyond capacity with tables,
chairs, an inviting “peace lounge” area with bean bag chairs and Indian cotton print de-
cor, and student creations depicting various peace themes throughout, Karen concludes,
“and I think that’s what I try to do with these guys.”
During her first year, something dramatic began to happen in her class and in the
school. It started within the conventional curriculum, with the students raising issues
about the various forms of violence that they encountered in school and elsewhere in their
daily lives. She led them in discussion, helping them to identify and try out non-violent
solutions. She imparted her belief that they could and should take responsibility for the
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conflicts that inevitably arise in daily life, that they were capable of choosing how to act
and react and of learning new means of establishing and maintaining peace.
Inevitably, this led to questions about peaceful relations in the larger world, a
natural extension of logical childhood wonder that asks not only “why not?” but “what
can we do?” Not one to discourage what she was endeavoring to teach, Karen assumed
the power of human agency that she was then striving to impart to her students, asking
them what they would like to do. By late winter or early spring, they began to implement
answers in amazing, highly unconventional ways.
Karen P’s students are mostly the descendants of French Canadian and Polish
immigrants who came to the North Berkshire County community to work in the mills, a
familiar New England pattern. Although those jobs have disappeared and the economy
has indefinitely slowed, their families have stayed longer than most, content in the com-
munity and scenery that surround them. One suspects that many were surprised when
their children came home that spring to tell them that they were going to be in a peace
parade, with their whole school, marching down the main street.
The parade was an idea that came from the students. It started with a suggestion
by one that they could do a peace march around the school corridors; however, when an-
other asked why it couldn't be outside, down the sidewalk, sort of like a real parade, she
knew that she should not dismiss the idea unless she first checked it out. To understand
what followed, one must imagine an innocent-appearing, enthusiastic, diminutive, and
utterly sincere teacher presenting her students’ idea:
“So I asked my principal. He goes “well, you know, go for it.” He’s very suppor-
tive of what I do because, actually, it helps take care of a lot of discipline things
and stuff. So he’s very supportive, not actively advertising it but he’ll let me do
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just about anything I want to do and then he says “but beware of, you know,
somebody else. Like maybe some of the teachers and such. Okay, that’s fine
I’U do my thin§ and just stand up with the kids. I feel stronger because I’ve got
the kids - right. [Next] I called up the police department and asked them if there
were any way at all that I could get some sort of permit
... to maybe walk down
the sidewalks or something, but the kids really would like to walk in the street.
The cop said ‘that'll be no problem. And I said ‘you’re kidding me?’ And he said
No. We can stop the traffic. What would you like to do? How big would you
like to make it?’ And so we were already starting a conversation. So again,
here’s that social change and that activism because you step outside of our school
building and now the cops are behind us. I went to the Board of Selectmen and
asked them if they would be supporting it because actually the cops sent me to
them. The cops said you have to talk with the Board of Selectmen. So I talked to
those guys [and] they were so supportive it was unbelievable.”
The Selectboard issued a proclamation declaring the day of the parade, June 11,
1998, Piece of Peace Day in the town. That morning, some seven hundred children
marched down the main street carrying hand made banners, signs and posters with a vari-
ety of peace messages and slogans relating to family, community, country, and world. At
the end of the parade the children formed a giant peace symbol in front of a fire depart-
ment aerial ladder truck, with a photographer perched at the top. 30
In a press release Karen explained how the event was the outgrowth of the stu-
dents’ response to her suggestion that the best way to deal with their varied responses to
the violence of contemporary life - fear, confusion, anger, apathy, and powerlessness -
was to take action. She presented them “with the notion that change begins on the inside
of people (with thoughts, feelings, and ideas), and that kids have the power to create
[such] change.” The parade was the result of that process, an action generated by the
children “that would demonstrate that [they] can help teach others about tolerance and
building a safe community.”
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The parade was a growing annual event for the students and the town for four
consecutive years. Karen built her social skills curriculum around the concepts peace and
nonviolence, using the parade project as the capstone activity for the year. In the spring
of 2002, however, there was no parade. A combination of changes in school administra-
tion and, one suspects, some furtive expressions of discomfort with Karen’s
nonconformity resulted in the elimination of the social skills position, the closing of the
‘peace classroom," and Karen’s reassignment as a special education teacher.
Although saddened by the change, her idea remains alive as she remains active,
working with other teacher activists in Berkshire County and elsewhere who are now en-
gaged in similar projects in their schools. In 2001, for example, an organization called
Peace Crew was formed as “a community initiative dedicated to peace education and
safety in Southern Berkshire schools.”31 One can also readily imagine that her ideas and
practices remain vital in the lives of some of the several hundred students who spent time
in her classroom, discovering their competence and finding there a refreshing oasis from
our public culture of violence in the cause of justice, and for the sake of self.
The selection of Frances, Donna, James, Fr. Leo, and Karen from the twenty-
seven persons interviewed results in a necessarily incomplete portrait of morally informed
actors and action in the region. There are, for example, Andrea, a Protestant college
chaplain, a wide-ranging social justice activist; Steve, a grassroots community organizer
in an economically distressed former mill town; and Betsy, with her husband a long term
peace and social justice activist whose current focus is on clean elections and other de-
mocratic reforms, while also running a rehabilitative horticultural program she developed
for inmates at a local jail. Each of them, along with an estimated four hundred others in
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the Pioneer Valley, join together each spring in public ceremonies to declare their ongo-
ing refusal to pay federal taxes to support war. Also omitted are Don and Marion, a
Berkshire County area husband and wife partnership who for years have taken part in pro-
tests, peace walks, vigils and other forms of public action. They have also organized a
wide variety of symposia, international exchanges, and other informative gatherings to
better understand and communicate the principles of nonviolence at all levels of social
and political life. Further not mentioned are Dora, Tenagra, and Michael Ann, each of
whom has worked fulltime in a variety of ways to alleviate racial and ethnic injustice and
poverty in Springfield and Holyoke.
In addition there are several others not yet mentioned and those referred to only
briefly in the introduction. Each has learned that they possess the capacity to act, and to
act authentically, in a wide variety of settings and a number of moral issues. What re-
mains to be learned from them, and from the four core actors from our past, is what
sustains and informs them, matters that have thus far only been inserted as part of the nar-
rative of their action. If, as has been suggested, they have acted with some discemable
success in our past and if we accept that success as moral progress - as achievements that
we are willing to at least verbally defend - we should now be prepared to accept the pos-
sibility that they can further succeed in our present.
To understand how this can happen we need to examine more than the ability of
core actors in our midst to act authentically, and to illustrate the current forms of such ac-
tion. We need to know what other capacities they possess that undergird and inform then-
capacity to act, and which enhance their power of moral persuasion. After all, we must
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have the same capacities if even a portion of what they are seeking is to be achieved,
whether in our time or ever.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CAPACITY TO CARE
“All feeling is for the sake of action, all feeling results in action. .
-
William James
1
“Feelings accompany the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of love, but they do not constitute itnd the feelings that accompany it can be very different.... Feelings one 'has'; love occurs. Feel-
'
mgs dwell in man, but man dwells in his love.” - Martin Buber2
“The domain of morality is not just what people do but how they think about what they do howbehaviors come to be called moral and immoral [and] what that means to us.
.
.”
- Helen E
'
'
Longino
“We need to develop a moral system that will combine the virtues of what the historical discourse
has relegated to men on the one hand and to women on the other.” - E. Ann Kaplan
4
“The willingness to die is the ultimate guarantee of moral standards, of purposes, and of the self.”
- Wilson Carey McWilliams 5
Introduction
When an intended action affects us, its authenticity is only part of what we at-
tempt to discern. We are concerned to know not only the identity of the actor or agent,
and whether they are sincere and committed in their effort, but also the nature and quality
of care that their action signifies. It concerns us, for example, to learn that someone is
hostile or indifferent to our well-being, regardless of the sincerity and candor with which
they act.
There is little question concerning our capacity to exercise care for ourselves in
our reaction to action by others, and in our own action. Further, few will argue that our
self-focused concerns, particularly when justified by some form of rational or traditional
moral sanctity, do not inform action that has, in its cumulative effect, considerable - to-
day seemingly dominant - social and political import. We take legitimating refuge in
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such rubrics as national interest, economic necessity, ‘way of life’, law, and individual
nght, particularly when there is public debate over the morality of our action, and we find
ourselves privately uneasy. Slavery, once again, is a powerful example of an institution
created from the impetus of powerful, individual and purposively aggregated self-regard,
legitimated by each of the foregoing moral claims along with supporting ‘facts’ of superi-
ority and paternal benevolence.
Given our undeniably ample appetite for self-service, enlightened and otherwise,
the questions to be considered in this chapter concern what many of us believe is our
lesser capacity to care broadly and deeply for others and for things that lie physically out-
side of the self. To accomplish this, two tasks are or critical importance. First, we must
examine the particular problems we have in our culture with our comprehension of caring
for self and other. Having examined the historical development of our two most common
beliefs concerning the nature of the self and its relationship to others, namely liberal re-
publicanism and communitarianism, it is time to focus our attention inward, in order to
assess how we become morally informed and stirred to action in ways that belie our cul-
turally dominant beliefs. In doing so we discover something that core actors have simply
learned more profoundly - that our capacity to care lies at the heart of all such morally
informed action.
Second, we need to explore the actual and potential relationships of caring to
moral knowledge and the role of caring in social and political action. Any such venture
within a larger analysis must be partial in scope, although hopefully sufficient to suggest
the content of the rest. Most noteworthy, the core actors selected herein to furnish testi-
mony and inferences for the nature and role of caring in morally informed action happen
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to act more on the strength of concerns for others rather than for other life forms or the
environment. This is not to suggest that they have a divided or prioritized foundational
world-view, or that their concerns are informed only by human interaction.
As with the examination of action itself, evidence from their self-understanding
and deeds is substantially relied upon to inform and support the argument. Each of them
is accustomed to carrying heavy loads uphill, which makes their use for this purpose en-
tirely appropriate. As always, we must furnish the balance from our respective reservoirs
of learning, caring, and acting.
The Nature of Care
Caring, regardless of its form or object, is a state of mind that is present in all in-
tended action. It is associated with a wide range and depth of emotions that are important
to both the actor and those who are affected by the action, either with or without the ac-
tor’s specific intention. We typically overlook its presence in action where, as discussed
in the previous chapter, most of our daily acts and those of others which reach us are
habitual, instrumental, or both. Depending on the agent source, if that can even be
reliably determined, our occasional reflection on routine interaction reveals little if any
care specifically targeted at us. Much of it is organizationally scripted, coordinated action
aimed at our demographics and our assumed or gathered preferences, not at us.
At those moments when our cognition and reflection informs us that we are the in-
tended recipients of an act which has some of the qualities of genuine affection, concern,
and respect, our state of mind is favorably affected, our sense of self enhanced, our spirits
lifted - the list continues. It matters greatly to us that we are valued in some affirmative
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regard by others for who we are, whether the person knows us well - or not at all - and
cares for us nonetheless.
It is also highly important to us that we are able to regard ourselves favorably for
the ‘who we are' that we are able to authentically disclose to the world, for our particular
capacity to act authentically. This “is’' quality is often especially evident in those who
initiate morally informed change in unfamiliar, uncertain settings that contain the risk that
they will find selves standing alone in unpleasant circumstances, or worse. At such times,
the affectionate, caring acts of lovers, family, friends - and similar regard from those who
stand with us in broader fraternal and sororal kinship
- provide much-needed nourish-
ment for the self.
Care, Knowledge, and Action
When we examine our personal repertoire of care and its particular associations,
we are quickly reminded that the relationship between care and action is neither casual,
nor significant only for the security and comfort that it affords to one’s self or, when ren-
dered, to others. Caring, regardless of its form or intensity, is the motive energy that
propels us from contemplation to intention and into action, influencing our premeditation,
the nature of our action, and the intensity or “single-mindedness” with which it is under-
taken. It is also part of the information that we consult prior to deciding how or whether
to act - a vital component of our ability to prioritize moral knowledge. Moreover, it is
the only part that finally motivates us to act, and the ultimate arbiter in our deciding to
reformulate our plans, alter our means - even our goals, when necessary, and to act again.
All other forms of knowledge, regardless of their form and content, lack the mo-
tive power to determine our course of intentional action until we consider their
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implications and attach some form and level of care to each, or are reminded by some
stored emotion of care that immediately attends it. In other words, when we consider
whether and how to act in some context where our decision may have serious, non-
routine implications, we go through an interactive process of thinking, feeling, and car-
ing.
Caring, as just suggested, is also the process that morally informs our intended ac-
tion. The fact that, for some, caring may happen in a moment and be recognized as
awareness more than conscious thought does not render it any less important. It may
mean that we have acquired an all too rare ability - that of forming profound moral hab-
its .
6
The varied contents of our conscious thought, concrete and abstract, individual
and grouped, personal and impersonal, cognitive and intellectual - everything that in-
forms and urges our attention - can be overridden by the form and intensity of care
associated with a particular knowledge composite that moves us to choose its form of ac-
tion. In this process, we relegate our other knowledge, feelings, and concerns to either
supporting roles or to some lower priority along with their associated forms of action.
Even our seemingly unadorned will is unable to move us unless we first care
enough about someone or something to employ it. That someone, in the first instance at
least, is often the self, our inner voice urging action for the sake of our fundamental integ-
rity, our congruent self, vital in the world and within.
Extreme Caring
Examples of how care operates within us are abundant among the more extreme
conditions of intended action. In accounts of famine, for example, there are invariably
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stones of parents and others who, having exhausted all avenues of possible relief, and
considenng what to do with the last scant ration, have chosen to go hungry, accepting the
stark consequences of physical sacrifice for the sake of a loved one. Alternatively, there
are those, who out of mutual love and the respect for the other’s decision that mature love
entails, have shared - or jointly, defiantly refused to consume - the insufficient single ra-
tion. Finally, there are those who have eaten while the ‘loved one’ knowingly went
without, although their stories are less often told. In all cases, it is the form and intensity
of care, not hunger or reason that has had the final word in their action.
In the above example, or in others involving non-familial forms of deep human
caring, since most of us likely believe that one of the self-abnegating actions is the right,
moral, or noble course, the form of caring that attends it seems patent, therefore somehow
secondary, of less importance than the act. However, the caring demonstrated in the in-
tentional but nonconforming action of morally informed actors in equivalent extreme
conditions and in other less dramatic contexts is substantially more difficult for many to
fathom. This is mostly due, as we shall consider more fully, to the fact that our caring -
our capacity to care and the form and intensity of our caring — is informed at any given
moment by a combination of inheritance, culture, experience, including the experience of
caring itself, other acquired knowledge, and reflection. Since all of these are variables in
our respective lives, so our caring and our ability to comprehend the caring of others vary
also. Fortunately, our capacity to learn from others, and from life more broadly, is formi-
dable and ongoing.
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Gendered Caring
It is no accident that men, in particular, are apt to dismiss or deprecate our capac-
ity to care broadly and intrinsically for others as part of the human apparatus that informs
moral action in civil society and in government. As most of us are aware, this is a much
more universal problem than can be laid at the collective feet of men in America or the
western world to which this discussion is confined. Having been almost ubiquitously in-
formed since at least the dawn of the virtually all major civilizations that they are the
natural superior to women in strength and the intellectual skills of government, men have
acted within a moral framework that fosters male caring in the service of self, the protec-
tion of those cared for within the private coterie of self, and sacrifice either for social
honor or for the sake of those to whom one becomes bound in the pursuit of noble pur-
pose. It is not that men do not care deeply for others, whether intimately or fraternally.
They are, however, powerfully encouraged to express profound interpersonal and other
concrete care only in private and to subordinate such care for the sake of abstract goods
that are seen as distinct from and superior to concrete caring, whatever its form.
In contrast, women have long been associated with concrete, particular care and
nurture of others linked by bonds of birth, love, affection, and intimate friendship, as well
as empathy for the weak and vulnerable. For them, such “virtues” are portrayed as natu-
ral, and at least somewhat unique to their sex and gender. As one result, the objects of
their caring and most forms of expression need not be bifurcated into private and public,
exclusive and general. To appreciate the role of social reinforcement in this gender di-
vide, we have only to look at such phenomena as the madonna-whore duality of western
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culture, most visible in our history of criminal justice administration, to appreciate the
extent to which men have and continue to strive to ‘preserve’ the nature of women
.
8
With the powerful installation of the rationally enlightened understanding of hu-
man nature and the resulting decline of common public goods, the elite male tradition of
sacrificial public service as a duty inherent in one’s station or class has been gradually
devalued. Freed from the limits of tradition by the logic of equality and economic
power, newly liberated middle class men shifted the focus of their profound concerns to
ideals and ideologies that were informed by reason, rather than more tangible, acknowl-
edged caring for the extended family of ethnic group, country or their religious and other
cultural icons.
We are now largely aware that our history and its selection of heroes and other
exemplars has been driven by the persistent myths of masculine physical and intellectual
superiority, the reality of male dominance by sheer strength, and the almost primordial
social and political instantiation of both into customs, mores, law, and constitutions. The
gradual amelioration of male dominance in America over the last one hundred and sixty
or so years is a powerful story of gradual moral awakening, informed in each generation
by women like Stanton who refused to conform, and by men and women who were per-
suaded by their efforts. It is not a tale of men awakening either on their own or around
some fraternal campfire. Myths must be confronted if they are to lose their luster of truth.
The still ongoing, thirty year debate between feminists and traditionalists in the
field of developmental psychology illustrates that the debate over the relationship be-
tween caring, gender, and the nature of morally informed action in all areas of life is far
from over. Psychologist Carol Gilligan cogently argues that the stages of individual
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moral development model relied upon by Lawrence Kohlberg and other cognitive theo-
rists explicitly assumes the immature inferiority of morality derived from caring for
others and the valuing of concrete relationships, both of which he associates with women
in particular. In his version of the enlightened moral hierarchy, the highest stage of moral
development for men and women is reached when we acquire the capacity to formulate,
from an empirical and Kantian perspective “Universalizable, Reversible, and Prescriptive
Ethical Principles. Gilligan notes the historical paradox, observing that “the very traits
that have traditionally defined the ‘goodness' of women, their care for and sensitivity to
the needs of others, are those that mark them deficient in their moral development .” 10
The foregoing is not offered to suggest that many men are not good caregivers, or
that their capacity for local, familial love, deep friendship, and related care is not showing
signs of significant individual growth, as well as slight social and political change. The
observation is made to point out a key reason for our widespread assumption that in the
political and associated social realms, such affectionate caring is considered to strongly
inform only the pluralistic, instrumental pursuit of private, aggregative self-interests. In
contrast, core actors, such as those discussed thus far, reveal that in some fashion, our
capacity to experience, express love, and act with caring affection toward family and
friends can inform and motivate equally powerful caring that spurs us to act socially and
politically for the benefit of others whom we do not concretely know.
Broadly Affectionate Caring
It has been suggested in the foregoing that our capacity for concrete, particular and
affectionate caring, particularly that associated with women, somehow informs our capac-
ity to move beyond the limits of blood and desire to more broadly encompass others and
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the world. The vehicle suggested by enlightened modernity is our capaeity to abstract and
conceptualize from the perspective of self and our framework of experience and knowl-
edge, or, failing in that effort, to at least learn tolerance. Such means, as McWilliams
powerfully argues, are partial, temporary at best, and ultimately doomed to failure as are
all projects conceived with an exclusively rational, prudent mindset. 11
The means of broadly affectionate caring - of moving from the particular to the
general - are inherent in our existing, developable nature, a nature that must be seen as
combining the gendered capacities of women and men and blending the somewhat artifi-
cial categories of intellect and reason with profound feeling in order to obtain caring, the
state of mind that is the subject at hand.
Gail K., one of the contemporary activists not yet discussed, told a story during
her interview that further illustrates the content, formation and expansion of our capacity
to care. For at least the reasons suggested, some readers will relate easily to the form and
intensity of care expressed or evident from her action, while others will not. Before re-
counting her story, therefore, it is especially important to learn something about her as a
person in order to understand her moral formation and to relate her life to our own.
Married and the parent of three grown daughters, Gail has lived in a Western Mas-
sachusetts hill-town overlooking the Pioneer Valley for the past twenty years. For almost
all of that time, she has engaged in an extensive range of social and political activism that
has long-since become a customary part of her life. Gail is a morally informed, highly
competent, deeply passionate core actor.
The range of the concerns that she has acted on is impressive. They include nu-
clear disarmament, United States military and political interventions in Central America
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and elsewhere, and a whole range of issues having to do with violence, historical gender
beliefs, and structured subordination that uniquely disempower women. Like her friends
and activist colleagues, Frances Crowe and Jean Grossholtz, introduced in earlier chap-
ters, she has taken part in many direct action protests on a variety of peace and social
justice concerns that have led to her arrest on perhaps one hundred occasions. The first
occurred when she and her youngest daughter were detained at a Pentagon sit-in in the
early 1980s, shortly before she moved to Massachusetts.
By the time she moved to Massachusetts, she had been a core actor for well over
twenty years. For as long as she can remember, Gail has “always had this kind of under-
lying drive toward social justice.” She was bom and raised in New York City as part of
an average-sized middle-class Jewish family. Both of her parents were public school
teachers, socially and politically engaged and informed but not unusually active. When
asked if they gave her and her siblings a religious upbringing, Gail replied: “Well, I grew
up in a kosher home [kept for the sake of a Grandmother who lived with them], my par-
ents were Conservative [and we] went to temple, but they were atheists.” She indicated
that she views herself today as a “spiritual person,” informed by her sense of being “con-
nected to nature and, in some very deep way, to my roots as a Jew.” 12 She is also strongly
connected to others.
Gail recalls that social and political issues were part of the regular family conver-
sation that occurred around her and that spirited discussions on these topics were a vital
part of her family experience, including the evenings she spent listening to her parents’
passionate conversations with friends while she was supposed to be sleeping. The only
activist she knows of in her family tree was her maternal Grandfather, a socialist who
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died when she was five. She learned about h.s “soap box” speeches and other activism
from family stories and adopted him as a role model early on.
Gail has a tremendous capacity for caring of all types, most of all, affection and
altruistic concern for the welfare of others. 13 She evidenced the conventional ability to
form strong attachments with her family while growing up, and within her own family
where the intimate ongoing bonds between Gail, her husband, and her daughters are ap-
parent not only in her conversation, but in the photographs and family memorabilia that
adorn her home. Her early broad ability to form friendships and communicate warmth
and concern for others is further suggested by her selection in high school as the captain
of the cheerleading team and her election as “most popular” in her graduating class. Such
adolescent peer judgments are by no means the consistent rewards for broad, genuine car-
ing, however, in Gail’s case, until science has enabled us to transplant entire
personalities, one must suspect that her peers had this quality much in mind.
It was Gail s concern for others, informed by her growing awareness of what she
now sees as many forms of institutionalized, systemic oppression and injustice that moti-
vated her to become an activist. After graduating from Cornell around 1959, she taught
in New York City Schools for several years, while marrying, having children, and earning
her masters degree in social work. Her experiences as a teacher in inner-city schools, par-
ticularly in the South Bronx, exposed her to the underbelly of American class prejudice
and racism. In one junior high school to which she was assigned, she recalled “kids went
into the schools with shotguns
. .
.
[it] was literally a war zone.” Although she quickly
discovered that “teaching didn’t happen” in that environment, she was able to do more
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that “stick it out." She subsequently volunteered to teach over the next several years in
some of the toughest classrooms in New York City.
Gatl’s words and actions confirm that primary object of her compassion was the
children she had been assigned to teach. It motivated her to learn more in order under-
stand the causes of their precarious, chaotic, deprived lives and to strive to do whatever
she could to educate them. When interviewed, her informed passion for learning was
physically confirmed by the hundreds of books that fill her home library, covering sub-
jects relating to social understanding and to social and political change.
Living in Contradiction
The existential and moral dissonance of undertaking this task - of attempting to
live and work coherently in two vastly different worlds - was considerable. As she de-
scribed it, “There were difficult teaching conditions, and they were very difficult learning
conditions [her emphasis]. So I would leave [after school], and in about fifteen minutes I
would go to my nice house ... over the line in Yonkers, and it was like
... [lengthy si-
lence]”
It was during this period, as her awareness grew that her students were the inno-
cent victims of organized mistreatment and neglect beyond their control, that she took her
first direct action, crossing a picket line of her fellow and sister teachers who were on
strike, refusing to teach until their own needs were addressed. Forced to choose between
the legitimate concerns of her colleagues which would also benefit her in many ways, she
learned that she cared more for the students and their much greater, more immediate
needs.
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For the next several years, as her young family grew and her husband’s career as
an accountant took hold, she continued in this pattern of known contradiction, moving
upward and slightly more outward in the process to the south side of New Rochelle,
next to Yonkers. As a progressive, engaged suburban couple, they were involved in vari-
ous groups that met, discussed and sought to address community and the broader social
and political issues of the time, including the Vietnam War. She recalls that her social
circle, at one point, included liberal intellectuals, E. L. Doctorow and others: “We would
go to parties with these ...friends of ours
... people who were very progressive, and
[who] were storytellers. But when I would tell stories, it wasn’t a story that they wanted
to hear. .
.
[W]hat I had to say was too intense, and I . .
.
was considered abrasive .” 14
Deep caring was something to be either avoided or left elsewhere, outside the realm of
banter, networking, and relaxation.
Their move to Massachusetts was not to escape her social and political concerns
for others, but engage them more fully while better tending to the need to maintain a
healthier self. Her move enabled her to obtain a quieter, less hectic home life in more
natural, less material and overtly status-conscious conditions, while facilitating her ability
to develop and nurture a few deep friendships, while avoiding many casual ones. In addi-
tion to tending to self-care, she was able to expand the scope and reach of her activism
through involvement in groups, primarily with other women, where she experienced “the
sharing of ideas in a way that challenges me and also nourishes me . .
.
[where there was]
feeling for each other as people ... a real feeling of connection and caring.” What Gail
describes is the sororal counterpart of McWilliams description of fraternity, referred to in
the first chapter .
15
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Like each of the historical actors and most of those interviewed, she is aware that
she still lives in the midst of moral contradiction, given her concerns and world-view.
However, she concurs with her activist colleague and close friend, Jean Grossholtz, who
sees any form of middle or upper-class life in America, including their own, as a life that
almost daily contradicts the values that each of them ardently supports. Each of them at-
tempts to reduce the incongruities to an extent much greater than most of us who share
their world-view and concerns are able to manage. As with ourselves, Gail and Jean re-
flect the need for self-regard that comes from acting up to ones beliefs, and the virtual
impossibility of doing so when you can only act effectively from “within the very world
you’re trying to change.”
While living in New York during the late 1960s and 1970s, she became aware of
the problem of battering, the use of violence by men to establish and maintain control
over women in families and other intimate relationships, long before it was identified as a
widespread social problem in the 1980s. After moving to Western Massachusetts, in ad-
dition to getting involved with political and social justice activism via the area office of
the American Friends Service Committee and directly with Frances Crowe, she also
joined with women in the Northampton area who had organized to work together on a
range of women s concerns. Using her social work credentials and experience (she had
worked as a school counselor after getting her master’s), Gail began to work as an advo-
cate for battering victims and with them as a personal counselor. After eighteen or so
years she has come to see her individual work with battered women as a vital, grass roots
component of her activism.
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Her work with these women is the basis for her story. Occasionally Gail has been
asked to help battered women referred to her by other colleagues. She has done so by
various means, including assisting them in “going underground” in order to escape from
especially dangerous abusers. This has occasionally meant giving higher priority to her
informed concerns for the safety of women and children that to the sanctity of court or-
ders and general respect for the rule of law. She does so in reliance on her experience,
that of her colleagues and those whom she has helped, that the legal system has been slow
to grasp the personal and social severity and the dynamics of domestic violence
.
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One of the many consequences of this failure has been the charging of women
with murder who have killed their male batterers in the belief that they were acting in
self-defense, but under circumstances that men, as originators and enforcers of the law,
have been slow to grasp . 1 Several years ago, Gail became familiar with one such case
through a local colleague who had worked with an accused murderer during the lengthy
time that she had been held in state prison awaiting trial. The friend believed the
woman’s story of horrendous abuse leading to justifiable homicide and persuaded Gail to
accompany her to a further pre-trial bail hearing that had had been obtained on her behalf.
Gail trusted the friend and was prepared to help the accused with bail if possible. After
meeting her at court for the first time that day, Gail offered to secure the woman’s release
with a second mortgage on her home as surety for the multi-thousand dollar bail. After a
surprised reaction, the court accepted her offer.
Confirming her husband’s long, ongoing role as her closest ‘supporting actor,’ she
recounts her call to him that day to discuss her unusual plan. His simple response was
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“’Fine.' And we knew that she could have fled. If she had ... we would have supported
that ... because I knew that the system was not going to be a just system for her.” Gail’s
decision to act to help a factual stranger was prompted by care for the woman in circum-
stances furnished to Gail by the woman, by a trusted colleague and friend, and further
informed by her extensive direct experience and other knowledge concerning the dynam-
ics of domestic violence. “I knew her story” is the way Gail described it.
Relations within Action and Caring
If we are to fully accept the presence and power of some form of care in all of our
intentional actions, and to acknowledge caring as an essential part of that which morally
informs us, we need to further explore the nature of both. In doing so we discover that
both intentional action and caring are relational. All premeditated action has a subject -
the actor, and an object - someone or something else whom or which the act is intended
to affect. That someone or something lies outside the self, in the world of other selves,
other forms of life, inanimate things, and in our shared ideas and organized arrangements.
That is the locus of action, the place where it will have its external effects.
Caring, because it is expressed in and conveyed with our intended action, also has
a subject actor and an intended target, the object or objects of our affection and concern.
Unlike action, our caring may be only instrumentally evident in the world outside the self.
We go there only because we have to. Its exclusive object is the subject, the actor, the
self. Thus, while our action relates us to the world, the form and quality of caring that we
impart to our action informs those who experience or witness it the manner and extent to
which we see ourselves related to them and the world as they know it . Inferentially, they
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also learn something about how we define our world, and the degree of overlap between
the two.
Multiple Motives
We often experience the motives that underlie our acting, the several forms and
relative strengths of our caring, as complex and mixed. This awareness stems from the
reality that one important situation or event can trigger several concerns involving others,
the world, and one’s self as we contemplate our response. We either sense or more con-
sciously determine that our motives - our cares and concerns that finally motivate us to
act - contain a blended mix of caring for our self and for others.
It appears to follow from the above that all human caring, including that which at-
tends social and political action, exists along a continuum - a line strung between two
opposing objects of care. The action of morally informed core actors would presumably
attach near the pole of deep, altruistic concern for some “broad constituency” of others,
while the action of those who are informed by more extreme versions of self-interest or
exclusive views of community would gravitate to the pole of self-regard
.
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The foregoing, however, is neither the exclusive nor, likely the dominant view.
Many evolutionary biologists, for example, join with liberal republicans in accepting the
neater hypothesis which holds that most, if not all of our caring, along with our associated
action, is undertaken for the benefit of the self. Our moral capacities evolve in the same
manner as our physical characteristics via natural selection “because they help the indi-
viduals who possess them to survive and reproduce.” 19 Others argue with equal fervor
(and apparently with Darwin) that we act only for the larger sake of some socio-biological
group, upon the basis of information, including the forms and methods of care that the
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group maintains for its own benefit
.
20
Only a few assume the possibility that the truth
lies less neatly in between and elsewhere, in the realm of cooperation, as is argued by
evolutionary adaptationists, rather than in the dangerous realms of individual or group
competition
.
21
Hopefully, on the strength of what we know with reasonable certainty about our
own caring, and what we further are able to learn from the morally informed core actors
such as those presented herein, we can discern that neither the continuum nor the evolu-
tionary either-or alternatives explain us completely, either as individuals or as groups.
Our common experience of mixed or multiple motives, of concerns for self and other, is
likely correct and, although often painful or messy, not of any immutable necessity, either
fixed or inconsistent.
Congruent Caring
Self-care and caring for others are not, or need not be, seen as either mutually
exclusive or as engaged in a zero-sum competition within the self. We have the demon-
strated, varied and developable capacity to care for our selves, the world, and others in
ways that are neither mutually exclusive, nor inherently preferential or determined as to
the objects of affection and concern. This is not to suggest that “win-win” scenarios of
the utilitarian, New Democratic variety abound. Everything we do for the sake of another
may not - likely does not - somehow yield psychic rewards of equal weight to the self.
The conditions of life impinge on our range of options for action and require us to make
difficult, imperfect choices. At our best, we act in response to the part of what we have
come to know which informs us most deeply. Where that knowledge establishes some
close connection between the self and others, or the self and the world, the continuum
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collapses, and the dichotomy recedes. The mixture of concerns relating to self and other
becomes more complementary, less competitive, more amenable to peaceful resolution
both within and outside of the self. That does not mean that the decision and resulting
action will be easy and pain-free. We often have little control over the context of choice.
Almost invariably, however, we retain the radical freedom to choose and to act.
Our capacity for accommodating self and other in a single action becomes appar-
ent when we return to the example of the person who, acting from deep love for another,
gives over the food that will only keep one of them alive. From the perspective of the
recipient or someone who later learns of the story, the act may be seen as selfless only;
however, from the vantage point of the donor, to have acted otherwise would have been
contrary to the most his or her fundamental understandings - say that of a parent’s auto-
matic, loving duty to her or his child. For that person, such an act is simply the most
competent that one can take both for the sake of another and for one’s self.
As caring for another does not invariably crowd out self-regard, care or regard for
one’s self that is expressed in action does not, of any pre-fixed necessity, crowd out our
capacity to experience and express care for others or the world, whether in separate acts
or in the self-same action. In a self that sees itself as radically free (in the sense of having
the capacity to choose), as competent to act, and connected to all or some part of its
known, believed-in world by a form of knowledge and corresponding level of care that
exceeds that then afforded to the continuance of its physical life, then the self may be well
served by its own apparent destruction. We are capable of caring for others, the self, and
the world - indeed we must endeavor to do so if we are to live our lives to their full exis-
tential capacity. The inevitable imperfection of individual caring cannot and must not be
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made an excuse of justification for intentional ignorance, self-serving instrumental action
or for blind obedience to an individual, tradition, or cause.
Extreme forms of intended action demonstrate the maximum thrust of human
agency, its potentially devastating, as well as uplifting effects, and reveal the form and
intensity of caring that such action demonstrates. As suggested, extreme action intended
for the benefit of others and motivated by concern for their welfare is sometimes further
motivated by concern experienced for the sake of self - that we live up to our highest or
deepest concern, overcoming our insecurities, fears and other self-concems. What we
experience as will in the realm of morally informed action is really our striving to over-
come the inevitable gaps that appear between our imperfect ability to know and care.
Our inherent, developable capacity to care, much like our capacity to act authenti-
cally, is subject to inner-variation over time and circumstance and is also strongly
affected in its form and intensity by the quality of knowledge that informs it. The diverse
patterns of care among individuals, societies, cultures and states are simply a larger, much
less perfect expression of the varied quality of knowledge that affects caring in the self.
This is apparent in the relationship between caring, ideals, and beliefs.
Caring and Ideals
Our social and political ideals and beliefs need to be understood as much more
than rationally sensible arrangements for life in close proximity to others. For many, they
are authentic symbols for action and caring that is demonstrated in the present, as short-
hand reminders of some imagined way of life informed by knowledge of the past, and as
concise expressions of hope for its greater instantiation in the future. Ideals, in other
words, serve as terse expressions that open our personal and common repositories of
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knowledge, care, and forms of action that we associate with the name. Like institutions,
they exist in the self where they are stored and have an extended shelf life. They become
vital in the world only through action and in written and oral accounts of their formation,
preservation, and enhancement.
Democracy and freedom are cogent examples. The fact that the knowledge and
forms of care associated with each varies widely among individuals and groups is evident
in the practices that comprise American pluralism. Our dominant knowledge and belief
concerning human nature, liberal republicanism, informs us that representative democ-
racy and freedom are fundamental requirements of the self, created and abstracted for the
sake of the self and those instrumentally or affectionately important to our needy nature
and particular circumstances. We may want these symbols to have substance for others,
but not approaching the extent where their exercise might restrict our freedom by reduc-
ing the power, property, and other resources which define and secure it. Their
demonstrated and symbolic priority is the self.
Accordingly, our motive energy for deepening or extending freedom and democ-
racy is a combination of instrumental self-care and weak sympathy for others. The latter
is confirmed by our preference for charity or philanthropy rather than the sharing of
power that comprehensive democracy and positive freedom entail. This dominant con-
tent of each symbol is evident in the acts of those who are excluded from their ambit,
both at home and abroad. To the extent that those excluded share the enlightenment view
of self in relation to others and the world that we disseminate so powerfully through insti-
tutional and systemic action, they offer themselves for easy enlistment in organizations
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and regimes that offer them a measure of enlightened access - symbolic inclusion - or in
coups and revolutions against those that do not.
Others who are excluded, or who have refused the narrow terms of inclusion,
forming instead fraternal and sororal communities for mutual support and democratic re-
form, evidence broader, more inclusive knowledge and forms of caring in association
with these symbols. They resist the temptation to accept some form of co-optation while
working to inform, confront, and persuade those who practice democratic exclusivity.
Finally, there are a few who also strive to accomplish change by working within the tradi-
tions and practices of the system where the most influential of those whom they seek to
persuade preside. John B., one of those interviewed, is an excellent example of this lat-
ter group, and of the attempt to inform deeply-valued ideals with altruistic and concretely
informed concerns.
Caring for Democracy and Democratic Caring
John B. and his democratic reform colleagues associate democracy and freedom
with broad forms of knowledge and caring. 22 He is the director of the National Voting
Rights Institute, a Boston based group that he founded in 1994 for the immediate purpose
of “challenging the constitutionality of the current campaign finance system at the federal
and state levels.”^3 Since then, he has been active fulltime, employing his legal talent
(Harvard Law School) and persuasive skills both to challenge “our campaign finance sys-
tem in voting rights trials, and to defend [public financing] campaign reform laws that
pass at the state and local level and then get subjected to constitutional challenge.”
John is clearly determined to increase the level and quality of citizen democracy in
our society. He has been instrumental and has lent support, for example, in the defense
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public campaign finance laws in Maine, Arizona, Massachusetts and elsewhere. More-
over, he has learned that he must attend to these laws after they are upheld, and even
where they have been the result of strong majority enactment via direct voter initiative, as
was the case in Massachusetts.
After extensive efforts by other citizen democracy advocates getting the proposed
law on the ballot and enacted, the voters did so by a two to one margin in 1998.24 The
law, which is similar to one adopted and implemented in Maine, provided for funding in
stages, with the law to go into full effect with the state-wide election of 2002.
As the first election under the new law approached, the notoriously non-
democratic, Democrat-dominated Massachusetts legislature balked At first, it refused to
either appropriate the balance of funds required to fully fund the mandate, or alterna-
tively, to test the institution s constitutional power in a well-publicized atmosphere by
repealing the voter enacted law as provided in the state constitution.
Emboldened by the apparent success of their initial action, the leaders in each
chamber, with apparent majorities of their colleagues standing tacitly behind them, next
refused to authorize the release of the monies already provided at least partially to fund
qualified candidates. At this juncture, John B. and his colleagues assisted supporters of
the initiative by filing suit in the state high court. To the surprise of many, the court de-
cided by a slim majority to order the executive branch to comply with the law. 25 When
that did not occur, and the legislature remained unresponsive, John’s group obtained a
further court order allowing the seizure and sale of state non-cash assets, the only further
remedy that the court would allow under its view of the Massachusetts constitution. This
course of action contained a minefield of potential harms to the legitimate needs of other
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citizens whose programs would be affected, and, accordingly, was gingerly pursued by
the NVRI.
The hope of the reform coalition, reflected in its seizure strategy, was that the
publicity generated by a few targeted seizures, such as new SUVs purchased by the Lot-
tery Commission or the desks of lawmakers, would embarrass the them into honoring
what the reformers fairly regarded as a democratic mandate. As of the date this is written,
the above vehicles along with one large land parcel have been sold, and the legislature has
appropriated a small portion of the mandated funds - roughly ten percent. However, due
to John’s and the initiatory efforts of many others, the issue is still very much alive
.
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When one becomes familiar with John B’s background, it becomes apparent that
his concepts of democracy and freedom are more strongly informed by his care for others
than by a rationally-informed idea of democracy leading to the logic of obligation. His
idea ol democracy and of freedom is part of his ideal vision, a future dream “that we have
to fight for, it is equally a morally informed way of life that is inspired by his experience
of the world and of his caring for others in the present.
Of all the actors interviewed or studied for this project, John B. is perhaps the
most positively nurtured and consistently mentored in the direction of core activism. This
is largely due to his parents who were activists and went to great lengths to expose him to
the world as they had come to know it. He readily acknowledges their role in his first an-
swer to a general, open-ended question: “Well, my parents provided me with an
enormous amount of influence growing up.”
His mother, who founded and directed a non-profit co-operative to support low
income artists from around the country, introduced him
251
“to a number of amazing people from the deep South and Appalachia who
taught me a lot about different realities, [their] faith in their lives, the day-to-day
struggle to survive that many of them didn’t live through. And some of these peo-
ple were involved in the equal rights movement and told me stories, taught me
songs, that sort of thing.”
His father, an Ecuadorian native, was a chemical engineer with Dupont when John
was a child, attending law school at night. “He was also very engaged in working with
farm workers in Tenant Square, Pennsylvania, which is the mushroom capital of the
world. I went to some of the camps with him and was exposed to some of the conditions
people were forced to live in.” His father also took the family to Ecuador every other
summer to visit his family, where the conditions of extreme poverty were further laid
open.
His parents, although non-Quakers, further tended to his moral learning by send-
ing him to the Wilmington Friend’s School, located near where they lived in Delaware. It
is part of a small network of Quaker run schools across the country. During his twelve
years at the school he was further furnished with both a grass roots and global perspective
of humanity and the planet and taught about each in a peace and social justice framework
that related ideas to caring and acting. By the time he was in high school, he was already
an activist, something that conventional schools discourage. Commenting on the school’s
teaching philosophy, he indicated his awareness that caring cannot be directly taught, only
informed and stimulated: “So they certainly take a position. They’re not as neutral as
some other schools might be. They teach - they encourage a [sense of] responsibility to
do something that would improve the world for everyone.”
When he left home to further his education, his early influences persisted. At
Brown University, he recalls, “I spent my junior year in India, and that had an enormous
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influence on me.” He further easily withstood the enlightenment forge heat of a top-tier
law school, spending one summer on a Navajo reservation in New Mexico, and another
working as an advocate for farm workers in Florida.
Following law school, John spent some time in Washington, D. C„ doing research
on the influence of money in elections for the Center for Responsive Politics. While
there, he helped develop a legal strategy that led to the founding of the [National Voting
Rights] Institute.”
For John, democracy is a fundamental question,” a matter of how one sees one’s
self in relation to others and the world at a basic ontological level. It is clear that his ex-
perienced and learned, felt and conceived connections to others, although expressed in
ideals such as democracy, are what inform him, motivate him, and sustain him. He read-
ily acknowledges his strong base of support, beginning with his family, extending to his
fraternal and sororal colleagues. There is also his sense of present and historical connec-
tion - informing his heart and mind - to other activists, especially those who “have very
little resources, but have the spirit to fight on...” He summarizes the emotional compo-
nent of his motive energy, stating: “I think that there’s no question that you have to be
passionate and committed to this work.” We need to remind ourselves that “passion” and
“commitment” are terms that signify the intensity of one’s care.
The concretely informed human focus of his care becomes even more apparent
when he discusses his less democratic and anti-democratic opponents. When offered the
opportunity to label them as “the enemy.” he declines, expressing his belief that “there is
always the opportunity to move people in the right direction.” While he sees, as did
Eugene Debs, that there are some elites whose actions suggest that “they would be more
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satisfied in a dictatorship,” he feels that many politicians are basically well-intended but
misinformed about the actual conditions of life.
Showing the same insight and faith as Jane Addams and John Dewey, he believes
that his opponents “have this supreme fear of [democratic] process” due to their funda-
mental distrust of the capacity of average citizens. They would not trust the poor to
govern, because they believe the poor “are not capable of that.” Echoing Frederick Doug-
lass, he continued, gently critiquing elites and average citizens as part of a common
human puzzle:
“People need to be confronted ... I don’t think there’s any chance ... that people
will just change [automatically]..
.. But I think people can change and I definitely
believe that we can really persuade people to; [however], you can’t just let them
off the hook. Sometimes it requires a fair amount of pressure.”
Any residual doubt concerning the role of care in informing John’s passionate
core activism and his sense of individual duty was erased toward the end of his interview.
As he discussed his problems with moral relativism, he further revealed his understanding
of human nature, and his own motivation:
“We have a lot of wavering. We have a lot of looking at the center and then com-
promising. We need some steady, demanding voices our there There is no
compromise when it comes to poverty in America. It needs to be abolished.
There is no compromise to big money controlling our democracy. It needs to be
abolished.”
When asked whether his basis for knowing or believing that these propositions
were morally right was rational, he related rational thought to moral knowledge and car-
ing in a manner that we need to consider for ourselves:
Question : How do you know what’s right and what’s wrong?
John : “I would say it’s world experience. People come from different places, you
know, but my world experience gives me a set of guideposts to understand . . . how
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I think of what s nght and wrong. I'm not suggesting that on every single ques-
tion I automatically know what is right and ... wrong, but on certain core
questions, I don’t find there's a whole lot of difficulty in determining ...”
Question: Describe to me how that is grounded in you .... Is it rational, logical?
Mn: “Yeah. And, you know, it's connected to human needs and that we ought
to be able to stand up for other human beings.
Asked to further explain the ground for his concerns, and whether it might stem
from religion or some broader spirituality, he replied: “Well, it’s not that I don’t respect
that others have religious faith and so forth ... but you know, I personally find that power
in individual humans - in relationships .”
Iconic and Institutional Caring
Just as caring in some form is present in all intended action, the attitude of cer-
tainty is characteristic of all action that has been informed by some combination of
profound knowledge and intense caring. Certainty originates in our knowledge and feel-
ing, in the fundamental nexus of heart and mind. It is a property of our most profound
awareness and reflection but not, of any necessity, of any particular plan or course of ac-
tion. Depending on the content of our certain knowledge, the forms of action and the
means to be employed are constrained - as, for example, with those who eschew vio-
lence. Certainty is present - our certain knowledge is reflected - in the strength of our
perceived need or desire to act, and is discemable to others in the forms and methods em-
ployed in action itself. Because, however, there is often still a wide range of specific
choices within moral constraints, as well as a lot of facts and contingencies that are un-
known or uncertain, there is a great deal of room left for humility - unless one is as
certain of one’s plan of action as of the knowledge and caring that prompted its adoption.
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Morally informed certainty is often expressed in elemental terms of knowing right
and wrong, as with John B. It is also stated in personal terms of overriding duty or un-
conditional obligation, such as is indicated in the common refrain of the rescuers of Jews
dunng World War A. When asked why they had put themselves and their immediate
loved ones in palpable mortal peril, they replied, in effect: “What else could I do?”27
It has been argued thus far that our deeply informed caring, regardless of its ob-
ject, has at least two primary effects: it prompts us into action, and it strongly affects the
form and method of action that we choose. Since caring as a conscious state of mind re-
sults from of our varied ability to learn, feel, and reflect, the form of knowledge or object
that we direct our attention toward and to which we attach the highest moral significance
indirectly affects the nature of our action. More succinctly put, we act with our greatest
strength, our fewest doubts, to install, defend, and enhance that which we come to know
most profoundly - with the greatest certainty - and therefore care about most deeply.
The qualities of certain knowing and caring that results are often expressed in ab-
stract formulations of fundamental truth, universally applicable as categorical absolutes.
Principles, canons, creeds, and articles of faith are only a few of the generic titles we have
assigned to them. They are not the same as ideals, except to the extent that ideals, such as
democracy, are construed as ideology: a set of immutable principles for action in the pre-
sent.
As John B's actions to achieve greater democracy in America reveal, such abstrac-
tions can be powerful reservoirs of knowledge and inspiration. His life experiences and
his activism suggest that his ideas and precepts of democracy were formed - and remain -
in the world of exposure to and interaction with a wide array of persons, present and past,
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to whom he became deeply attached. His dedication to the concept of democracy, and his
lesser, related respect for liberal republican institutions and the rule of law are informed
by, therefore subordinate to, his learning that stems from relationship to others and the
care for them which that experience helps to instill. John's primary attachments are to
others, his fundamental faith is in others, and his political vision is the expression of the
social, economic, and political relationship that he wants for their sake and for his. His
idea of democracy is therefore imbued with interpersonal affectionate warmth, not the
sterility of a process that is derived from life-detached ideation.
When we become more attached in our caring to social and political moral pre-
cepts than to what and who has informed them, we locate ourselves in some at least
partially mythical realm, a world informed first and foremost by ideas. That is the risk
that is inherent in the false notion of the pure rational idea, the timeless conception
around which the past is reconstructed, the present is framed, and the future pre-ordained.
When Eugene Debs experienced his ‘jailhouse conversion' to Marxist determin-
ism and socialism, his initial world-view of general basic human decency and his
youthful, cultural exposure to Horatio Algerism, the centaur-like offspring of the Ameri-
can enlightenment
,
were each recast into a dichotomy of labor and capital - good and
evil - on a single, inevitable grand stage of history. From that point onward, he never
sought to persuade, only to defeat, those who were not at least closely allied with the pro-
letariat. Fealty to a set of beliefs became as important, if not more so, than his deep,
affectionate fraternal association with workers who, by and large, did not share his iconic
ideology, but revered him for his efforts on their behalf nonetheless.
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His caring, however, continued to inform his idea of democracy and his clear
preference for nonviolence. This suggests a close relationship between the idea of de-
mocracy and certain knowledge of a world that was still broad and vital enough to inform
him. It also explains why labor was moved by his caring even after his rigid adoption of a
world-view that explained more of the past, present and future that we are capable of
knowing with certainty.
Caring Near the Edge of Abstraction
Our ideas concerning life have had tremendous social and political ramifications
in America. Enlightenment informed knowledge has led to political relativism, given its
pragmatic assumption that individual life in the active, contested world of politics is all
that we can address safely with a majority voice. The question of when life begins before
it can vote or revolt is a matter of private secular, spiritual, and religious concern that in-
volves government only indirectly through its generally accepted role as our pluralist
referee. The demonstrable fact that governing elites have never succeeded in maintaining
their own neutrality on this issue only confirms its basic importance and the degree of
caring that each of us attaches to it.
Mary McD., another interviewee for this project, is part of a significant minority
who ardently believe that human life begins at least as early as conception. Given their
relative pluralist political weight at the national level, they have formed an often uneasy
alliance with the Republican Party where their rewards have come in the form of federal
court appointees and policies that seek to thwart public funding of abortions either at
home or abroad. Regionally and locally they have been somewhat successful in indirect
political strategies to weaken Roe vs. Wade by efforts to restrict access to abortion ser-
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v.ces, such as waiting periods, parental consent for minors, and grass roots support for
candidates to city councils and school boards who support the pro-life agenda. Finally, i„
cities, communities and states where political strategies are unlikely to be successful, they
struggle as core actors and supporters in organized, persuasive efforts to inform others of
their views and to broaden their acceptance as profound truth.
Mary has become a persistent, visible activist on this issue. She demonstrates a
strong preference for authentic action, and is by no means a supporter of violent action as
a morally justified response to abortion, although she believes it to be a form of homicide.
For her and for millions of Americans, the moral right to life for all human purposes be-
gins at conception, not at viability or at birth. It is a principle of the highest moral
certainty, a fundamental belief involving the nature and origins of life itself.
The “right to life” or “pro-life” precept lies near the border of belief that is ab-
stracted or derived from life in the concrete world, and the abstract idea which both
symbolizes and constitutes certain belief. In the former, life in the flesh for some is sac-
rosanct, for others it is entirely relative to self, and for most of us it is in the sometimes
agonizing ‘in between' of situational encounter and moral conflict. Albert Schweitzer is
one notable example of those for whom “reverence for life” in virtually all detectable
forms is expressed and confirmed in lives of caring, congruent action
.
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For others, it is the content of the abstraction, understood as a fixed, inviolable
principle or doctrine whose subject matter is life as therein defined . This does not imply
that those of us who adhere to such certain beliefs are devoid of any sense of value or car-
ing for life outside their scope; however, it does mean that in a concrete conflict between
one form of life and another - a mother-to-be and the unborn within her, for example -
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the form that is protected by the principle should prevail. The form and intensity of car-
ing that connects us to each life is acknowledged and experienced by many adherents but
does not factor into the decision. Something more important than interpersonal caring is
involved.
Abstract principles of the latter form are grounded on certain belief in the a priori
authority that formulates the abstraction. In is the authorship of the principle that gives it
its certainty. Certainty based on the false notion of pure reason has little durable social
and political weight because, by its nature, such authority is individual in its origins, in-
herently subjective, and cares first and finally only for its author, the self.
When the ultimate authorship is divine and furnished to us in a long, widely-
shared, and valued institutional tradition, the principle becomes powerful and persuasive
not only individually, but socially and politically as well. The fact that the principle also
relates to a matter of basic importance to each of us - and offers a clear rule for resolving
our fundamental concern - only enhances its influence on our action.
Mary McD’s personal belief reflects the close association between principle and
institutional transmission, in her case, via Roman Catholicism. She was raised as an only
child in a loving, working class family, which devoutly observed the beliefs and ritual
practices of the Catholic Church as it existed in the Springfield, Massachusetts area dur-
ing the 1940s and fifties. Neither of her parents were active on either social or political
issues, devoting themselves, as most of us do, to work, family, and the raising of their
daughter in a nurturing environment. “My parents gave me every benefit” is how she
summarizes her upbringing that, from a child’s perspective, seamlessly incorporated fam-
ily, church, and schooling.
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After graduating from college she pursued a diplomatic career in the United States
Foreign Service. For the next thirty years, from 1955 to 1985, when she retired, she led a
very interesting” life, posted in succession to our embassies in Paris, Warsaw, Ankara,
Stockholm, and Brussels. She recalls that she was most sttmulated by Ankara during the
1970s with its mixture of ancient, traditional, and cosmopolitan, reflected it its visual,
sensory mix. She found Stockholm dunng the 1960s the least interesting, describing it as
pretty, pretty, pretty, but very dull. Everybody looked alike on the street.”
Spending her entire career overseas except for brief home leaves, she readily ad-
mits that she “lost touch” with what was going on in America, including the furor over
Roe v. Wade in 1973 and thereafter. “I might have heard about it but I didn’t get person-
ally involved or emotionally involved in many of the things going on in the United
States. She volunteered that she had never married, “never had children,” expressing the
latter ingredient in the mixture of pleasure and regret that we experience as we look back
on our lives. “I do feel that I’ve missed a tremendous amount. I try not to look back
but I [also] feel that I have been blessed in many ways.”
Mary had reached adulthood devout in her received faith and maintained her rela-
tionship with the church throughout her career. She recalled that on one occasion, while
posted to Warsaw in the Iron Curtain 1950s, she had gotten to know a nun who acted as
the “outside liaison” for her small cloistered order located in an old part of Warsaw. The
nun told her about the suffering and loss her convent had experienced during the Nazi
occupation that included the slaughter of several members. Mary came to admire the
woman for her personal courage, evident in the risks she took to raise financial support,
obtain food and gamer other necessities under the new oppressive conditions of enforced
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secular communism. Referring to her own faith, she noted: “I was always a faithful
Catholic, you know, but I m much more involved in it now.”
After retiring from government service in 1985, she returned to the Pioneer Val-
ley, settling in the “five college” area because she thought it would be “an interesting
place to live.” She also “reconnected with friends [from her] childhood...” and through
them became exposed to the right to life movement. Her two closest renewed friendships
were with sisters, one of whom was “involved with the movement.” She describes her
exposure and gradually greater involvement as follows:
She and her husband were deeply involved in the pro-life movement and bought
me a ticket to the annual dinner they have I sort of said ‘I don’t know if I want to
go. So they forced me to go and kept talking ‘why don t you get involved with
this? Well I [didn’t] want to. I’ve got other things and eventually I began to be-
ing more and more interested, and then people in the Pioneer Valley office,
Massachusetts Citizens for Life which is located in Ludlow, I began to know
them. I didn’t work very much with them but they said “why don’t you form a
chapter up here?” Well no, I wasn’t going to form a chapter and that went on for
several years.”
In 1 992, Mary relented and agreed to help organize a local chapter, doing so with
eight to ten others. One year later she agreed to serve as its Chair, a position she has held
ever since. Modestly referring to her role as something she simply “stuck with,” she con-
tinued:
“Fortunately I say stuck, you know, because there is a lot of work, but I re-
gard it as a very important part of my life in the sense that I feel it’s a service ... a
service to God. I feel that I have been privileged [in my life] in a tremendous way
... so I do have an obligation to give back a little, and this is one way that I can do
that.”
Mary's beliefs regarding the sanctity of human life appear to have been
formed and have evolved within the Catholic doctrinal tradition. 29 Both her career and
the church have likely fostered her ecumenical approach to activism on the right to life
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issue. Acting in the consciously informed spirit of Vatican n, which afforded “ a much
greater role for [lay] people to play,” she emphasize that the organization “meets in a non-
denomrnatronal church,” in Northampton, and although “most members are Catholic, and
I deplore that. I think [of it] as everybody’s organization.” She is further concerned that
“it’s awfully white, too” although the group does have a black physician member.
The primary strategy of her organization is public persuasion. At least twice a
year, they form an informational picket line on the Coolidge Bridge, part the primary ar-
tery connecting Amherst and Northampton over the Connecticut River. She notes: “If we
get twenty-five people we’re lucky, but we stretch all the way across the bridge.” They
also take part in similar protests outside Bay State Medical Center in Springfield, attend
various regional protests, and the annual mass demonstration in Washington, D. C. on the
anniversary of Roe v. Wade .
Mary and her colleagues also work hard to at least limit the availability of
abortion services in the Pioneer Valley. Through physicians and other supporters who
work in the healthcare field, they identify and pressure hospitals and government agencies
who either provide or are considering providing such services. Finally they have done
some work on college campuses helping students to organize and conduct pro-life rallies.
In one such rally on the UMass campus, she experienced the phenomenon that had made
Frances Crowe somewhat uncomfortable in the mid-1980s, when students at Smith Col-
lege, with her assistance, made it impossible for a State Department spokesman to be
heard:
I never went to anything like it in my life. It was so raucous and the effort to
squelch and stop it and cover it up with yells and everything was, you know, it’s
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just terrible. You think what is the University teaching? What are they teach-
ing?”
On this concern, which stands in contrast to the greater moral complexity of the
circumstances that Crowe and her colleagues had confronted, one should acknowledge
the validity of her point. Tolerance, like any form of moral action, is durable only when
informed by both knowledge and some form of deep regard for others. Further, as Fran-
ces Crowe acknowledged in her interview, there are many who are broadly active in
peace and social justice causes who are informed by both concrete and abstract forms of
altruistic care, including a core spiritual connection to life that has led them to individu-
ally oppose abortion.
The interview with Mary was conducted in March 2000. At the time, she was
queried about her views and possible activism on other moral concerns relating to other
fundamental social and political issues. She indicated that she was interested in
American foreign policy matters, as was the case throughout her career; however, now as
then she generally agreed with official governmental policy, assuming its good faith cor-
rectness when she was not directly familiar with underlying facts. Further, on those
occasions when she has disagreed, she has not been spurred to activism. As for domestic
concerns, such as the civil rights movement, she kept aware through the international edi-
tions of the Herald Tribune
,
and held private opinions, but acted within the constraints of
her career, trusting her belief in American democracy and its traditional practices of bu-
reaucratic hierarchy and political accountability.
At the time of the interview, Mary was active only on the pro-life issue. Recently,
however, she has become involved in a project to place a binding referendum question on
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the statewide ballot in Massachusetts. The proposal, recently defeated by the legislature,
would amend the Massachusetts constitution for the purpose of limiting civil marriage
and its associated rights and privileges to heterosexual couples only. Interviewed at the
state capital after the legislature’s unfavorable vote, Mary was quoted as saying: “It re-
quires a vote of the people, not these characters. It’s a very serious issue for society. It
can’t be allowed to rest .”30
Although Mary’s activism has come later in life, and although it is informed by
caring attached to ideas that are more intangible and institutional than concrete and inter-
personal, it is clear that she cares deeply and ecumenically for people, likely on a level
approximating the intensity of her doctrinal convictions. It is also apparent that she is
greatly comforted and inspired through deep friendship and fraternal association as were
all of the core actors who were studied and interviewed, including those who for reasons
of time and the effort to be representative are not expressly included.
It is further obvious that, as with all of the named and unnamed core actors herein,
her affection for others is expressed in her embrace of democratic persuasive means,
rather than the absolutism of violence. However, unlike the others, except for Eugene
Debs and one other interviewed couple who were involved in the pro-life cause, Mary’s
caring is informed by a form of knowledge that carries with it the potential to set bounda-
ries between lives and within life itself. Part of the problem is inherent in the
institutionalization of belief itself within a tradition which combines certain moral belief
with hierarchical formulation, pronouncement, and the sanctioning of apostates. Al-
though much softened in the somewhat devolved practice of contemporary Catholicism,
particularly in America, such knowledge continues to divide us unnecessarily. We run
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the institutionally enhanced risks associated with our division into believers and nonbe-
lievers, converts and non-converts, the saved and the damned - into opposing teams of
good and evil, with the risk that caring will be directed more at the preservation of an ab-
stract doctrine, or the institution that asserts it, rather than at the broader, more inclusive
truth that underlies it.
Given her broad affection for others and her concomitant support of democratic
process, Mary is able to subordinate her particularized, doctrinal views concerning the
sanctity of life and the nature and purpose of sexual union to a wider, more deeply held
priority - upholding the universal sanctity of human life. Such is the fundamental knowl-
edge from which moral progress can be built in our diverse world of which America is
emblematic.
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CHAPTER 8
THE CAPACITY TO LEARN AND TO KNOW
“In cffea wha seems to hold ambition and unbridled desire for power in check is some sense of aarger context of life, a recognition that something greater than the self is at stake in how one
chooses to spend and be spent.” - Laurent A. Parks Daloz et al 1
Not all protest emerges out of clear structural positions, but often simply out of a shared vision ”
- James M. Jasper
“I think every one of us is bom with a need, an ability ... to grow, and once we come to the reali-
zation that growth is a natural thing
... you [can] experience it.” - Pastor B., interviewee
“The rationalist’s fallacy ... is exactly like the sentimentalist’s. Both extract a quality from the
muddy waters of experience, and find it so pure when extracted that they must contrast it with each
and all of its muddy instances as an opposite and higher nature. All the while it is their nature. -
William James'
“When will we teach our children in school what they are? We should say to each of them: Do youknow what you are? You are a marvel. You are unique. In all the world there is no other child ex-
actly like you. In the millions of years that have passed there has never been another child like you
.... You may become a Shakespeare, a Michaelangelo, a Beethoven. You have the capacity for
anything. Yes, you are a marvel. And when you grow up, can you then harm another who is, like
you, a marvel?” - Pablo Casals
4
Introduction
If the idea of moral progress is to become vital in America, we must first learn to
swim against the massive tide of our enlightened, systematic ontological ignorance. In
our time, impoverished moral learning has left us adrift in an ersatz national community:
an amoral political world of public policy that informs us mainly with facts, trends, fiscal
constraints, and incremental probabilities; a culture of images, dreams, and coordinated
products, all produced to stimulate and satisfy conforming demographic consuming be-
haviors that are themselves too much the product of previous mass images. Trapped in
our enlightened misunderstanding, believing that our authentic isolation from others out-
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side the private coterie of self is irremediable. too many of us feel powerless to struggle
against the conventional current.
The professionals who act as the specialists of knowledge and operation in each
realm are themselves caught up in the worlds that many of them continue to help create.
In growing company with the rest of us, they often live paradoxical, segmented lives -
one as isolated selves who understand their relationship to the world as a combination of
private, particular, subjective, intimate relations to people and places, and the other as
systematically connected to others in instrumental relationships based on behavioral
knowledge, structural constraints, and targeted manipulation. Given the fundamental dis-
harmony of this arrangement, it is not at all surprising that there is considerable spillage -
divorce, whistle-blowing, and insider trading, for instance - from one world into the
other, or that so many seek relief from their existential schizophrenia in therapy, life-style
adjustments, escapist adventures, and early retirement.
All the while, the discerned facts on which the objective world is premised are
shifting as its actual operators invent, by their powerful initiating, entrepreneurial agency,
new organizational and other devices to extract and control greater resources in their life-
time. These free radicals, the Ayn Rand superstars who are functionally present in any
society and only lightly tamed by rational morality in ours, alter the system dynamic,
changing the pluralist mix by attracting a multitude of imitative actors in their wake, leav-
ing the social scientific professionals, our students of what is, to discern each major
alteration after the fact of change. It is no surprise, then, that so may of the latter, upon
detecting their version of Sisyphus’s eternal dilemma, go to work for those who can
‘truly’ shape the world . 5
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Too many of us have lived up to the expectations of our social and political mal-
formation. To do so, we have largely made the worlds thus created our own, accepting
them as who we are in the American aggregate. We have heeded the contemporary po-
litical call to inaction and have gone shopping, leaving entrepreneurs, political and
economic brokers, and increasing numbers of hired professionals to tend to the decision-
making apparatus of society, economy, and state. We live longer and in vastly greater
physical comfort; however, the lives we live are, if anything, less profoundly satisfying
than the more abbreviated ones our national forebears lived after freedom became their
claim of right, but before the promise of material immortality became a rationally con-
ceivable possibility, and our systems were seen to have fully acquired a life of their own.
For many, especially those of us whose ancestors, such as Frederick Douglass, did
not experience the automatic status of American freedom, and also those who have not
yet experienced its promise of opportunity, this dark portrayal of who we have become,
may seem arrogant and foolish. The evil inherent in any system of institutionalized self-
aggrandizement is apparent to those most oppressed or omitted, and ignorance - as well
as calls for reform that are seen to threaten the further expansion of material opportunity -
by its perpetrators and benefactors is a thin excuse. However, as Douglass understood,
intentional and innocent ignorance stemming from excessive attention to self is part of
our shared inheritance; moreover, it is even forgivable when the ignorant at least demon-
strate that they are open to new learning and persuasion . 6 The willfully arrogant must be
otherwise dealt with, but one need not dissipate the energy necessary to defeat their nar-
row world view by despising them.
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It is not that our chronic striving to avoid death or our current versions of physical
immortality are incomprehensible. Anxiety over death is chronic in our youth-obsessed
culture, whereas deep, extensive love for life is not. The growing global popularity of
physical immortality belies its Scylla-like allure and the mortal fear that feeds it. What-
ever our professed understanding, sentient life is all we know with concrete physical
certainty, and a greater abundance of the orgasmic, aesthetic, and lesser pleasures its ex-
tension affords is highly enticing.
Given our dominant self-understanding and corresponding world-view, it is even
easier to understand our individual and nationalized temptation to further sate the insatia-
ble. Few of us are anxious to die, but too many of us are willing to pay the personal inner
price of prioritizing one s life over others’, to squeeze out increasingly scant drops of
pleasure and utility, and to willingly impose on the world and others the ‘external costs’
of our existential self-enhancement.
Fortunately, many of us are no longer assured that our children will - or should -
forgive us. The current challenges to our myth of automatic systemic certainty, evident in
the reappearance of indeterminate economic insecurity, and in emergence of terrorist, cli-
matic, and environmental threats, have the potential to awaken us from our ontological
misapprehension. Unfortunately, the results of such events are at least as likely to involve
the further re-emergence of naked, unenlightened private and national power from their
enshrouding mythical mist of systemic rational global convergence, rather than the crea-
tion of a more unified self, national, and world understanding.
The personal, domestic costs for life as we apportion them to ourselves are appar-
ently considerable - so much so that not much of our acquired obesity is left for others
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who lack our personal fortune. At the level of our still staggering relative prosperity, we
cannot afford to extend the physical comforts of life, or even its basic maintenance, as
broadly as before. We have dismantled much of our flawed but precious New Deal com-
mon provisioning. Our governmental overseas economic aid as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product has slowly declined since the 1960s to around one tenth of one per cent
in 2001
. Our private domestic philanthropy has incrementally soared - from 1 .7% of
GDP in 1995 to 2.1% in 1999, as did individual giving - from 1.5% of gross personal in-
come in 1995 to 1.8% in 1999. Corporate largesse grew to almost six per cent of the
private total in 1999. In the 2000-2001 downswing, however, it quickly shriveled to
4.3% - evidence of the enhanced ability of our corporate structures to quickly adapt to
changing conditions in their environments. 8 The above are all ‘gross’ figures that become
even less munificent in their actual distribution, net of the disproportionality of public
economic aid going to support our strategic allies, and less the private largess which en-
dows the religious, educational, and cultural institutions that the donors and their children
attend.
Despite the professed values of our traditional civic and religious institutions and
their leaders, we are living lives of staggering moral contradiction, organized and sys-
tematized in a global matrix of dominance and one-way dependence that is based on an
American design. In 1980 we fired President Carter for several reasons, among them his
gentle audacity in suggesting that we were suffering from an implicitly moral malaise.
Today, many of us are prepared to acknowledge that his diagnosis was accurate.
The private, inner unease that Carter briefly identified is today broadly evident in
a wide variety of contemporary phenomena, among them the following: the popular, gov-
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emment-supported effort to return to the ‘normalcy’ of nuclear family; the growth of fun-
damentalist faith and the plethora of television programs and films featuring the comfort
of helpful ghosts and angels, and the simple justice of heroic vigilantes; the sales figures
for jeremiad books by William Greider, Robert Reich, Jeremy Riflcin, and many others;
the intellectual search for improved understanding and moral comfort in the writings of
Max Sandel, Michael lemer, and Stephen Carter, as well as in the survey analyses of
Robert Putnam and Alan Wolfe; the numerous op-ed and pulpit calls for the return of vir-
tuous leaders and for mass self-denial based on naked will alone; and our perennially
disappointed vigils for exemplars and mentors who will authentically inform and guide us
for less than thirty thousand dollars a lecture
.
9
We are much more than insecure; a great many of us are fundamentally ill at ease
with what we have become - with our own inaction and the action that is taken in our col-
lective national name. Considerable numbers of us further sense that we are far from
enlightened, that there is much more that we are capable of being. We have grown in-
creasingly anxious while waiting for answers from others or awaiting some calamity that
will stimulate a moral leadership response
- passive postures that are not only dangerous,
but also unnecessary.
The fundamental answers that we seek are already present in our respective inner
and outer worlds, the only places where certain truth can be found, truths about ourselves
and the world we severally inhabit, but seem unable to discover and therefore share. In
order to discern these truths, we must struggle with ourselves to shed our enlightenment
and inward-looking communal blinders and adopt new methods for learning about the full
nature of who we are.
275
The effort to accomplish this does not require that we deny the vital strengths of
rational discovery and other rational knowing; rather, we need to add to these means of
learning in order to dethrone its premises concerning our nature and to accept their par-
tial, limited role in the discovery' of human truth and the construction of moral precepts
on the foundation of our discoveries. Neither does the content of a vital moral frame-
work mandate our subordination or abandonment of family, friends, and community in
the name of some higher principle or greater good. All are critical - but not in any given
composition or role, nor is any particular institution essential - to the initial and ongoing
process of moral formation, moral discovery, and to the task of morally informed social
and political change.
We will know that we are in the process of succeeding, of moving beyond the lim-
ited potential of our enlightened liberal republican and traditional communal heritage, as
we find ourselves discovering, caring deeply for, and acting with others to build upon, a
broader, more inclusive image of ourselves and the world that we have thus far largely
been unable to see, except in fragmented pieces, or in the privacy of intimately shared and
unexpressed, undemonstrated dreams.
The first two parts of this attempt to undertake the above task - examining our en-
lightenment dilemma, and introducing via a cadre of morally informed core actors how
some of us have been and still are able to act in the changing context of our common mis-
apprehension - are complete. In the last chapter, the process of constructing a fuller,
richer moral epistemology, a better understanding about how we become most profoundly
morally informed and motivated to act, was begun. We have the capacity to care greatly
about what and whom we know most intimately and profoundly, therefore we act.
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In this chapter an effort is made to complete this assignment, once again with the
invaluable example of selected morally informed core actors. Through their assistance,
we can discover and expand not only our extant capacity to learn deeply about ourselves,
others, and the world, but we can also glimpse for ourselves some of the certain knowl-
edge that they have been able to discover.
Learning from the Particular
Moral learning is inherently inductive. It begins at birth with our experience of
the immediate and the particular. We enter the world unaware that it and others exist, yet
carrying within us our specie’s particular combination of what we already are and may
hereafter become. In varied circumstances, we arrive already equipped with our mysteri-
ously assigned, developable potential - our universal capacities to know, to care, and to
act and our unique talents for doing so. It is not the mechanisms of assignment that are so
mysterious; much of that is factually understood. It is our capacity to wonder that it hap-
pens at all. More than any other question that expresses our profound mortal curiosity, it
is the sequential, Socratic, answer and response puzzle of “Why?” addressed to the fun-
damental matters of life that propels us to learn and to potentially grow.
As has been increasingly implied and suggested, our capacities for profound learn-
ing, caring, and acting are tightly interrelated - so tightly that any effort, including this, to
unwind them can be only partially successful at best. Our earliest profound childhood
questioning, for example, presupposes an innate capacity for caring that is inseparable
from mortal curiosity. We arrive with an intrinsic desire to know the core ‘facts of life’
that present themselves to us in our immediate surroundings and to comprehend ourselves
in relationship to them.
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The circumstances that attend our arrival are, of course highly significant. The
three capacities we all possess are initially developed in direct relationship with and total
dependence on those who relate themselves to us by primordial maternal and other inti-
mate, familial love, and by the much less dependable bonds of law, custom, and rational
obligation. If we are fortunate, like Frances Crowe, John B., and most of those discussed
thus far, we are afforded life’s greatest gift apart from itself - the experience of unmedi-
ated, deep affection - and will find our own capacity to extend our own authentic warmth
well-nourished, robust, resilient, and contagious. We arrive curious to know, equipped to
care, and anxious to act, needing only to witness, experience, and less directly learn the
forms and relative strengths of each capacity from others.
There are two additional contemporary actors who make this point well, while
adding important variety. The first, Maria M-L., is the director of a community out-reach
agency that serves the sizeable Hispanic community in Springfield. In the spirit of Jane
Addams, she is a facilitator and an organizer with others, not simply a philanthropic pro-
vider or doer for others. In her late-forties when interviewed, she was in the unfortunate
position of being able to share her background and insights from the vantage point of
someone who was recovering from a major illness that had involved a close encounter
with death. Although still weak, she was already back at work part-time and did not seem
at all afraid of what she more consciously knew lay ahead.
Maria was bom in a small town outside Silver City, New Mexico, one of five
children of Mexican and Native American parents. In addition, there was her huge ex-
tended family of four grandparents, uncles, aunts and “many cousins.” She smiled
broadly and unself-consciously as she described her family, and again, more reflectively,
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when this was brought to her attention. “Yes. (I am],” she agreed, “ because it’s such a
gift. It’s a gift.”
During the interview she told two stories that convey the role of early caring and
experience with maximum effect. The first and briefest is the last event in her childhood.
At eighteen, she enlisted in the Navy, thus becoming the first in her generation to leave
home. Describing the culminating event in an upbringing she would only later come to
appreciate, she continued:
I remember the day I was leaving. I was getting on a bus ... in my little
hometown the bus comes like once a week or something, and I’ll never forget that
moment. Here comes my grandmothers and my mother and my father and sib-
lings and some cousins and there s this large amount of people out there and
they'd really come to wish me well and the little things that they gave me for the
trip. My grandmother had made bean burritos and wrapped them up, you know,
“in case you get hungry”, and my other grandmother gave me a rolling pin, [say-
ing] ‘you’re going to need this’.”
Her leaving, as with Frances Crowe’s, was motivated, in part, by a similar Ameri-
can version of youthful desire to explore a larger world. It was informed as well by a
strong desire to escape from the harsh experiences that she underwent at home. She was
introduced to a larger, often indifferent and hostile social context as had Donna S.; how-
ever, Maria’s family appeared to have learned and gained strength from their struggle. In
contrast, Donna’s immediate family, having moved from its traditional community locale,
became more atomistic and susceptible to the damage that occurred.
Her small community and its activism was the inspiration for the 1954 movie. Salt
of the Earth
, a film that recounts the efforts of Mexican-indigenous workers at the zinc
mine, located in her town, but distantly owned, to unionize and bargain to obtain the same
wage status and benefits that were then afforded the white or Anglo miners that they
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worked with. Their efforts were so unique and potentially contagious that federal gov-
ernment officials, at the height of the McCarthy era, pressured the film industry and at
least one of its trade unions successfully to blacklist the actors and crew and suppress the
film’s release in America until the early 1960s. 10 Maria’s father was one of the striking
miners, and according to her, played himself in the film. 11
The physical ‘community’ that Maria grew up in was the product of externally
imposed structure. The mining corporation owned the town completely, including her
home and those of the other miners, Mexican and Anglo. The Anglo’s homes had run-
ning water and power; whereas, the Mexican homes, segregated from the Anglo’s, did
not. The school she attended was separated, not segregated. As she explained the ar-
rangement,
‘‘We would arrive to school and we would have to stand in lines, and all Mexican
indian children would be in this line and all white kids would be in this line. We
would have to be standing there waiting to come in the building, and the teacher
would finally come out and the white kids would go in first and [then] we would
go in...”
At lunch and recess it was the same, as it was for the rest of daily life that brought her
family in contact with the Anglos. Maria summarized it most effectively:
“You were constantly reminded that you were different, no matter what interac-
tion was going on. So it wasn’t just that we were learning it, we were living that
experience constantly. And I had [other] experiences when I was in school. Prac
tically all my school teachers were Irish women, Irish teachers and I never knew
for a long, long time why I knew so many Irish songs and so much about Irish his
tory and why St. Patrick’s was such a huge holiday when I was growing up.”
Fortunately for Maria, she learned about caring and acting in particular circum-
stances that included her family and neighbors. It was a community maintained in spite
of a long history of external coercive intervention, including the Conquistadors, their
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church, and more recent forced relocation. When asked what role formal religion had
played in her moral formation the following exchange occurred:
MM4,: Well that was an important factor. I was raised as Catholic and it was re-
flected in everything we did in terms of. .
.
Question : And did the church support the activism in your community?
MM-L : Oh very interesting.
Question: I don’t mean to suggest an answer to that.
MIVhL: Yeah. Actually, no. We had a priest who was ... from Spain. Very strict.
And when I was growing up all the masses and everything were in Latin and I
could never really understand anything that was going on. But religion was part
of the family rhythm. There was family rosary every night, [and] there was, you
know, all the rituals from season to season.
It is apparent that Maria acquired her catholic spiritual perspective more from her
family and its syncretic spirituality than from institutional transmission. She credits her
grandparents in particular:
“My grandparents who were very . . . they were very humble but they were very
educated about life in a lot of ways. They were farmers and great teachers and
they really lived up to those beliefs in how they were and how they treated people
and the way that they felt love for everyone, for everything that was living and sa-
cred. For example, when my grandmother would send me to go get some
chamomile leaf teas - mansania from the bush ... and that’s because maybe a
neighbor was not feeling well. But she would say “don’t forget to thank the bush
for the leaves before you take [them].”
In addition to being fostered with a reverence for nature and the physical world,
she had the good fortune to witness more morally-informing major experiences in her
childhood than most of us encounter in a lifetime. The men in her community, including
her father, had been struggling unsuccessfully with the mine owners for years before she
was bom. When she was a toddler, the union that later co-sponsored the film sent an An-
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glo “out-slder” to their community who assisted them in their efforts to organize and pro-
test.
When the men were enjoined by court action from their protest outside the mine
entrance, Maria witnessed her mother and others educate their male partners in their own
capacity to know and act, as well as render traditional gendered care. The women pro-
posed that they and the older children ‘man’ the picket line in order to circumvent the
injunction, an offer the men at first staunchly refused. The women persisted, however,
and moral persuasion took on a new, powerful dimension at the mine entrance soon there-
after. Demonstrating the new political dynamic introduced by their non-incremental
action, the women added to the list of traditional labor demands, insisting that the owners
furnish their families with electricity, running water, and more secure tenancies in their
homes. Given the unique character of the protest, their cause attracted much wider atten-
tion, and the strike was ultimately resolved on terms that afforded Maria’s community a
measure of pragmatic success.
As a result of the women’s initiative, and the men’s adjustment, Maria grew up in
a family and community whose base of moral knowledge was lastingly affected by a
newly discovered sense of democratic competence. Maria’s father went on to become an
appointed Justice of the Peace, and, when that position was abolished, a local, elected ju-
dicial magistrate, a position he held for many years. When she got on the bus, she took
with her enough moral learning to effectively inform her adult lifetime of recurring, now
fulltime social and political activism.
Maria M-L has been a core actor wherever she has lived since then, most visibly
since taking over as director of the organization she now heads. She has devoted herself
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to observing, listening, and helping others to organize and act to enhance the quality of
their lives by becoming politically literate and democratically competent. Her action has
reflected her early-acquired view of life itself as interconnected and sacred, and her edu-
cated awareness that her image of the world is not as broadly or deeply shared as she
perceives it. This world view, with its implicit integration of humanity as part of the
whole, combined with her awareness of existential incongruity, has also furnished her life
purpose:
“What's sacred [in our social and political life] is embracing each other's human-
ity. lhat s what sacredness is and that’s what we've come to learn. I think that
t at s really what our life purpose is, to come and embrace each other’s humanity
and that along the way we will have many teachers and many lessons that are go-
mg to teach us how to do that.”
She offers herself to us as one such teacher.
As has been already observed, the lives of both the historical and contemporary
actors selected herein confirm that the content and consistency of our childhood and early
adult moral formation does not determine our capacity to become powerful, morally in-
formed actors in adulthood. Family and community, while highly important, are only
rarely sufficient to the task. This is critical, where so much of the moral learning im-
parted in each venue is of the liberal republican and communitarian variety.
The dominant moral curriculum of conventional American cultural learning is
likely most evident in the nurture of middle and upper income families that also afford
conditions of material comfort and relative security. The lives of Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Jane Addams, Eugene Debs, and many of those interviewed suggest, however, that mortal
curiosity and moral learning need not end with adolescence, and need not unreflectively
conform to prevailing wisdom.
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Just as conventional nurture in conditions of comfort does not determine conform-
ing outcomes, diminished nurture under harsh conditions does not inevitably starve our
capacity to learn and grow. The lives of Frederick Douglass and Pastor B., one of many
African American men who have been reached, informed, and inspired by Douglass’s
life, demonstrate that our moral capacity can be tenacious.
Pastor B., a middle-aged church minister and community activist in the predomi-
nantly African American North End of Springfield, did not begin to awaken to his now
powerful moral awareness until he was almost seventeen years old. Bom and raised in
the Bedford-Stuyvesant minority enclave of Brooklyn, he dropped out of high school in
tenth grade, angry and frustrated with the realization that he was functionally illiterate and
no longer willing to accept the indignity of scant teaching and social promotion. He suc-
cinctly summarized his angry adolescence in the following: “I was functionally illiterate, I
was carrying firearms and knives [at] 12, 13, 14 years old and involved in a number of
different gangs in Brooklyn.”
Apart from two female African American teachers who, along with his hard-
working, devoted mother, were the most caring and competent of the very few “who chal-
lenged me, who encouraged me, who nurtured me, who would not give up on me despite
the fact that society had caused me to see nothing in myself.” He summarized his
schooling in an area similar to where Gail K. had taught in the early 1960s from a differ-
ent perspective than Gail’s:
“I attended schools in particularly my early years where most of the teach-
ers were white. Very early on there were a lot of white males who were simply
dodging the draft and so really didn’t care a whole lot about educating, about
teaching.”
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Frederick Douglass was one of many external influences that helped Pastor B.
transform the youthful anger implicit in the above into a much deeper intellectually in-
formed and righteous passion. He has become thoroughly familiar with the details of
Douglass’s life and, equally important, his moral perspective. Further informed by his
social gospel form of Christian faith, he no longer focuses his anger on individual whites
or on whites in general but on the particular structures and systems that their unenlight-
ened knowledge and power have encouraged them to form. He now believes, as did
Douglass and Dr. Martin Luther King, that our social, political, and economic institutions
enslave whites as well as African Americans. As he directly explained it,
“Understand, you’re bom into a system and by virtue of the fact that you're white,
living as a white person in America, you have privilege and power and I under-
stand that. So I can be angry at the system that unfortunately you are part of and
... not take out my anger directly on you. Does it mean that I disallow or just to-
tally push aside your behavior? No, [because] I recognize that you are just as
much a prisoner as I am.”
The imprisonment, as he experiences and conceives it, has two dimensions. There
are the systems of oppression themselves, the artificial contrivances of law, belief, and
practice, which still perpetuate subordination, group isolation, and exclusion from oppor-
tunity along lines of race and gender. Our criminal justice system - its drug policy is one
obvious example - and our property tax supported, ‘community’ situated public school
systems are another. The strength of these systems, aside from the reification of systemic
belief itself, is a combination of the perceptual blindness to the subtle, indirect racism of
those who support them, and the wide-spread belief that the right of the majority to incor-
porate such racism in their definition of security and individual freedom trumps justice
for those labeled as minority.
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The irony of the second dimension of our common imprisonment, which Pastor B.
has learned to personally detect, is that its walls are virtual and internal, part of one’s self-
definition. We are still taught to accept race, along with gender and ethnicity, as funda-
mental human distinctions, rather than as part of our universal human variety. From a
unique black perspective, this systemically-reinforced distinction leads to the devaluation
of self and a corresponding lack of agency that far exceeds that of the general population.
It occurs when we internalize the discrete group image of ourselves that our dominant
culture so pervasively imparts, in Pastor B.’s historically assigned circumstance, a picture
of inherent, color-identifiable inferiority. 1
2
He demonstrated the daily reality of incul-
cated black self-consciousness by a variety of methods, including the following simple
perceptual shift, offered from his church office and its racially homogeneous neighbor-
hood surroundings: “You never have to think about being white... [except] on days like
this ...”
Pastor B. believes that all of us have the capacity to “awaken” to a powerful un-
derstanding of self and a new, explicitly hopeful, optimistic image of the world and our
relationships within it. He uses the term “awaken” much like Father Leo intended with
his cave metaphor, to impart his belief “that people have fallen asleep to the possibilities
of their own freedom,” just as he had done. When asked how it had occurred for him, he
offered the following:
“What supported my awakening [was] not one thing, one event, one person. I
think it was a combination of people, a combination of events that took place in
my life. I think every one of us is bom with a need, an ability ... to grow, and
once we come to the realization that growth is a natural thing . .
.
you [can] experi-
ence it.”
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Judging from his eloquent, passionate discourse, his keen self-knowledge, and the
number of intellectual and Biblical authorities he was able to recall and quote, Pastor B.
has truly awakened to the full potential in himself, in others, and the world. He also has a
profound, imaginative sense of history and of the critical role that each of us can play in
its reported outcomes. He began, as with many of us who are not well-nurtured into our
moral awakening but are bom, like Douglass, with unusual inner strength reflected in
adolescent anger, by tending to the particulars of his own. He did so, as Donna S. had
also done, under the patient tutelage of the man who headed the church he now serves in.
At the age of seventeen he appointed Pastor B. to an assistant Pastorship in a Brooklyn
church. Music plays a major role in its denominational liturgy, and he was encouraged to
teach himself to play several instruments in what he now recognizes was in a conscious
mentoring effort to impart self-mastery and competence. He also became active in the
local community, in voter registration and in other areas in order gain new experience and
to enlarge his world-view. As he briefly put it, “I started working, volunteering in the
community at various levels.”
He did so both for the sake of his own learning and, ultimately, to become capable
of helping others who were still asleep. As he describes it:
“I became very aware of the fact that you have to be a part of the process. You
have to learn the system. You have to understand. You don’t go hunting for a
lion unless you understand the nature of it.”
The lion that Pastor B. was preparing himself to hunt for was the external source
of the oppression, and its unique entrapment of urban African Americans and many His-
panics. He learned how to hunt for his quarry by locating it in the context of a newly-
discovered world where he has many allies, white and black, who, although still caught in
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a racial divide, are engaged in the ongoing individual and small group process of revolu-
tionary change.
Pastor B. has made himself keenly aware of the history of America before his per-
sonal awakening. He sees the revolution that he is engaged in as encompassing racial
injustice and all other forms of inhumanity. He views it as a process of individual and
group awakening, involving action at all levels of society. It begins with caring grass-
roots attention to the awakening of others, local and wider action, including direct
confrontation, to bring about increased awareness and change, and throughout the entire
process, moral persuasion - “a struggle that goes on within the hearts and minds of men.”
Speaking of its subject matter and scale of this revolt from a meta-perspective, he adds
his profound understanding of the need for fraternity and sorority:
“It’s a revolution which recognizes a constant struggle for development and pro-
gress— It s much broader and it encompasses a variety of individuals working
from a variety of different angles who may not always be in touch with each other
but that there’s a spirit of commonality and a purpose.”
The origins of the revolution in every generation are “people who start to do some
inner growth. It is apparent that Pastor B. is well along the path of his own inner revolu-
tion. He has placed himself in a much larger context, yet deeply, spiritually rooted in the
common humanity of divine creation, and has come to understand much of the true range
of his freedom — his own moral capacity — to act. His extensive community outreach
work in Springfield involves persuading and assisting other African Americans from cir-
cumstances similar to his own, to experience their own awakening and to become full
citizens of America and the world.
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One simple, effective pedagogical technique he employs is to teach others to play
chess. In The Hut, a non-denominational drop-in community center that he directs, he
organizes chess clubs. He explains that before people can awaken to their full nature and
capacity, they have to first leant how to think about life in greater context - how it works:
“[W]e have a theme with the chess club that is it’s not about the board. It’s about
the players. So, for instance, the other day I put a question on the board and the
question was: ‘What is the first step or what must black do in order to gain the ad-
vantage? What is the first step? And naturally if you’re a chess player you’ll
understand that when you sit down to a chess board whoever’s playing white gets
to go first and therefore you have an advantage.”
After the group initially concludes that white moving first is simply a rule or a ‘given,' he
points to the historical, man-made source of the rule, then builds on the metaphor:
So then, what does black have to do in order to gain the advantage to win the
game? The whole concept of chess is that you will never win a game moving just
one piece. It’s about development, and so with every club that we have, I employ
this concept of chess that it’s about development. It’s about putting value on your
resources, knowing where things go and how things operate, knowing what’s ex-
pendable, understanding that there’s something I’m going to have to give up in the
course of this game. Being able to anticipate or even force my opponent to move
in certain ways based on my moves. It ain’t about that board, it’s about the play-
ers. So what we try to do is to get people to come into our space and through a
process of developing relationships first, developing relationships because [they]
have to understand that I’m not here to [do it for them].”
Pastor B. wants his chess clubs to be self-sustaining, their members self-empowered to
act effectively for themselves and for others.
It is easy to conclude that the qualities of caring and affectionate warmth are lack-
ing in his approach. For those of us who have this reaction, it is likely that we are
fortunate in that we lack the kind of initial formative experiences that would enable us to
more readily discern the intensity of caring that is present in his blunt, direct efforts.
Many may have had a similar response to the confrontational nature of Donna S’s activ-
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ism and to her candid acknowledgement of anger at the injustice she had experienced as
part of her motivation. Pastor B., like Donna, and like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Fre-
derick Douglass before them, is attempting to enable those who have experienced
generations of institutional and self-imprisonment to wake up so that they can begin the
process of their own liberation. It is also likely that, like ourselves, they are not divinely
ordained saints.
Although the work of individual, social, and political awakening is difficult in al-
most any setting, there is none that is more difficult in America than from within our
racial urban enclaves. The immigrant population in which Jane Addams had encountered
democratic competence had been economically set adrift in Europe, but not stripped of
their cultural past or physical freedom and relegated to an inferior sub-class of humanity
upon their arrival in America. One does not undertake such tasks with the almost daily
frustrations and frequent failures that attend them, unless one cares deeply about others,
has faith in their capacity to see the world as it is and to become competent within it, and
takes great, affectionate pleasure in their awakening.
Perhaps the rest of us can somewhat better understand the nature of the inner im-
prisonment that Pastor B. must regularly contend with by learning first to recognize the
three hundred plus history of our more comfortable, broader, still growing self-
confinement that begins with our early childhood formation. Most of us need to be con-
fronted with a fundamental truth: we are each responsible, although not in the first
instance, for our individual and shared dilemma. Each of us is an obstacle, in some pro-
found manner, to moral progress - our own and someone else’s. Most of us, for example,
continue to own, by our ignorance and inaction, a piece of the mental and physical space
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Pastor B. was bom into and left exposed to experience. Just as he has been able to see,
with the help of others, the harsh distortions of his initial formation and, with further as-
sistance, to overcome them, so we are capable of discovering the world not only as it is,
but as it can become, and the richer content of our selves that make progress from the
present possible. To obtain this freedom and to use it for the social and political awaken-
ing of others, we need to answer Pastor B’s call to revolution. To assist, he offers us his
inclusive definition of a radical, transforming way of life shared by morally informed core
actors and available to each of us:
What is a revolution? It’s people who start to do some inner growth and some
awakening and who decide to move from the thought process to action. Jesus,
one of the greatest revolutionaries
..., taught that it starts in your heart and in your
mind and then translates itself into action and the Apostle James said ‘faith with-
out work is dead and work without faith is dead.’”
Moving from the Particular to the Universal
Just as there is no social or political action that is not motivated by our caring,
there is no deep or profound moral learning that is informed by reason detached from car-
ing, even if it is only the care of self that informs us. The problem with self-serving
rational precepts, however, is not simply their insular, inherently divisive character; it is
their corresponding inability to move us from the particular to the general, from the indi-
vidual to the community, the polity, or beyond, except by the logic of contract or treaty,
and the stimulus external threat, internal insecurity, and force. We have known from our
national beginning that our rational political mores require too little of us, asking only for
the soft virtues of common sense and civility in a legal framework of rights and con-
strained individual striving. Moreover, as the most powerful manipulators and free-riders
within our enlightened political and economic architecture have long since learned, equal-
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ity, reciprocity, toleration, trust, civility, and legal constraint within a rule of law are in-
strumental^ important, but only to a self-defined point within an ever shifting
circumstantial radius. Accordingly, it should not surprise us that those who benefit most
from their observance by others are so often the most vociferous in their expressions of
care about their preservation. Whenever stress cracks appear in the thin veneer of our
rational morality, revealing the authentic underbelly of overly legitimated self-striving
and its inherent indifference to others, benefactors and servants of the status quo take to
their bully pulpits to issue passionate calls for repairs and restoration.
How is it that core actors are so different in the apparent nature of their moral
thought and the obvious dissimilarities of their action? The initial answer is that they are
not, at least at the beginning of life. As with each of us they have a basic desire to make
sense of life - to discern some coherence of meaning and purpose - and the undeveloped
capacity to move from the particular to the general in order to comprehend the nature of
the world in relationship to themselves.
The difference lies in the methods that they are taught or, despite their teaching,
learn to rely upon, and in the particular capacities that they utilize for doing so. As a re-
sult, they are able to move from the particulars of self and the seemingly fragmented,
isolated world of facts and segregated experience that we all begin with to a unified
world-view - a faithfully refracted image of a world that is constituted by a self that is
radically free in the sense of conventional constraints, yet deeply, intimately connected to
other selves and things.
As accounts of their lives reveal, core actors achieve their inclusive world per-
spective by the following epistemological means: repeated experience consisting of
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witnessing, purposive action, and direct or unmediated encounter; the critical input of in-
tellectual learning that furnishes factual connections, depth, and texture to life as they
experience and reflect on it; recurrent profound reflection or more subtle growing aware-
ness that includes the attachment of care to what they have experienced, witnessed, and
more formally learned; and the employment of morally rich imagination
- profound in-
ferences - which allow them to comprehend and attach care to the world and those
within it who lie beyond their direct reach.
What they come to learn as a result informs, broadens, and strengthens their ca-
pacity to care, arms them with the optimism that comes from a core of certain knowledge
thus obtained, and moves them to plan and act in ways that are intended to demonstrate,
persuade and awaken others to what they have learned. It is not only their agenda of so-
cial and political reform that matters, but the foundational lessons or truths that they have
drawn from life, and the manner in which they conceive of and live life, that constitute
the crux of their reform potential. They offer us not only their insights, but their exam-
ples of lives well-lived.
Experience and Conventional Learning
As parents, we have long since sought not only to protect our children by shield-
ing them from certain experiences, but also to morally inform them and impart life skills
through selecting and encouraging certain others. Many of us make them go to church,
temple, and mosque, even as we question their doctrines and our own beliefs. We moni-
tor their education, send them to camp, enroll them in purposeful, structured activities,
limit their friendships, and attempt with little success to control their access to at least
some of the excesses of mass culture.
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As is now apparent, the parents of core activists strive do the same. In some
cases, such as that of John B., his parents, themselves powerfully informed and working
to persuade others, were able to deal with the contradictions posed by our dominant
world-view by daily exposing their child to their own lives, including their authentic, car-
ing interactions with others. In addition, there was his schooling, both in the classroom
and in his crafted broad exposure to conditions of injustice and human indifference. The
latter experience, most significantly, included the opportunity to know actual persons
within these conditions. He further learned the value of modem means of rational
thought along with their respective and overall limits.
In sum, he learned that the world was usefully understood in discrete terms by the
various rational means of classification, quantification, and deconstruction. At the same
time, he was exposed to the concepts and practices of an inclusive, integrated world-
image, together with social and political ideals that were commensurate with such a
world. Of equal importance, rather than merely reconstructing the factual components of
the world into a complex, abstract, depersonalized set of processes and systems, he was
encouraged to experience the identity and worth of actual lives of others whom he di-
rectly encountered within it.
John was initially informed in a moral tradition that stands in opposition to our
conventional cultural institutional models. He was raised in a pattern of nonconformity -
not for the sake of self-expressive liberty, but for sake of learning by experience what one
can only discover in that realm - the reality, agency, and power of our individual and
common humanity. He was nurtured into becoming an active, vital citizen in an inter-
connected world with both a critical perspective and deeply caring, life-affirming
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connections to a wide variety of others within it. By the time John left ‘home’ he was
already at home wherever he went. As Jane Addams had discovered as a young adult, he
became more easily aware that the only reliable means of discerning the truth and vitality
of a social or political ideal is by experiencing the potential of human life within its wide
range of actuality.
The same cannot be said of the formative experiences of others in our society who
also come from families of ample or adequate means. In contrast to John’s rearing, they
were lovingly and conventionally encouraged to sleep to indefinitely delayed maturity in
the spirit and structures of the popular peer culture. Their early imaginations and express
curiosity on matters that are profound for all children were responded to with answers
detached from life, left parked outside the self and its ambit of care and responsibility, or
simply unanswered. They learned to be comforted with simple moral resolutions and
with sentient pleasures that could be rented or bought. At the opposite extreme of aggres-
sive nurture, others were sleep-deprived, discouraged from dreaming, distracted by some
hyperactive frenzy of parentally-choreographed preparation to dominate the competition
in their generation. The effect of such rearing on these children has been to largely deny
them the opportunity to become directly familiar with the reality that stimulates our early
spontaneous curiosity and sympathies into progressively deep questioning and moral
growth, not to allow their evolutionary imaginations take them too far from the instru-
mentally self-essential outer worlds of class and privilege, work and consumption,
competition and utility.
For members of either group, adult awakening is almost as difficult as it is for the
chronically life-deprived. In our past, the former group has required the initial interven-
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tion of harsh, disturbing events, or direct confrontation at the hand of core actors, men-
tors, and exemplars that today are too easy to avoid. 13 Fortunately, there are other
opportunities for the stimulus of perspective-expanding experience that are incidental or
accidentally associated with other culturally-endorsed activities. Learning from travel,
such as that of Jane Addams while in London during the 1880s, is one example. Oppor-
tunities for expanding one’s vista, whether for adventure, concentrated pleasure, or
instrumental enrichment abound more widely than ever. However, seeing inhumanity,
whether far away or locally, without directly encountering the actuality of common hu-
manity that frames the universal image, is to experience another form of virtual reality
that can be assimilated without experiencing any unmediated connection to one’s own
existence or lifestyle. We have long since learned to travel in peer group cocoons and to
otherwise isolating ourselves as we seek high adventure. It is testimony to the tenacity of
inherent youthful idealism that it still survives to maturity in such morally non-nurturing
environs.
John B’s nurturing was exceptional, a model worthy of much wider emulation.
From a youthful, individual perspective, however, none of us is able to order the sequence
of our moral development, our respective 'sequence’ of formative life experience. Fortu-
nately, those of us who were rudely introduced to the world, like some of those
mentioned herein, can find, seemingly by instinct, or fortuitously ‘run into’ capable men-
tors and further learn how to awaken themselves. They can do so on the combined
strength of our human need to understand and our capacities to learn and deeply compre-
hend. In the same manner, those of us who have been induced into moral developmental
slumber, or distracted by some variant of instrumental frenzy, can also learn to wake up.
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Our current deep-seated unease, containing much more than mortal anxiety, is evidence
of our unfocused desire and potential to become vitally engaged with life . 14
Reflection and Awareness
It is our capacity to reflect, to consciously contemplate or to bring to the surface
our more gradual, less conscious awareness, and to integrate by these means what we
have experienced and less directly learned that affords us moments of profound or deep
insight. It is from what is realized or known in these moments that care is most deeply
attached, priorities are most readily assigned, and our capacity to act most durably
strengthened by profound motive. We awaken, or further awaken, to truths that the world
- life itself — offers in both the elemental and complex qualities of its being.
For some ot us, our awareness does not surface — become apparent to the self
—
until we find ourselves in circumstances when we feel compelled to act without our cus-
tomary concern for what others are doing, how they may react, or other evidence of our
customary self-concern. Where we have been more gradually, affectionately nurtured, we
enter adulthood already somewhat awake, in the fortunate manner of John B. and, to a
lesser extent, Frances Crowe, Gail K., and Karen P. For them, such moments are more
likely to be those of recurring and further awakening - a renewed or enhanced awareness
of organic congruence of self and life more broadly.
Acts of contemplation and the stimulation of conscious awareness are necessary
throughout one’s life for three inescapable reasons: first
,
we inevitably fail to maintain by
purposeful action our congruence with life, however deeply and intentionally we have
experienced and come to know it; second
,
even our most profound insights are fleeting
and incomplete, received in a world where they are easily lost, along with care, in the de-
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trims of destructive, exclusive visions and events beyond our grasp; and third, given our
imperfect nature, such knowledge is durable and progressive in its effects, whether indi-
vidually, socially, or politically, only for so long as we continue in our efforts to
intentionally act, experience, reflect, imagine, and adjust our action to better match what
we have since learned. Recurrent knowing, renewed caring, and intentional acting, each
of necessity informing the other, constitute the necessary rhythm of a life lived at the full
reach of human capacity.
Our variety of birth inheritance, acculturation, and particular life history is too
broad to allow for a single explanation of how the process of moral knowing unfailingly
occurs. All that can be said with any certainly is that it does happen. The process is nei-
ther entirely intellectual, nor entirely cognitive, intuitive, aesthetic, or emotional. Yet it is
the only means that reveals to us results that become the core of one’s moral knowledge,
deeply inform care for others and the self, are readily sharable, and furnish the ontological
framework of morally informed social and political action that is deeply persuasive to
others. The only common denominators of such knowledge, apart from its content, is that
it is derived from active authentic engagement with others, and from other repeated direct
encounters with life itself.
Jean Grossholtz, introduced in the first chapter, offers a rich version of the above
epistemological composite. Of the contemporary core actors interviewed, her broad
moral methodology was the most extensive and seemingly incongruous. Her intellectual
nature, her patent brilliance, is easy for anyone schooled in the high cultural tier of the
enlightenment tradition to comprehend. Yet, she is a rare combination of gifted scholar
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and wide-ranging peace, social justice, and environmental activist - a powerful gadfly
with brilliant, multi-hued, epistemological wings.
Her academic intellectual-direct action anomaly is heightened by her elemental
descriptions and expressions of the moral and the good. It should be noted that “moral”
is not a word that she is comfortable with. She associates it with institutional religions
and their general tendency to reach out into the world from their customary inward stance,
and then only when changing values in the broader society threaten institutional preserva-
tion.
15
Jean’s preferred terms are “right” and “wrong,” “makes sense” and “makes no
sense, and, occasionally, what I want and “what I don’t want.” One suspects that she
rarely couches her social and political views in the enervating comfort of “that depends.”
The anomaly is removed when one recognizes that she has discovered a coherent
world of vital interconnection, a world that contains “the natural harmony” of place and
of “people living together.” Widely informed and keenly mindful of existential reality,
she further explained her world in its teleological form: “.
. .the kind of world I want to
live in ... If I say ‘This is the kind of world I want to live in' ... it is a world where no
baby is bom unwanted, no baby is ever without food, clothing, shelter, healthcare. I want
to live in a world like that.” For her it is also a real world
,
one that she and others strug-
gle to create in the midst of contradiction, one that she has worked full-time since
adolescence to further instill and expand. It is a world informed by fundamental, pro-
found, simple, and certain truths.
Jean’s apparent existential incongruity - her non-conformity with conventional
expectations in worlds maintained by others - is also the partial product of actual life cir-
cumstance. Growing up as one of eight siblings in a small rural farm community in
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northeastern Pennsylvania, her youthful, intensely curious mind craved information. Like
her activist colleague, Gail K. she is “a reading addict.” Referring to her sizeable office,
where the interview took place, she described the origins of her habit: “In the town I grew
up in, the library was not much bigger than this room. I started at ‘A’ and read it all.
.
Some of the stuff I never understood. I mean, I [would] tell people, when I was talking
about my life, that I loved this book called ‘Less Miserable’.” Summing up her reasons
for reading, she added a further explanation for her identification with Victor Hugo’s
novel, however its title is pronounced: “So I read a lot, and [as a result] I had some un-
derstanding of different worlds that I could live in because my world was so miserable all
the time.”
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there was much for Jean to be miserable about. They
were poor. Her father, a generous dreamer with a compassionate nature, but not a practi-
cal provider for his large family (“He did his best”), left them with the farm and their first
crop unharvested, to enlist in the merchant marine. 16 She was then thirteen, the oldest of
three siblings still at home. When her mother had a nervous breakdown in the stressful
aftermath, Jean learned to care for all of them, including speaking for the family in court
where she “lied about her age [and said she] had a job” to keep her younger sister from
being removed from their family. She was enabled in this formidable task by the fact that
her own capacity to care had already been nurtured in a family which, although far from
idyllic, was full of concern and affection for children and strangers that was acted upon,
not simply expressed.
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After high school, she worked locally for a while, helping to support her family
until the two younger children had further matured, and her mother had regained her
health and remarried. At that point, she broadened her horizons beyond her home and the
contents of its library by enlisting in the Army, thinking that she would advance her edu-
cation, although she was not eligible for the G.I. bill when she signed up. Elaborating on
her military experience, she explained:
“Despite all the other things that people say about the Army, it was a good experi-
ence for me. I learned a lot. I learned how to take care of myself. I learned how to
have respect for people, how to have people have respect for me. I learned disci-
pline, I learned order, I learned a lot .”
Jean also demonstrated that she had already learned a great deal at home. At one
point she was assigned to teach short classes on current events to sister recruits:
“They gave you a piece of paper containing what you were supposed to teach. So
I kind of started then. We would have discussions about the ownership of prop-
erty, about trade unionism and stuff. The Army didn’t like that much, so they
[removed her from the assignment]. They actually interviewed me to see if I was
a communist, which in some ways I probably was...”
What she had not yet explained was that her youthful reading had included such
authors as Dos Passos and Steinbeck. By imaginative reflection on their narrative con-
texts and characters, and comparing them to her own experience, she found herself
mentally and emotionally connected to a larger world and with an expanded grasp of just
and unjust, humane and inhumane.
Moral Imagination
Imagination, as Jean learned early on, is the means available to all of us to extend
our intellectual and other forms of knowledge beyond the reach of our immediate experi-
ence. It is much more than detached, freely floating dreaming or cerebral ideation,
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although such forms are valuable and potentially informative. Moral imagination - imag-
ining that is applied to matters of profound import - is an essential means in the process
of knowing and caring, a further conjoining of mind and heart in both the singular and the
plural sense. The world is simply too large to directly experience or adequately witness,
let alone completely organize. Paradoxically, however, even our imagination can enlarge
our world reliably only to the same depth and extent that we have come to experience and
know it in our immediate circumstances.
Communitarians are correct in their emphasis on the importance of “face-to-face”
relationships in our moral and ethical formation, although often not on the process of
deep moral learning itself. 17 If, for instance, we learn in our intimate and local relations
within our liberal republican communities to regard all people, or only certain people as
objects in our intimate, familiar surroundings, that is how we are predisposed to imagine
them in the world we can reach through books and other informing media. The most
powerfully emotive, evocatively descriptive literature fails to stir the passion its author
intended if it has not been first aroused in, or at least witnessed in another by the self.
Lacking that connection, the most that we can derive is factual information and perhaps
transient, instinctual sympathetic feeling. Fortunately, most of us can gain by adult ex-
perience what was imperfectly or negatively furnished in childhood, and can develop the
capacity to employ our imagination accordingly.
By the deployment of imagination we are able to form vital hypotheses about the
world on the basis of certain knowledge and profound caring already in the possession of
the self. When one reads, for example, some description of physically distant facts of
hunger or courageous moral action, one can imagine the actors caring for each other as
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one has learned to care and acting as one has acted or seen others act. Just as valuably,
we are able to take in the description of their caring and associated action, compare it to
our own inner feelings and aspirations - our personal moral imagining - and comprehend
that because the former is actual, our own ideations are possible. It was in this manner
that Frederick Douglass experienced freedom before he was able to gain it . 18
If a distant account conveys the pathos and world view of its actors, a pathos and
perspective that have been at least awakened in one’s own experience, it can be broad-
ened, deepened, and further awakened. With more effort, one can even discern caring
and human or environmental consequences in non-emotive, impersonally presented, and
otherwise distant data. In our imagining via any of the foregoing instruments, we are able
to attach value to the place and to the actors within it, seeing them as part of a common
process of striving to live fully and well in a world that becomes both larger and smaller
in the process. Imagination enables us to know life more broadly and to infer the exis-
tence of certain and universal truths. As such, it is an indispensable, although less
reliable and powerful form of encountering the world and others within it . 19
Imagination is the process that allowed Jean to enter the larger world before she
left home. She had also read about the black experience in America. Having had little
contact with African Americans, she welcomed the opportunity to do so in Truman's
newly integrating Army. While stationed in Virginia, she went with two black female
enlisted friends at her post to their house for dinner:
“And the next morning, my commanding officer called me in and said I was never
to do that again ... not in Virginia ... And I was ready to go AWOL [until her CO]
talked to the [two] women, and they talked to me. They said Took, we could have
all gotten killed. We didn’t think.’ And that was it, but it was hard for me...”
303
As she continued, she expressed more fully the extent to which her knowledge
and caring acquired through experience, learning, reflection, growing awareness, and
imagination has affected the course of her life: “You see, my problem has always been,
when people say to me, ‘how can you live your life like this [as an activist], how can you
spend so much of your time doing these [things]?’ My answer to them is ‘How can I
not?’” Jean has clearly discovered a world that is vital in its actuality - in its furnishing
and confirmation of certain truths, and in her own extensive efforts to awaken the rest of
us to comprehend and help achieve what she and too few others have so well learned.
Encountering Truth
Two important questions remain to be discussed: Assuming that the methods of
moral learning are as varied as described, how are we able to discern the quality of certain
truth in the knowledge that is obtained? Finally, within the limited scope of what can be
profoundly learned - without involving the divisiveness of some institutionalized, tradi-
tional leap from mortal curiosity to detailed faith - what are these truths?
The answer to the first question is by virtue of repeated intimate or unmediated
encounters with its sources. Encounter is the most profound aspect of our capacity to
know, yet it is an event or occurrence that we often do not consciously discern until after
it has happened. As noted in Chapter 1
,
the bush does not burst into flame for most of us,
particularly in our hyper-enlightened mindset and setting. Like a physicist testing in the
world of matter for some invisible energy, for proof that it exists, that something pro-
found in our state of knowing has happened becomes apparent to us most often when we
reflect on, contemplate, or simple become aware of its results in the self. We recognize a
changed attitude; a deeper, more informed caring; an awakened sense of enhanced and
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broadened relationship to the world, to others, or both; a more complete, integrated mean-
ing to life. As in the physicist’s attempt to indirectly demonstrate the presence of
invisible matter by some evidence of an altered state in a given substance, the results be-
come socially and politically evident only in our own rare, exceptional action, and in the
more frequent, otherwise inexplicable actions of morally informed core actors.
If there is a coherence within a generation and over time to the action of a diverse
group of morally informed core actors, and a set of beliefs that similarly inform their ca-
pacity to care and to act, that fusion, alongside the diversity of the actors themselves,
should encourage us to consider the possibility of a commonly accessible, powerful
means of knowing the full nature of the self, the maximally knowable nature of others
and the world, and the most vital connections among the three. Further, to be sharable as
profound truth, any truths that such a form of knowing affords must be directly and com-
monly verifiable at their source - in the concrete world of life itself. In other words, we
must be capable of discovering them for ourselves. Inescapably, human ontological
truths must, to some extent at least, be existential, real, actual - already evident in the
world. There are no shareable answers to the “why” of the human life that lay outside the
currently knowable world . -0 Someone, therefore, must have already initiated the forms of
individual, social and political action that our capacity to encounter reveals as authentic
and pragmatic expressions of truth in those realms.
Finally, to the extent that such truths undergird the possibility of moral progress
versus mere change, they must be profound enough so that enough others can be sooner
or later persuaded to encounter them and experience their certainty for themselves by
their own caring action.
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To engage in encounters in our lives, and to discern their occurrence in other lives
that we know of, including the lives of core actors, requires an open mind and a receptive
heart in no given order. One must be prepared to directly and authentically confront, en-
gage with the world as it is and others as. they are, of their own nature and in actual
relation to us. The only additional requirements are a reservoir of commonly accessible
knowledge and caring from experience and reflection, supplemented with other learning
and imagination. As has been extensively suggested, these are qualities that all but the
most deprived can develop and at least occasionally utilize, even in the powerful atom-
istic conformity of our culture.
An encounter can be further thought of as a process that reveals fundamental
truth, a proposition, an image, or a sense, which, by its self-evident meaning, is inclusive
in its subject matter and universal in its applicability. One cannot discover the reality of
love or deep friendship - let alone their qualities as universal goods - except in an au-
thentic, unmediated relationship. It is the last stage of moral induction: we become aware
of something in a moment that contains our self and some it, or self and some other[s],
that briefly identifies both as related within in some larger existing whole. It is the ex-
perience of an unmediated relationship in the local and the particular that informs the self
of a larger, more encompassing reality.
The process of encounter differs from an intellectual breakthrough leading to
some higher level of abstraction or a mental inspiration that leads to some new invention.
Neither is it the overwhelming emotional rush of some new or renewed passion, whatever
its form and however concretely of diffusely directed. It is a state or condition of pro-
found awareness - of certain knowing - that the world and our worlds, your life and mine
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are separate yet alike, part of some vital common enterprise, existing in a realm of unified
explanation, or possessing the same essential quality of life. Why else, we need to ask
ourselves and each other, would someone, anyone, act beyond impulse to rescue a
stranger from extermination or a runaway from re-enslavement, or initiate some risk-
laden, other regarding, non-conforming, authentic social or political act, unless they had
encountered some profound truth that somehow trumped the magnitude of one’s own life
or well-being?
To encounter truth is not an out of body or otherworldly, mystical occurrence, al-
though, when we realize that it has happened, we react with wonder, awe, amazement,
and other expressions of deep caring. We also experience the obligation to act, having
obtained a powerful motivation to do so. Accordingly, it is no wonder that in our culture,
the experiences of encounter are effectively banned from public social and political dis-
course, authoritatively labeled as subjective, emotive, and divisive. Profound truth in our
society, we have been taught, is predicated by the human condition of mortality and mor-
tal needs, reliably civilized only by institutions, and therefore cannot be widely known or
shared, except by inculcation and coercion. Yet encounters occur, and the common truths
they reveal, are of critical import, but only if they can be shared and others awakened, in-
vited, and encouraged to encounter truth for themselves.
It is our capacity to encounter, to authentically, directly relate with and to at least
some of what we experience and otherwise learn about life that enables us to know life
most deeply, and to at least glimpse at its common underlying truths. It is a moment of
profound experience - of direct relation and connection of the known self with what and
who is already there and possible, but until then was unknown and therefore only objec-
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live and instrumental. As Martin Buber observed: “Those who [only] experience do not
participate in the world. For the experience is ‘in them' and not between them and the
world .” 21 We can only encounter truth - the actual nature of the world of things and oth-
ers by reciprocal, active, authentic engagement - by actively taking in the physical world
in all of its known aspects, accepting them as they are in relation to each other and the
self, and by presenting our full, genuinely disclosed selves to others and by accepting the
same from them. It should not surprise us that morally informed action and persuasion
have the same qualities as an encounter with truth.
Two Examples of Encounter
Although the historical and contemporary core actors that are relied upon in this
project were chosen for other reasons, they demonstrate a variety of forms of encounters
and express a common, expandable core of certain truth. They confirm Buber’s observa-
tion of three realms of relationship in which encounters are sought: in life with nature, life
with others, and life with “spiritual beings .”22 He is not suggesting that the world is or-
ganized in this manner, only, one suspects, that we have mentally arranged it this way in
western culture. If there is a God or a single creative, purposive explanation for ourselves
and the world, he believes that the answer, to the limited extent that we can discern it, lies
within our capacity to encounter truth in relationships with nature or with others. The
discovery of innate or certain truth, as already suggested, does not present itself to pass-
ers-by, but, as in the sub-realm of politics, only to those who place themselves, as the
necessary price of freedom, “into the public realm” where they must relate authentically
and reciprocally with others if they are to experience truth and instantiate it by demon-
strating its content to others .
23
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Jean Grossholtz is fortunate to have experienced life and to have discerned truth
in both nature and society. As a result she is attached intimately to life in its particulars
and in general. As mentioned in the first chapter, she seeks to encounter life daily in na-
ture, going for walks in the woods with her dog. She brings life with her, and relates
there to life as it offers itself back to her, harmoniously, relating with no evident effort on
the part of either. What she encounters invites her into a relationship that is more entire
than what she directly perceives - the suggestion of an organically related whole to which
she is somehow intimately related. It seems to her that this is the natural relation of hu-
mankind to the world, given what she has learned about herself, other people, and the
world more broadly. She is aware that death is inevitable in both realms, but that man
has learned to kill beyond the needs of the physical self, as opposed to those left to then-
lesser nature. She cares deeply about this and the plethora of other evidence of our
alienation from nature. Her regular encounters both inform and sustain her current full-
time efforts to do something about it.
Upon returning to "her estate,” which she owns alone but has lived in with be-
tween twenty and thirty other women for many years since she reluctantly accepted the
contradictory practice of ownership, she re-enters the realm of human interrelationship.
Her household is part her intentional effort to add to the human realm the actual experi-
ence of authentic democratic encounter. Unlike the realm she just left, it is often in much
greater visible disarray, due entirely to the nature of its occupants. Jean reflected on this
in the following:
“People say, well ‘How can you do that? You have all these different people...
Over the years, I think we’ve had two people I’ve had to ask to leave because they
didn’t fit in. There was no way we could do it. But what I’ve had to do is how to
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live with different people. And we all have to. We have to figure out every time
something changes in the house, ... the new dynamic, what makes sense, and how
to work with it. So we do. And it’s a logical, practical way of living together in
community. We can’t set up a model that will go through time. Each time we get
different personalities and we’ve got to work with it. I guess there are certain ba-
sic principles - sort of morals, I guess - that have to be there. People have to be
kind to each other; they have to be caring for each other
. . . respectful of each
other.... So there are certain standards, but to me, it’s a practical thing. It’s prac-
tical and it’s logical.”
Her sororal living arrangement and her sororal and fraternal relationships in her
activism and professional life are each the product of and part of the process by which she
has encountered truth in the social and political realms. It is apparent that she is keenly
aware of human nature - her own and others’. As she, Douglass, Stanton, Debs, and Ad-
dams each expressed, we are flawed, far from perfect, and therefore carry within us the
potential for evil as well as for good ."4 Most of us have an abiding, ontologically-rooted
preference for the latter and profoundly wish to live in a world where our predilection for
good prevails. Such a world, she understands with Buber, can be created only in an ac-
tual context where authentic relationships are difficult to establish and must coexist with
practical ones, and where truth must be demonstrated in action that is almost never en-
tirely free of contradiction.
Her intimate relation with nature, the “special sense of belonging” that she experi-
ences in diverse locations, together with her rich acquired learning, imagination, and deep
caring, inform her that the concrete world she has not yet been in and others whom she
can not reach or directly engage with are part of a common reality. Just as with Stanton,
Douglass, and Addams, she confronts but cares for those who disagree with her, or who
are willing, as with many of her faculty colleagues, to only privately express their admira-
tion and respect.
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Learning in our time the truths that are so evident and palpable to Jean and most
of those interviewed can only effectively happen through the initiatory action of those,
like her, who have already discovered their content and motive strength. Given the nature
of the truths she has derived from her daily, recurring encounters, one thing is abundantly
clear: she will not risk the world or life itself in order to save it. Thus, morally informed
core actors can typically be seen at work, from a conventional ‘realist's’ perspective, with
one hand tied behind their backs - the hand of violent coercion. Persuasive confrontation
is quite a different thing.
Many core actors derive their truths largely or entirely from the sphere of human
relationship. This is true, for example, of Ira H., the physician activist introduced with
Jean Grossholtz in Chapter 1. Ira has spent his life caught up in the realm of human in-
teraction. Accordingly, it is apparent from his decades-long actions to confront
Americans, Russians, and others with the magnitude of risks and consequences — the
moral evil - of nuclear weapons, that he is motivated by truth derived from encounters
with others, and secondarily by the natural world. He has learned to care most deeply, to
relate most profoundly with people. It is not that he is ignorant concerning the natural
world or unconcerned for its welfare. It is rather that his deepest experiences have been
with others. Like Gail K. his Jewish heritage and knowledge of the Jewish historical ex-
perience has strongly informed his world-view and caring, along with intimate, loving
relationships within family and among intimate friends. Religious institutions and others,
are formative, essential, and indispensible, and in any event an inherent expression of the
human condition.
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In particular, Ira demonstrates that encounter with others does not lead to the in-
evitable discovery of joyful, centripetal truth; in fact, it often does not. Along with the
realization of common humanity comes the awareness of stupendous evil, behavior ren-
dered more horrific by its sheer magnitude, and the banality of its perpetration. 25 As
described in his initial introduction, his first encounter with this truth occurred in the set-
ting of a loving relationship with his father, a Holocaust survivor. Since establishing this
intimate connection with evil he has worked to understand and confront it ever since.
He has most powerfully learned the nature of modem evil - the routine ordering
of society and the state into systems whose participants are capable of performing por-
tions of the otherwise unimaginable as their legitimated daily routine. He further knows
that he is potentially implicated, capable in his own evolved nature and in America, his
country of birth, of “being a good German,” or permitting one’s self to live in the midst of
inhuman contradiction - without acting to ameliorate it. Ira H. is powerfully awake to
our capacity for evil
,
and its enlightenment and older historical roots. Yet he shares, de-
tectable within his reserved, carefully measured words, the assessment of Jean
Grossholtz, and almost all of those interviewed, of our general essential goodness:
“I do think that human character is at least significantly determined by our evolu-
tion [or] history. People clearly have important needs that need to be satisfied and
the satisfaction of those needs often puts them in conflict with other people, and
the competitiveness to get ahead, to stay alive, to feed yourself, to have that piece
of land which will let you and your family live well - 1 think that stuff is very
deeply ingrained in people too. But most people, I think, in trying to meet those
needs, are capable of behaving humanely and with consideration to the people
around them.... For most people the initial response to other people is positive.”
In common with many men, especially those with his rigorous intellectual and
scientific training, Ira does not speak easily and fluently to strangers about matters of car-
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mg °r the heart ‘ Neither did James M. or John B. However, he clearly knows, as do they,
that people are capable of experiencing, encountering each other, and growing in their
understanding of truth through love, intimate friendship, and the sometimes uncomfort-
able, awkward, agonistic practice of fraternal and sororal democratic relationship.
It is this further awareness, that not only he, but most of us can experience such
intimacy and acquire profound knowledge in the process, melding self-care with morally
congruent action and candid, powerful self-knowledge, which further informs, sustains,
and renews him. His work has enabled him to profoundly relate with others across na-
tional, cultural, and ideological borders in the common international project of nuclear
disarmament. As first quoted, his core value, his highest integrating truth is: “Human life
is good. That is what it is all about.’ Finally, given his intimate awareness of the causes
and consequences of nuclear war, he is cognizant of the most fundamentally realizable
truth of modernity. There is but one earth and a single, common humanity within it. He
only hopes that he can help deepen this awareness in others before it is too late.
Summarizing the True and the Good
Each of us starts life outside the womb, in America or elsewhere in the world,
with a varied genetic reservoir of learned human experience. We are the products of still
dimly understood evolution, a process of ongoing creation that we are unable to grasp at
all without a belief in some kind of beginning. By definition, we cannot imagine, let
alone live or achieve progress in a world whose core organizing principle is either infinity
or chaos - or self.
Such a world holds no potential shared meaning, and no possibility of common
purpose. Fortunately, infinity and chaos are the province of only a few minds seeking
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existential truth by non-existential means
- pure reason employed from an inherently un-
achievable omni-perspective. So it is with the rational possibility of nonbeing. As a truth
it has no verifiable reality from the only place where its existence can be known - in life
itself. In fact, such empirical evidence as exists suggests the dynamic constancy of some
entirety of being, if one is informed to include more than the human domain in one’s con-
templation.
As a metaphor for the post-death unknown, nonbeing serves mostly to remind us
of our mortal anxiety and encourages us to lean on an external God - one we cannot
know - or upon the courage of an isolated self that we cannot always depend upon to as-
sign its own meaning. If there is a comprehensive purpose or meaning that can
potentially be known, its content is knowable only in the conditions of our existence and
by the means of our capacity to learn and to know, attaching moral significance to what
we learn by caring, and acting - spreading and instilling the word by defining justice and
decrying injustice, and by living the truths we have learned, even as we continue our ef-
forts to expand our learning.
Our acquired legacy at birth serves as further evidence that we have become and
developed as a species on the strength of what we have learned from experience, from
intended action, from direct engagement with life. “ In its primal, inherited forms such
learning is evident in our physical features, our instinctive behaviors, and in our cognition
- the things that pediatricians assess when we are bom and monitor as we progress to-
ward adulthood. There is also evidence of much that we are constantly in the process of
unlearning: our reactive tempers, our tail bones, our tendencies to fight or flight, and
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other vestigial behavioral and physical evidence that reminds us that our evolution is on-
going.
We are indeed fortunate to have been bom in a country where so much of our spe-
cie s recent learning and unlearning has occurred. Enlightenment man is indeed an
improvement over the previous vertically segmented social and political model, and mod-
em Communitarian man has a less localized heart than his still evident traditional
forebears. Most of the time, both harbor a gentle disposition that is predisposed to see the
basic good in most others, and to generously include some of those formerly excluded
from the country and the neighborhood, the workplace and the state.
We are now, in general, further able to somewhat deduce that those in other cate-
gories of humanity - national, ethnic, racial, and gender - are entirely human and
significantly interdependent, although we are still getting used to the assertive presence of
those who have arrived here more recently (or much earlier) than ourselves. We are also
are familiar with the physics, chemistry, and biology of other living things, the material
world, and their overall instrumental as well as sentimental importance to our lives. Our
public policy concerns and our polling data confirm our growing factual awareness that
the world with us, other humans, other life-forms, and resources within it are all part of a
common rational puzzle whose many parts may somehow constitute a complete, inte-
grated picture.
What remains unchanged, apart form the vastly greater amount of factual and
practical knowledge we have acquired and variously stored, is our undying fear of death
our consequential need to protect, comfort, and enhance the self. As already discussed in
a number of ways, our mortal self-absorption, and our related false depiction of our natu-
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ral and fallen condition, have combined to effectively block the possibility of our gamer-
ing from each other and from life, the profound knowledge, the simple core truths that
rationalism, thus informed, can only weakly identify.
We are blessed to have morally informed core actors in our midst. It is not that
they are flawless prophets, apostles, or certain architects of our redemption. What they
have demonstrated for us in our past, what they are striving to exhibit in our midst, is a
fuller, richer, more robust version of ourselves, both alone and in social and political con-
cert. Their actions are intended to stir us from our sleep, attract us from our distraction,
to confront us with their open invitation to relate with them and to encounter for our-
selves what they already know:
• The world and life within it is interrelated, a single, still mysterious, precious, and
wonderful whole;
• While we are basically good and capable of becoming better, we each possess the
capacity to intend and commit both lesser harm and catastrophic evil;
• Neither others, nor the self, nor the world can be adequately experienced and
known, let alone lived in, by rational means;
• Profound social and political knowing and caring can only come from authentic,
democratic engagement with others, including the self-evident practices of frater-
nity and sorority;
• To undertake such learning, we have to go out into the world in the manner sug-
gested by Addams, and otherwise learn and imagine what we cannot directly
experience;
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• Discernible moral progress is the result of the initiation of authentic social and po-
litical action that is informed by the above truths, motivated by the deep caring
that attends them;
• Authentic action can be initiated and sustained in the liberal republican realm that
it has helped to produce, or in any other; moreover, it has succeeded, and can suc-
ceed again; it can do so because the knowledge and caring that inform and
support it are generally accessible, shareable, and powerfully persuasive;
• Knowing, caring, and acting, in the manner that morally informed core actors
demonstrate is possible, is the way of life that all of us must aspire to adopt to the
full extent of our varied talents and potential, and impart to others.
As Jean Grossholtz said in a recent address to a graduating class at her college, “It
always starts this way, with one or two, this fight for justice, for equality.” She con-
cluded, as does this effort, with the following: “I can tell you this, there is joy in the
struggle, in putting your whole self behind your deepest passions, in marching with [oth-
ers] for justice. But let that struggle be your own [as well]. Resist compromise, and don’t
take anything lying down.” It takes that kind of informed passion, and the strength of the
action it informs, to ultimately persuade and move others to reverently, humbly, and cou-
rageously participate in the further creation of both America and the world.
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